In Brackin, the supreme court approved the reasoning of the Third District in two cases in which the court held that the violation of a licensing statute was relevant to the injuries incurred in those cases. See id. at 544 (citing Corbett v. Seaboard Coastline R.R. Co., 375 So.2d 34 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), and Dorsett v. Dion, 347 So.2d 826 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)). In Corbett, the district court held that evidence that the sixteen-year-old defendant was driving without a license was admissible when the plaintiff's theory of negligence was that the defendant collided with a crossing train because she was speeding and “inattentive in that she failed to heed the warnings that were given” at the crossing.
In Brackin, the supreme court approved the reasoning of the Third District in two cases in which the court held that the violation of a licensing statute was relevant to the injuries incurred in those cases. See id. at 544 (citing Corbett v. Seaboard Coastline R.R. Co., 375 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), and Dorsett v. Dion, 347 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977)). In Corbett, the district court held that evidence that the sixteen-year-old defendant was driving without a license was admissible when the plaintiff's theory of negligence was that the defendant collided with a crossing train because she was speeding and "inattentive in that she failed to heed the warnings that were given" at the crossing.
OVERTON, Justice. This is a petition to review a decision of the First District Court of Appeal reported as Boles v. Brackin, 411 So.2d 280 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), which directly and expressly conflicts with several decisions of the Third District Court of Appeal, Corbett v. Seaboard Coastline Railroad, 375 So.2d 34 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), review denied, 383 So.2d 1202 (Fla. 1980); Dorsett v. Dion, 347 So.2d 826 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); and Goldner v. Lentin, 96 So.2d 553 (Fla. 3d DCA 1957). We have jurisdiction.
In some cases, however, courts in other jurisdictions have found that violation of a licensing statute is relevant in a negligence case. In Dorsett v Dion, 347 So.2d 826 (Fla App, 1977), the plaintiff brought an action for damages for injuries suffered in an accident allegedly involving the defendant's car, although there was no contact between the two vehicles. The court held that where plaintiff's injury may have resulted from her inexperience and inability to handle her car, evidence that she was driving in violation of a learner's permit was relevant, since it could be found to have a causal connection.
Other jurisdictions have allowed evidence of driving without a license when the causal connection was present. See Dorsett v. Dion, 347 So.2d 826 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.3 1977); Klanseck v. AndersonSales Serv., Inc., 393 N.W.2d 356 (Mich. 1986).
Without proof of a causal connection between the regulatory restriction and the incident, the finding of liability based on a regulatory deficit is unsustainable. See Dorsett v. Dion, 347 So.2d 826 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). Plaintiffs assert there was evidence of negligent training, too, which would support the denial of the directed verdict on this count.
In Duncan v. Hixon, 223 Va. 373, 288 S.E.2d 494, 495 (1982), the court noted that an adult driver might have avoided the collision in that case. In Dorsett v. Dion, 347 So.2d 826, 827 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977), there was a lack of contact between the plaintiff's vehicle and the defendant's vehicle; this and other circumstances led the court to conclude "that the plaintiff's injury may well have resulted from her own inexperience and her inability to handle her own car." In Klanseck v. Anderson Sales Serv., Inc., 426 Mich. 78, 393 N.W.2d 356 (1986), the court emphasized the plaintiff's minimal experience riding a 1,000 cc motorcycle and defense testimony that a front tire blowout would not have caused more experienced riders to fall.
(4) It is a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in S. 775.082 or S. 775.083, for any person to operate a motor vehicle in any manner in violation of the restrictions imposed in a restricted license issued to him. The appellee counters by arguing that the trial court was correct in rejecting the proffered evidence because the violation of the license restrictions could not be causally connected to the traffic accident, citing to a trio of cases from the Third District Court of Appeal: Goldner v. Lentin, 96 So.2d 553 (Fla. 3d DCA 1957); Dorsett v. Dion, 347 So.2d 826 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Corbett v. Seaboard Coastline Railroad Co., 375 So.2d 34 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). We do not need to reach the issue whether the record supports such a causal connection as we feel the causation predicate established by the Third District Court of Appeal directly conflicts with de Jesus v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad, 281 So.2d 198 (Fla. 1973).
The parties agree that the test as to the admissibility of the evidence depends upon the existence of a causal connection between the failure to have a license and the alleged negligence causing the accident. Goldner v. Lentin, 96 So.2d 553 (Fla.3d DCA 1957); and see Dorsett v. Dion, 347 So.2d 826 (Fla.3d DCA 1977). In each of these cases the license invoked was in existence and was a restricted license.