Opinion
No. 2-832 / 02-0265.
Filed December 11, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, NATHAN CALLAHAN, District Associate Judge.
The Department of Transportation petitions for a writ of certiorari challenging the legality of an order directing the DOT to issue a temporary restricted license permitting Donald Lutgen to drive for purposes of employment, community service, Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) meetings, and therapy. WRIT SUSTAINED.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Carolyn Olson, Assistant Attorney General, for plaintiff.
Donald Lutgen, Gilbertville, pro se.
Considered by HUITINK, P.J., and MAHAN and VAITHESWARAN, JJ.
On April 29, 2002, the supreme court granted the Iowa Department of Transportation's (DOT) petition for a writ of certiorari challenging the legality of a district court order directing the DOT to issue a temporary restricted license. Under the terms of the restricted license, Donald Lutgen was permitted to drive for purposes of employment, community service, Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) meetings, and therapy.
Lutgen's driver's license was revoked following his conviction of operating while intoxicated as required by Iowa Code section 321J.4(3)(a) (1997). Lutgen was granted a temporary restricted license for work purposes. Lutgen subsequently requested an expanded temporary restricted license permitting him to drive to AA meetings and his community service obligation. Over the DOT's resistance, the district court ordered that the DOT issue Lutgen a temporary restricted license pursuant to Iowa Code section 321J.4(9) (2001) for "work purposes, to include community service on a schedule and at a facility verified through the Department of Transportation, as well as for attendance of AA meetings and therapy sessions."
"Certiorari is a law action to determine whether a tribunal . . . has exceeded its jurisdiction or otherwise acted illegally." Polk County Sheriff v. Iowa Dist. Court, 594 N.W.2d 421, 423 (Iowa 1999). Apart from constitutional issues, our review is therefore for correction of errors at law. Id.
In ordering the DOT to issue a temporary restricted license, the court found:
completion of community service is the same for all practicable purposes as employment in that the community service hours are used to pay off financial obligations to the court system. . . . Additionally, the Court finds that maintaining sobriety and substance abuse treatment and counseling through AA and the defendant's therapist are necessary components of maintaining his employment. Consequently, the Court finds that there is nothing inconsistent in allowing substance abuse treatment to be included in the temporary restricted license issued under Iowa Code section 321J.4(9).
We disagree.
Section 321J.4(9) provides, in part:
d. The court shall determine if the temporary restricted license is necessary for the person to maintain the person's present employment. . . . If the court determines that the temporary restricted license is necessary for the person to maintain the person's present employment, . . , the court shall order the department to issue to the person a temporary restricted license conditioned upon the person's certification to the court of the installation of approved ignition interlock devices in all motor vehicles that it is necessary for the person to operate to maintain the person's present employment.
The right to a temporary restricted license is statutory. Iowa Dep't of Transp. v. Iowa Dist. Court for Greene County, 458 N.W.2d 1, 2 (Iowa 1990). Iowa Code section 321J.4(9) does not expressly provide any limits for the issuance of temporary restricted licenses. Id., Iowa Dep't of Transp. v. Iowa Dist. Court for O'Brien County, 540 N.W.2d 40, 42 (Iowa 1995). However, the statutory language reflects legislative intent to limit issuance of temporary restricted licenses for purposes "necessary for the person to maintain the person's present employment." Iowa Dist. Court for O'Brien County, 540 N.W.2d at 42. Lutgen's expanded temporary restricted license was intended to facilitate his attendance at AA meetings and therapy, functions that have been deemed unnecessary for a revokee's present employment. See id. (citing Iowa Dist. Court for Greene County, 458 N.W.2d at 2). We also disagree with the trial court's reasoning that Lutgen's community service obligation was "no different than working for an hourly wage and then submitting the money to the court." There is no evidence indicating Lutgen's completion of community service is necessary for him to maintain his present employment. Because the terms of the district court's order granting Lutgen an expanded temporary license contravene the express provisions of both the controlling statute and case law, we find the court acted illegally and sustain the writ.