But that such a consent form was signed does not in itself determine the correct objective characterization of the interview. See Dorsey v. Cook, 677 F. App'x 265, 267 (6th Cir. 2017) (per curiam). Nor does the fact that the doctor was trained as a sexual assault forensic examiner alter this analysis.

(Trial Tr. II, ECF No. 7-10, PageID.347.) To the extent that Petitioner believes counsel should have objected to Nurse Kasper's testimony regarding what the victim told him during the examination, the Sixth Circuit has held that such statements are not testimonial, and, therefore, do not violate the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause. See Dorsey v. Cook, 677 Fed.Appx. 265, 267 (6th Cir. 2017). Any objection by counsel on that basis would have been futile.

Dorsey v. Cook, 677 Fed.Appx. 265, 267 (6th Cir. 2017) (“Nothing in Crawford or subsequent Supreme Court cases interpreting the meaning of “testimonial” . . compels the conclusion that statements made to a sexual assault nurse examiner for both medical and legal purposes are testimonial.”)

Thus, habeas relief is not available to Mr. Craig on this ground. See White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 427 (2014); Dorsey v. Cook, 677 Fed.Appx. 265, 267 (6th Cir. 2017). Accordingly, I recommend that the Court deny this ground for relief because it lacks merit.

This objection lacks merit. In Dorsey v. Cook, 677 Fed. App'x 265 (6th Cir. 2017), the habeas petitioner argued that his Confrontation Clause rights were violated during his state-court prosecution by the admission of testimony from a sexual assault nurse examiner because, inter alia, "the victim signed a consent form that authorized her to provide information to law enforcement for purposes of criminal investigation and prosecution." Id. at 266.