Failure to file a cross appeal precludes review of error asserted by the appellee unless that strategy, as discussed above, is an attempt to demonstrate the correctness of the judgment as entered. Our cases previously reported dealing with this point have, on occasion, provided a limitation on the absolute nature of this statement by observations such as that in St. Louis I.M. S. Ry. v. Lewis, 39 Okla. 677, 136 P. 396 (1913):Cole v. Anderson, 304 P.2d 295 (Okla. 1956), Turner v. First National Bank Trust Co. of Muskogee, 292 P.2d 1012 (Okla. 1956), Corn Belt Bank v. Baker, 190 Okla. 278, 122 P.2d 989 (1942), Bahr v. Chicago, R.I. P. Ry., 78 Okla. 69, 188 P. 1057 (1920), Dotterer v. Chicago, R.I. P. Ry., 78 Okla. 67, 188 P. 1055 (1920), Westlake v. Cooper, 69 Okla. 212, 171 P. 859 (1918), Higgins-Jones Realty Co. v. Davis, 60 Okla. 20, 158 P. 1160 (1916). [W]e deem it unnecessary in the present case to go further than to hold that this court will not consider whether there is error in a ruling against plaintiff, not involved in any error assigned by the plaintiff.

"In a case properly triable to the court without a jury, and the court having made findings of fact, and said findings of fact are not clearly against the weight of the evidence, and the judgment of the court is based upon the findings of fact, the judgment of the trial court will not be disturbed on appeal." To the same effect see Smith v. Spencer, 8 Okla. 459, 58 P. 638; Smith v. Lindsey, 91 Okla. 8, 215 P. 791; Nickel v. Janda, 115 Okla. 207, 242 P. 264; Beams v. Step, 116 Okla. 291, 244 P. 775; Lowe v. Hickory, 176 Okla. 426, 55 P.2d 769; Dotterer v. Chicago, R.I. P. Ry. Co., 78 Okla. 67, 188 P. 1055; Roberts v. Roberts, 175 Okla. 602, 53 P.2d 671; and Johnson v. Rowe, 186 Okla. 60, 89 P.2d 955. The plaintiff urges in his cross-appeal that since there was a period of eight months and 15 days during which no work contemplated by the association was performed, he should not have been charged with a portion of office expenses during that time.

We are not unmindful of the rule that in law cases, where a cause is tried to the court, the court's finding will not be disturbed on appeal where there is any evidence reasonably tending to support it, but the rule in equity cases is equally well settled that where the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings of the court is challenged, it is the duty of this court to consider the whole record, to weigh the evidence, and to determine whether the judgment of the trial court is clearly against the weight thereof, and if it shall determine this to be so, to render or cause to be rendered such judgment as should have been rendered by the trial court. Mendenhall v. Walter, 53 Okla. 598, 157 P. 732 (and cases there cited); Dotterer et al. v. Chicago, R.I. P. Ry. Co. et al., 78 Okla. 67, 188 P. 1055; Sullivan v. Kitchens, 89 Okla. 108, 214 P. 176. Mollie Lewis was, doubtless, made a party to this action because of the deed attempting to convey the property from the mortgagor to her, but it appears that she did not even know until a long time thereafter that the deed was made to her, and the explanation given by Mr. Lewis as to his reason for conveying the property to his mother was very vague, indefinite, and uncertain, and upon a consideration of all the evidence we are bound to reach the conclusion that whatever interest she may now have in this property is inferior to the interest of the mortgagee.

This proposition is based upon the rule that, in actions of equitable cognizance, the Supreme Court will consider all the evidence and weigh it to ascertain if the judgment is clearly against its weight, and if the judgment is against its weight, then it is the duty of the court to render, or cause to be rendered, such judgment as the trial court should have rendered, but if not clearly against the weight of the evidence, the judgment should be affirmed. Dotterer v. C., R.I. P. Ry. Co., 78 Okla. 67, 188 P. 1055; Pelham Petroleum Co. v. North, 78 Okla. 39, 188 P. 1069; Orton v. Citizens State Bank, 99 Okla. 80, 225 P. 899; Keechi Oil Gas Co. v. Smith., 81 Okla. 266, 198 P. 588; Gorman v. Carlock, 72 Okla. 104, 179 P. 38. It will be observed that an action for divorce is one of equitable cognizance and these cases furnish the correct rule as to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment. (2) Defendant's second proposition is that the matter of residence in a divorce action under the statutes of Oklahoma is jurisdictional.

"In the trial of the case, several exceptions were saved by the defendants to the rulings of the court, which exceptions are extensively argued in defendant's brief; but in view of the fact that no cross-appeal had been filed by the defendant, and as the judgment rendered for the defendant must be affirmed, such exceptions will not be considered." In the case of Dotterer v. C., R.I. P. Ry. Co., 78 Okla. 67, 188 P. 1055, the court said: "This court will not consider whether, on the trial of a cause, there was error in a ruling against defendant in error when such ruling is not involved in any error assigned by plaintiff in error."

On appeal in an equitable proceeding, while this court will examine and weigh the evidence, it will not reverse the action of the trial court thereon, unless it be clearly against the weight of the evidence. Pelham Petr. Co. v. North, 78 Okla. 39, 188 P. 1069; Dotterer v. C., R.I. P. Ry. Co., 78 Okla. 67, 188 P. 1055; Hogan v. Grimes, 78 Okla. 184, 189 P. 353. Upon the evidence introduced in this cause, the court ought to have rendered judgment for the defendants. It is recommended that this cause be reversed and remanded, with directions to enter judgment for the defendants.

Plaintiff did not file a motion for a new trial and did not give notice of appeal from the judgment of the lower court, and has not filed a cross-petition in error in this court, and, therefore, the error complained of in this regard by the trial court cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court and the judgment of the trial court, in refusing to decree said sum of $120.15 as a lien on the property of the defendant Mrs. M.M. Holland, and foreclose the same, being not appealed from, has become final. Van Arsdale Osborne v. Olustee School Dist. No. 35 of Greer County, 23 Okla. 894, 101 P. 1121; Higgins-Jones Realty Co. v. Davis, 60 Okla. 20, 158 P. 1160; Kibby v. Binion, Sheriff, 70 Okla. 96, 172 P. 1091; Dotterer v. Chicago, R.I. P. Ry. Co., 78 Okla. 67, 188 P. 1055. The judgment of the trial court is reversed for a new trial, as to the personal judgment rendered against the defendant Mrs. M.M. Holland.