Opinion
CV 21-7008 CJC (PVC)
01-18-2022
Rajolin Charles Douglas, v. Raymond Madden, Warden
The Honorable Pedro V. Castillo. United States Magistrate Judge
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
PROCEEDINGS: [IN CHAMBERS] ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE SHOULD NOT RECOMMEND THAT THIS ACTION BE DISMISSED PURSUANT TO THE YOUNGER ABSTENTION DOCTRINE
On August 17, 2021, Petitioner, a California state prisoner proceeding pro se, constructive filed a habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. ("Petition," Dkt. No. 1 at 8). The Petition raises five grounds for federal habeas relief: (1) prosecutorial misconduct, (2) newly discovered evidence would have changed outcome of trial, (3) actual innocence, (4) ineffective assistance of counsel, and (5) "illegal sentence" as a result of the above errors. (Id. at 5-6, 33-58). However, it appears that Petitioner's claims are subject to dismissal pursuant to the Younger abstention doctrine.
Under the mailbox rule, "[w]hen a prisoner gives prison authorities a habeas petition or other pleading to mail to court, the court deems the petition constructively 'filed' on the date it is signed[, ]" which in this case was August 17, 2021. Roberts v. Marshall, 627 F.3d 768, 770 n.l (9th Cir. 2010); see also Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270 (1988). For ease of reference, when citing to Petitioner's submissions, the Court relies on the CM/ECF-generated pagination on the Court's docket.
The Younger Abstention Doctrine
As a general proposition, federal courts must abstain from enjoining a state prosecution except in exceptional circumstances where the danger of irreparable harm is both great and immediate. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1971); accord Sprint Commc'n., Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72 (2013). This concept is referred to as the doctrine of abstention or the Younger doctrine. Although “application of Younger does not lead to the determination that the federal courts have no basis for jurisdiction in the first instance” while state proceedings are pending, “the federal courts have bound themselves pursuant to principles of comity to voluntarily decline to exercise jurisdiction that they have and would otherwise exercise.” Canatella v. State of California, 404 F.3d 1106, 1116 (9th Cir. 2005).
Younger abstention in favor of a state proceeding is appropriate if three criteria are met: (1) the state proceedings are ongoing; (2) the proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings provide an adequate opportunity to litigate the plaintiff's federal constitutional claims. See Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982); Kenneally v. Lungren, 967 F.2d 329, 331-32 (9th Cir. 1992). However, federal courts will not abstain if the movant can establish that the state proceedings are being undertaken in bad faith or for purposes of harassment, or that some other “extraordinary circumstances” exist, such as where proceedings are being conducted pursuant to a “flagrantly” unconstitutional statute. Younger, 401 U.S. at 49, 53-54. When a federal court determines that the Younger doctrine applies, it must dismiss the pending action without prejudice. See Beltran v. California, 871 F.2d 777, 782 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Where Younger abstention is appropriate, a district court cannot refuse to abstain, retain jurisdiction over the action, and render a decision on the merits after the state proceedings have ended. To the contrary, Younger abstention requires dismissal of the federal action.”).
The paradigm Younger problem arises when a state criminal defendant, fearing a violation of his federal constitutional rights in a pending prosecution, petitions a federal court to restrain the state court from proceeding against him. See e.g., Younger, 401 U.S. at 37; Page v. King, 932 F.3d 898, 899-900, 902-03 (9th Cir. 2019) (applying Younger doctrine in federal habeas proceeding); Edelbacher v. Calderon, 160 F.3d 582, 583-85 (9th Cir. 1998) (same); Roberts v. Dicarlo, 296 F.Supp.2d 1182, 1184-86 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (same). Federal courts have almost invariably applied the Younger doctrine when a decision favorable to the federal litigant in a state court would moot the federal proceeding-e.g., when a federal habeas petitioner still has a direct appeal to his conviction pending in state court. See Sherwood v. Tomkins, 714 F.2d 632, 634 (9th Cir. 1983) (“[E]ven if the federal constitutional question raised by the habeas corpus petitioner cannot be resolved in a pending state appeal, that appeal may result in the reversal of the petitioner's conviction on some other ground, thereby mooting the federal question.”). Further, a federal court may “entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (emphasis added). As the Supreme Court has instructed, “[f]inal judgment in a criminal case means sentence. The sentence is the judgment.” Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 156 (2007) (citation omitted).
Thus, “in the absence of unusual circumstances, a state prisoner cannot proceed with his § 2254 petition when the state trial court has not yet rendered a decision as to the proper penalty.” Nowaczyk v. Warden, New Hampshire State Prison, 299 F.3d 69, 77 (1st Cir. 2002) (citing Edelbacher, 160 F.3d at 585). As the Ninth Circuit held in Edelbacher:
When there is a pending state penalty retrial and no unusual circumstances, we decline to depart from the general rule that a petitioner must await the outcome of the state proceedings before commencing his federal habeas corpus action. … The delay in this case was not extreme, unusual or attributable to the ineffectiveness of the state courts. … As Younger makes clear, our federal judiciary, “anxious though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to do so in
ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States.”160 F.3d at 582-83, 587 (quoting Younger, 401 U.S. at 44); cf. Phillips v. Vasquez, 56 F.3d 1030, 1031-33 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding “unusual circumstances” where a habeas petitioner's capital conviction was final, but his sentence was still being appealed 15 years after his conviction).
