Nos. 05-06-00368-CR, 05-06-00369-CR.
Opinion Filed December 12, 2006. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex. R. App. P. 47.
On Appeal from the 363rd Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause Nos. F02-35122-JW, F01-37577-LW AFFIRMED
Before Justices WRIGHT, BRIDGES, and MAZZANT
DAVID L. BRIDGES, JUSTICE
In these cases, Christopher David Doucette appeals from the revocation of his community supervision. In two issues, appellant contends his pleas of true were involuntary because he believed he would receive drug treatment, and ineffective assistance of counsel rendered his pleas of true involuntary. We affirm the trial court's judgments.
In his brief, appellant argues his "guilty pleas" were involuntary and that ineffective assistance of counsel rendered his "guilty pleas" involuntary. However, the substance of appellant's complaints concerns the voluntariness of his pleas of true to the State's motions to revoke community supervision and not his original guilty pleas. Therefore, we will address appellant's complaints.
Procedural History
In cause no. 05-06-00368-CR, appellant waived a jury and pleaded guilty to assault-family violence, with one prior conviction of assault-family violence. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 22.01(a) (1) (Vernon Supp. 2006). The trial court sentenced appellant to ten years' confinement, probated for ten years, and assessed an $800 fine. The State later moved to revoke appellant's community supervision, alleging several violations. After a hearing, the trial court found the allegations true, revoked appellant's community supervision, and assessed punishment at four years' imprisonment and an $800 fine. In cause no. 05-06-00369-CR, appellant waived a jury and pleaded guilty to burglary of a habitation. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 30.02 (Vernon 2003). Pursuant to a plea agreement, the trial court deferred adjudicating guilt, placed appellant on six years' community supervision, and assessed a $2500 fine. Subsequently, the trial court adjudicated appellant guilty and assessed punishment at ten years' imprisonment, probated for ten years, and a $2500 fine. The State later moved to revoke appellant's community supervision, alleging several violations. After a hearing, the trial court found the allegations true, revoked appellant's community supervision, and assessed punishment at four years' imprisonment and a $2500 fine. Involuntary Pleas
In his first issue, appellant argues his pleas of true to the allegations in the State's motions to revoke were involuntary because he did not understand the consequences of entering the pleas and believed he would receive drug treatment. The State responds that appellant's pleas of true were voluntary because the trial court properly admonished appellant and appellant admitted committing the violations. The records show the trial court admonished appellant both orally and in writing in both cases. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(a), (c) (Vernon Supp. 2006); Kirk v. State, 949 S.W.2d 769, 771 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1997, pet. ref'd). During the revocation hearing, appellant testified he understood the allegations in the motions to revoke, and he was freely and voluntarily entering pleas of true to those allegations. Appellant's signed pleas of true and stipulations of evidence were offered into evidence without objection. Appellant testified he used a controlled substance on two occasions and failed to report for one year, but testified he only wanted to be with his children, who had been molested. Appellant testified that although the trial court placed him in drug treatment previously and he failed to comply with the rules and regulations of treatment, he wanted the court to again place him in drug treatment. The fact that appellant received greater punishment than he hoped for does not render his pleas involuntary. See Tovar-Torres v. State, 860 S.W.2d 176, 178 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1993, no pet.). Having reviewed the records, we conclude appellant's pleas of true were voluntary. See Kirk, 949 S.W.2d at 771. We resolve appellant's first issue against him. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
In his second issue, appellant argues counsel's ineffectiveness rendered his pleas of true involuntary. Appellant asserts counsel failed to call any independent witnesses or introduce other evidence to show appellant had a residence and employment, failed to call any outside witnesses to show the reasons why appellant violated the terms of his community supervision, and failed to have appellant evaluated for drug treatment. The State responds that the record does not show counsel was ineffective or that appellant's pleas of true were involuntary. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and there is a reasonable probability the results of the proceedings would have been different in the absence of counsel's errors. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694 (1984); Bone v. State, 77 S.W.3d 828, 833 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002). Appellant has the burden of proving ineffective assistance of counsel by a preponderance of the evidence. Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999). An appellate court ordinarily will not declare trial counsel ineffective where there is no record showing counsel had an opportunity to explain himself. See Goodspeed v. State, 187 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005). Without evidence of the strategy involved concerning counsel's actions at trial, the reviewing court will presume sound trial strategy. See Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 814; Rylander v. State, 101 S.W.3d 107, 111 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003). During the revocation hearing, appellant testified he was satisfied with counsel's representation. As noted above, appellant testified he violated the terms of his community supervision. The trial court found appellant had violated his community supervision by failing to (1) report to a probation officer for one year, (2) attend Narcotics and Alcoholics Anonymous, (3) pay fines, fees, and costs, (4) comply with the rules and regulations of treatment, and (5) for using a controlled substance twice as alleged in the State's motions to revoke. Proof of one violation is sufficient to support revocation. See Lee v. State, 952 S.W.2d 894, 897 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1997, no pet.) (en banc). Nothing in the record supports appellant's claims. Nothing shows whether there were witnesses available or that their testimony would have been beneficial to appellant. Further, counsel did not have an opportunity to explain herself. See Goodspeed, 187 S.W.3d at 392. We conclude appellant has not met his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel was ineffective or that his pleas of true were involuntary. See Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813; Thomas v. State, 2 S.W.3d 640, 642 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1999, no pet.); Kirk, 949 S.W.2d at 771. We resolve appellant's second issue against him. We affirm the trial court's judgment in each case.