The law of this state is well settled that "[t]here is no material variance where there is proof of so much of an indictment as shows the defendant committed a substantial offense specified therein." Dotson v. State, 337 So.2d 83 (Ala.Cr.App. 1976). See also Owens v. State, 291 Ala. 107, 278 So.2d 693 (1973); Taylor v. State, 47 Ala. App. 285, 253 So.2d 354 (1971); Fuller v. State, 39 Ala. App. 219, 96 So.2d 829 (1957); Blakeney v. State, 244 Ala. 262, 13 So.2d 430 (1943); Tyson v. State, 361 So.2d 1182, 1188 (Ala.Cr.App. 1978).
The law of this state is well settled that '[t]here is no material variance where there is proof of so much of an indictment as shows the defendant committed a substantial offense specified therein.' Dotson v. State, 337 So.2d 83 (Ala.Cr.App. 1976)." House v. State, 380 So.2d 940, 943 (Ala. 1979).
"[T]here is no material variance where there is proof of so much of an indictment as shows the defendant committed a substantial offense specified therein." House v. State, 380 So.2d 940 (Ala. 1979), quoting Dotson v. State, 337 So.2d 83 (Ala.Cr.App. 1976). This court has also said:
The appellant was found in possession of the cards and he attempted to use them for identification. The state proved more than enough evidence to show that the appellant committed a substantial offense specified in the indictment. Dotson v. State, Ala.Cr.App., 337 So.2d 83 (1976). We must answer the appellant's erroneous contention that a fatal variance exists because intent to use the credit cards was not proven.