And "where the condemning authority seeks to exercise the power of eminent domain within the territorial limits of another governing body, an additional restriction has been held to apply." Dougherty County v. Burt, 168 Ga. App. 166, 169 (3) ( 308 SE2d 395) (1983). "The extra-territorial exercise of the right of eminent domain as an 'implied' power is authorized only if it is 'reasonably necessary' to a condemnor's successful completion of an undertaking initiated pursuant to its express grant of authority over a subject matter within its jurisdiction."

The denial of a "discretionary" motion to set aside, on the other hand, is never appealable in its own right; nor does the filing of such a motion extend the time for filing an appeal. See Johnson v. Barnes Co., 237 Ga. 502 (1) ( 229 S.E.2d 70) (1976); Dougherty County v. Burt, 168 Ga. App. 166, 167 (1), 170 ( 308 S.E.2d 395) (1983); Bartlett v. Hembree, 177 Ga. App. 253 ( 339 S.E.2d 388) (1985). Although in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Clark, 186 Ga. App. 58, 59 ( 366 S.E.2d 394) (1988), this court recently held that "[t]he denial of a `discretionary' motion to set aside a default judgment is an appealable final judgment," that holding was mistaken and is hereby overruled.

Hardrick v. Morgan, 240 Ga. App. 155 ( 522 S.E.2d 742)(1999). See Austin v. Carter, 248 Ga. 775, 777 (1) ( 285 S.E.2d 542) (1982); Dougherty County v. Burt, 168 Ga. App. 166, 167 (1) ( 308 S.E.2d 395) (1983). 2.

However, Hudspeth timely appealed the trial court's new judgment on A H Construction's complaint. See Dougherty County v. Burt, 168 Ga. App. 166, 167 (1) ( 308 S.E.2d 395) (1983) (the grant of a motion for reconsideration may extend the time for filing an appeal only where the original judgment is stayed, vacated, or set aside). Accordingly, Hudspeth's appeal with respect to the trial court's judgment on his counterclaim is hereby dismissed.

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Bailey v. Bonaparte, 125 Ga. App. 512, 514 ( 188 S.E.2d 119). Additionally, the time for filing a notice of appeal is not extended by filing a motion for reconsideration. Dougherty County v. Burt, 168 Ga. App. 166, 167 ( 308 S.E.2d 395); Anton v. Garvey, 160 Ga. App. 157 ( 286 S.E.2d 493). In Case No. A96A2427, Brown seeks to appeal the denial of the pauper's status.

3. The appeal in Case No. A91A0657 is dismissed, both because our ruling in Division 1 of this opinion renders it moot and because the denial of a motion for reconsideration of a final judgment is not, in any event, an appealable ruling. See generally Dougherty County v. Burt, 168 Ga. App. 166, 167 (1) ( 308 S.E.2d 395) (1983). Judgment reversed in Case No. A91A0656. Appeal dismissed in Case No. A91A0657. Carley and Beasley, JJ., concur.

]" (Emphasis supplied.) Dougherty County v. Burt, 168 Ga. App. 166, 169 (3) ( 308 S.E.2d 395) (1983). "A court should not interfere with an exercise of the discretion of a condemning authority determining the necessity of taking land for public purposes and selecting the location and amount of land reasonably necessary unless the condemning authority abused its discretion or exceeded its authority."

It requires a motion that meets the requisite of OCGA § 9-11-60 (d). Dougherty County v. Burt, 168 Ga. App. 166, 170 ( 308 S.E.2d 395) (1983); Mathis v. Hegwood, 169 Ga. App. 547, 548 ( 314 S.E.2d 122) (1984). Despite the language used in the motion here at issue, it does not meet those requisites and instead is basically in the nature of a motion for reconsideration.

The motion was nothing more than a request for a reconsideration of the trial court's summary judgment award. See Dougherty County v. Burt, 168 Ga. App. 166 ( 308 S.E.2d 395). Accordingly, the motion did not extend the time for the filing of a notice of appeal from the April 5, 1985, order granting plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.