5; 27 Utah 1, 73 P. 886; 86 Ark. 481, 111 S.W. 470; 98 S.E.2d 716; 201 Fed. 489, 119 C.C.A. 581; 111 Ark. 399, 163 S.W. 1177, L.R.A. 1915C 302, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 933; 69 Ark. 545, 64 S.W. 268; 163 Iowa 123, 142 N.W. 948; 91 Kan. 653, 138 P. 410, 51 L.R.A.N. S. 286; 32 S. 915; 177 S.W. 371; 218 N.Y. 1161, 112 N.E. 733, L.R.A. 1916F; 6 Okla. Cr. 398, 119 P. 139; 26 Philippine 503; 44 Tex. 642; 75 Tex. Cr. 110, 170 S.W. 739; 57 Tex. Cr. 605, 124 S.W. 661; 51 Wn. 372, 98 P. 741; 37 Tex. Cr. 339, 39 S.W. 935; 103 Indiana 142, 2 N.E. 349; 121 Mo. 604, 26 S.W. 364; 201 Fed. 489, 119 C.C.A. 581; 51 Wn. 372, 989 P. 741; 17 F.2d 973; 48 S.Ct. 20, 275 U.S. 527, 72 L.Ed. 408; 61 F. Supp. 919; 36 So.2d 897, 251 Ala. 314; 336 P.2d 169, 51 C.2d 751; 90 So.2d 704; 185 So. 625, 135 Fla. 548, 120 A.L.R. 742; 247 S.W. 376, 197 Ky. 416; 342 P.2d 1052, 135 Mont. 580; 112 N.E. 733, 218 N.Y. 161, L.R.A. 1916F, 1044; 113 N.E. 1064, 218 N.Y. 702; 71 N.Y.S.2d 830, 189 Misc. 602; 149 S.W.2d 96, 141 Tex. Cr. 456; 54 S.W.2d 515, 122 Tex. Cr. 171; 244 S.W. 1014, 92 Tex. Cir. 523; 200 S.W. 842, 82 Tex. Cer. 634; 98 S.E.2d 817, 199 Va. 184; 70 S.E.2d 293, 193 Va. 612; 73 S.Ct. 177, 344 U.S. 880, 97 L.Ed. 681; 73 S.Ct. 278, 344 U.S. 900, 97 L.Ed. 696; 107 P.2d 927, 6 Wn.2d 393; 351 P.2d 209, 67 N.M. 31; 247 S.W. 376, 197 Ky. 416; 69 Ark. 545, 64 S.W. 268; 12 Ga. A. 702, 78 S.E. 268; 193 Ill. A. 291; 218 N.Y. 161, 112 N.E. 733, L.R.A. 1916F, 1044; 42 Tex. Cr. 176, 58 S.W. 131; 131 Fed. 378; 193 Ill. A. 291; 42 Tex. Cr. 176, 58 S.W. 131; 24 F.2d 82; 82 S.Ct. 643; 177 S.E. 318, 174 S.C. 344; 194 S.E. 11, 185 S.C. 274; 22 S.E.2d 417, 201 S.C. 170; 145 S.E.2d 15, 246 S.C. 575; 22 S.E. 274. As to the Court's erring in failingto ascertain the facts constituting the acts for which thepleas were taken: 247 S.C. 475, 151 S.E.2d 221; 89 S.Ct. 1709. Philip Wingard, Esq., Sol. of Greenville, for Respondent. July 8, 1971.
R., 51 S.W.2d 359; Douglas v. State (1932), 122 Tex.Crim. R., 54 S.W.2d 515; Schwartz v. State (1941), 141 Tex.Crim. R., 149 S.W.2d 96; Powell v. Commonwealth (1922), 133 Va. 741, 112 S.E. 657, 33 A.L.R. 541; Hodnett v. City of Danville (1929), 152 Va. 955, 146 S.E. 281; State v. Elliott (1940), 6 Wn.2d 393, 107 P.2d 927.
In Branch's Ann. Texas P. C., page 131, it is said: "Where an inculpatory witness makes affidavit after verdict that he or she testified falsely or was mistaken as to an important inculpatory fact a new trial should be granted." In support of the text many authorities are cited, among them being Mann v. State, 44 Tex. 642; Brown v. State, 13 Tex.Crim. R.; Heskew v. State, 14 Tex.Crim. R.; McCleavland v. State, 24 Tex. Crim. 202; Zedlitz v. State, 26 S.W. 725; Brown v. State, 42 Tex.Crim. R.; Carter v. State, 170 S.W. 739. See, also, Douglas v. State, 54 S.W.2d 515, and Rhea v. State, 255 S.W. 757. Giving application to the announcement of the decisions, we are constrained to hold that appellant's motion for new trial should have been granted.
It is our opinion that said testimony, together with the unretracted testimony of the witness, is sufficient to support the verdict of the jury. We believe that the case of Green v. State, 252 S.W. 499, and Douglas v. State, 54 S.W.2d 515, have application to a case where the State relies solely upon the retracted testimony for a conviction. Having reached the conclusion that under the facts of this case the trial court did not err in overruling the motion for new trial, the judgment is affirmed.