Here, Petitioner's criminal proceedings in state court are still pending. In 2008, a Los Angeles Superior Court jury, in case No. VA103562, found Petitioner guilty of three counts of robbery, in violation of California Penal Code (“P.C.”) § 211, and two counts of commercial burglary, in violation P.C. § 459. (Petition at 2); see People v. Douglas, No. B288534, 2019 WL 644223, at *1 (Cal.Ct.App. Feb. 15, 2019) (“Douglas I”) (nonpublished opinion). The trial court sentenced Petitioner to a prison term of 28 years and 4 months. (Petition at 2). The California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, and the California Supreme Court denied review. See California Appellate Courts Case Information, Nos. B211221 and S174276.
The dockets (and some opinions) of the California Courts of Appeal and the California Supreme Court are available at: <https://appellatecases.courtinfo.ca.gov/ index.cfm> (“Cal. Case Info.”). See Porter v. Ollison, 620 F.3d 952, 955 n.1 (9th Cir. 2010) (taking judicial notice of court dockets, including those available on the internet, from petitioner's state court proceedings).
In 2018, Petitioner filed a petition for review under Proposition 47 to reduce his burglary convictions to misdemeanors, which the trial court denied without holding an evidentiary hearing. See Douglas I, 2019 WL 644223, at *1. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing. Id. At the hearing, the superior court granted Petitioner's petition for review but denied his oral motion to strike the firearm enhancement. See People v. Douglas, No. B300438, 2020 WL 3481581, at *1 (Cal.Ct.App. June 26, 2020) (“Douglas II”) (nonpublished opinion), review granted (Sept. 16, 2020). Petitioner appealed from the denial of his motion to strike and also requested that the court of appeal strike the prior prison term enhancement pursuant to the recently enacted Senate Bill No. 136. See Id. In June 2020, the California Court of Appeal found no error in the trial court's denial of the motion to strike the firearm enhancement but modified the judgment to strike the one-year prior-prison-term enhancement. See Id. The trial court was directed to prepare an amended judgment reflecting the modification and Petitioner's resulting overall sentence of 27 years and 4 months. See Id. at *4.
In July 2020, Petitioner filed a petition for review in the California Supreme Court. See Cal. Case Info., No. S263396. On September 16, 2020, the California Supreme Court granted review on the firearm enhancement issue but deferred further action on the matter pending the disposition of related issues in People v. Tirado, S257658. See Id. On October 6, 2020, the California Supreme Court appointed counsel to represent Petitioner on the appeal pending in that court. See Id. The appeal remains pending. While the pending appeal concerns only his sentence, and Petitioner's habeas petition concerns his conviction, the Younger abstention still applies. Until the California Supreme Court determines whether to strike the firearm enhancement, Petitioner's sentence remains in flux and there is no final judgment as to his conviction and sentence. See Burton, 549 U.S. at 156.
In addition, beginning in September 2018, Petitioner filed several petitions for habeas corpus relief in the state courts, which were all denied. (See Petition at 3-5, 146, 148, 150-51); Cal. Case Info., Nos. B300966, S263814, S263937.
It appears that Petitioner has exhausted his habeas claims in the state courts. (Compare Petition at 5-7, with Id. at 33-58).
Further, the Petition does not identify any “extraordinary circumstances” that would warrant an exception to Younger. Here, as in Edelbacher, there are no “unusual circumstances which might suggest that no end is in sight to the state court proceedings.” 160 F.3d at 584 (internal quotation marks omitted). There have not been large delays between state court actions as in Phillips. See Hamilton v. Calderon, 134 F.3d 938, 939 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that Phillips did not apply because there was no “extreme delay” in the pendency of the petitioner's state sentencing proceedings). Indeed, once Petitioner first raised the sentencing issues with the state courts in 2018, they moved without unusual delays to address his claims. “Under these circumstances, the principles of comity strongly suggest that the courts of California be given the opportunity to determine the proper sentence to be imposed upon the petitioner.” Edelbacher, 160 F.3d at 587.
Accordingly, it appears that Petitioner's claims may be subject to the Younger abstention doctrine because his state criminal action is still pending and the other criteria for abstention appear satisfied. In response to this Order, Petitioner must explain why the elements for Younger abstention are not present here, or identify any “extraordinary circumstances” that would warrant an exception to Younger.
Conclusion and Order
Because Petitioner's criminal proceedings are still pending in state court, it appears that the instant claims are subject to dismissal without prejudice pursuant to the Younger abstention doctrine. Petitioner is therefore ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE, within twenty-one (21) days of the date of this Order, why this action should not be dismissed without prejudice under Younger. After the Court receives a response to the OSC, the Court will prepare a Report and Recommendation for submission to the District Judge. This Order is not dispositive of any of Petitioner's claims.
Instead of filing a response to the instant Order to Show Cause, Petitioner may request a voluntary dismissal of this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a). A Notice of Dismissal form is attached for Petitioner's convenience. However, Petitioner is advised that any dismissed claims may be later subject to the statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), as amended by AEDPA, which provides that “[a] 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court.”
Petitioner is expressly warned that the failure to timely file a response to this Order will provide a ground for a recommendation that this action be dismissed with prejudice for his failure to comply with Court orders and failure to prosecute. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b) . The Clerk of Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order on Petitioner at his current address of record.
IT IS SO ORDERED.