Hamilton was convicted of the 1994 first-degree murder, armed sexual battery, armed robbery, and armed kidnapping of Carmen Gayheart. Hamilton v. State , 703 So.2d 1038, 1040 (Fla. 1997), cert. denied , 524 U.S. 956, 118 S.Ct. 2377, 141 L.Ed.2d 744 (1998). We affirmed Hamilton's convictions and sentence of death on direct appeal.
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. People v. Griffin, 178 Ill.2d 65, 227 Ill.Dec. 338, 687 N.E.2d 820 (1997) ( Griffin II), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 956, 118 S.Ct. 2376, 141 L.Ed.2d 743 (1998). The court recognized that "counsel has a duty to investigate potential sources of mitigation evidence, or to have a reason not to make such an investigation" and stated that the "decision whether to present a particular witness is generally a strategic choice which cannot support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel."
The facts of Tennard's heinous crime and the subsequent state criminal trial are set forth in the prior opinions this court, the Supreme Court, and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. See Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 124 S.Ct. 2562, 159 L.Ed.2d 384 (2004) ; Tennard v. Cockrell, 284 F.3d 591 (5th Cir. 2002), vacated by 537 U.S. 802, 123 S.Ct. 70, 154 L.Ed.2d 4 (2002); Ex parte Tennard, 960 S.W.2d 57, 58 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997), cert. denied, Tennard v. Texas, 524 U.S. 956, 118 S.Ct. 2376, 141 L.Ed.2d 743 (1998); Tennard v. Texas, 802 S.W.2d 678, 679 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1259, 111 S.Ct. 2914, 115 L.Ed.2d 1077 (1991). Tennard met his accomplices Paul Anthony Bogany and Daniel Groom at the Groovey Shack Lounge in Harris County, Texas, on August 15, 1985.
The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution requires an affirmative showing that a defendant's plea is entered both knowingly and voluntarily before the trial court may accept the plea. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 400 (1993); Salas v. United States, 139 F.3d 322, 324 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 956 (1998). "The longstanding test for determining the validity of a guilty plea is `whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant.'"
See Godinez v. Moran (1993) 509 U.S. 389, 400; Parke v. Raley (1992) 506 U.S. 20, 28, reh'g denied (1993) 506 U.S. 1087; Salas v. United States (2d Cir. 1998) 139 F.3d 322, 324, cert. denied (1998) 524 U.S. 956. In order to ensure that a guilty plea represents a "voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant," the trial court judge must make a searching inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the plea.
It is well-settled that the Due Process Clause of the Constitution requires an affirmative showing that an accused's plea is entered knowingly and voluntarily before the trial court may accept the plea. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 400, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 2687, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993); Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 28, 113 S.Ct. 517, 523, 121 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992), reh'g denied, 506 U.S. 1087, 113 S.Ct. 1068, 122 L.Ed.2d 372 (1993); Salas v. United States, 139 F.3d 322, 324 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 956, 118 S.Ct. 2377, 141 L.Ed.2d 744 (1998). In order to ensure that a defendant's guilty plea represents "a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant," the trial court judge must make a searching inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the plea.
See Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 604 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1139, 119 S.Ct. 1028, 143 L.Ed.2d 38 (1999); Hampton v. Hobbs, 106 F.3d 1281, 1287 (6th Cir. 1997). See also Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176 (9th Cir. 1999); Zehner v. Trigg, 133 F.3d 459, 463 (7th Cir. 1997); Dougan v. Singletary, 129 F.3d 1424, 1427 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 956, 118 S.Ct. 2375, 141 L.Ed.2d 743 (1998); Gavin v. Branstad, 122 F.3d 1081 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 955, 118 S.Ct. 2374, 141 L.Ed.2d 741 (1998). Neither prisoners nor indigents are a suspect class.
Finally, the jury was able to observe Hall's behavior first-hand in the videotaped interview he gave the press.See also Ex parte Tennard, 960 S.W.2d 57, 60-63 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 956 (1998). In light of this evidence, we cannot say that Hall's due process rights have been violated or that he has been subjected to cruel and unusual punishment.
1985);State v. Mann, 959 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tenn. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 956, 118 S.Ct. 2376, 141 L.Ed.2d 743 (1998). We have defined "serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death" as follows:
The ultimate goal of voir dire is to insure that jurors are competent, unbiased, and impartial. State v. Mann, 959 S.W.2d 503, 533 (Tenn. 1997), reh'g denied, (1998), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 956, 118 S. Ct. 2376 (1998); State v. Cazes, 875 S.W.2d 253, 262 (Tenn. 1994). There is no constitutional right that a defendant is entitled to have questions posed to the venire specifically directed to matters that conceivably might prejudice veniremen against him.