Doughtie v. Dennisson

5 Citing cases

  1. Hampton Ridge, Etc. v. Marett Prop

    265 Ga. 655 (Ga. 1995)   Cited 4 times
    In Hampton Ridge, this Court found that homeowners in a subdivision who purchased lots including easements set aside for an area dedicated to recreational use expressly abandoned that easement when, subsequent to the filing of the plat, they agreed to be bound by a Declaration of Covenants and Restrictions which stated that the developer would retain fee simple title and “all rights” to the recreational easement.

    1. Hampton Ridge bases its claim to title to the recreational area on the designation of that tract in the plat as "recreational area." Where a developer sells lots according to a recorded plat, the grantees acquire an easement in any areas set apart for their use, and that easement is an irrevocable property right. Doughtie v. Dennisson, 240 Ga. 299 ( 240 S.E.2d 89) (1977). They cannot be deprived of that right except by express abandonment, or by such conduct on their part as would be tantamount to express abandonment.

  2. Smith v. Bruce

    241 Ga. 133 (Ga. 1978)   Cited 23 times
    In Smith, the Supreme Court of Georgia held that purchasers of lots in a subdivision acquired, by implication, easements over a strip of land providing access to the beach.

    An easement acquired in this manner is considered an express grant, and is an irrevocable property right. The rationale is that the grantees of the property have given consideration for its enhanced value in the increased price of their lots. "See also Doughtie v. Dennisson, 240 Ga. 299 ( 240 S.E.2d 89) (1977). 3. (a) The attempt by Mrs. Lucy M. Bruce, as successor in title to E. C. Bruce, to make certain reservations on the 1924 Gramling-McCormick plat that would be adverse to express property rights theretofore conveyed or offered for dedication by deeds referring to the 1914 J. B. High plat, is to no avail.

  3. Bishop Eddie Long Ministries v. Dillard

    272 Ga. App. 894 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005)   Cited 13 times
    Finding veil-piercing appropriate where a corporation never opened or maintained a bank account, issued stock, held directors' or shareholders' meetings, filed tax returns, or kept corporate minutes; failed to file its annual report with the Secretary of State for nine years; and fraudulently represented to the plaintiff and the Department of Natural Resources over a period of years that it did not own the property at issue in the underlying easement dispute

    See Doughtie v. Dennisson.Doughtie v. Dennisson, 240 Ga. 299, 300 ( 240 SE2d 89) (1977). Here, Dillard purchased his 19-acre lot from HVI, the developer that owned the dam and the impounded lake as shown on the referenced plat.

  4. Patterson v. Powell

    257 Ga. App. 336 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002)   Cited 10 times
    Concluding that because subdivision was created around lake and lake was designated on the subdivision plat, landowners in the subdivision were expressly granted rights of access to and use of the lake, which they acquired express easements

    In the instant case, too, it is the subdivision plat that creates the irrevocable easement. 240 Ga. 299 ( 240 S.E.2d 89) (1977). Id at 300.

  5. River Birch Associates v. City of Raleigh

    326 N.C. 100 (N.C. 1990)   Cited 84 times
    Holding that a litigant may bring suit on an associational standing theory if "its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right" (quoting Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm. , 432 U.S. 333, 343, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977) )

    That River Birch depicted more than the minimum common area necessary is of no great import. Cf. Doughtie v. Dennison, 240 Ga. 299, 240 S.E.2d 89 (1977) (although twenty-five-foot strips sufficient for recreation easement, developer could not unilaterally alter terms of restrictive covenant setting aside larger area for same purpose). River Birch cannot now attack a condition of its own making which the City has accepted.