Opinion
December 18, 1995
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (D'Emilio, J.).
Ordered that the appeal from so much of the order as denied the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability with respect to the codefendant Vito Calia is dismissed; and it is further,
Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as reviewed, on the law, with one bill of costs, the cross motion of the appellants for summary judgment is granted, and the plaintiffs' complaint and the codefendant's cross claim are dismissed.
The appellants are not aggrieved by so much of the order dated September 6, 1994, as denied the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability with respect to the codefendant Vito Calia (see, CPLR 5511; Candela v Port Motors, 208 A.D.2d 486; Yule v Town of Huntington, 202 A.D.2d 439; Board of Mgrs. v Schorr Bros. Dev. Corp., 182 A.D.2d 664; Dublin v Prime, 168 A.D.2d 597; Lackner v Roth, 166 A.D.2d 686; Hauser v North Rockland Cent. School Dist. No. 1, 166 A.D.2d 553; Nunez v Travelers Ins. Co., 139 A.D.2d 712; Sikora v Keillor, 17 A.D.2d 6, affd 13 N.Y.2d 610; Schultz v Alfred, 11 A.D.2d 266, 268).
We reverse the remainder of the Supreme Court's order because there are no triable issues of fact either with respect to the plaintiffs' cause of action against them or with respect to the codefendant's cross claim for contribution. The appellants' vehicle was lawfully stopped when it was struck by the codefendant's vehicle prior to the impact between the codefendant's vehicle and that of the injured plaintiff. As a matter of law, the appellants were free of negligence and were entitled to summary judgment (see, Edney v Metropolitan Suburban Bus Auth., 178 A.D.2d 398, 399). Bracken, J.P., O'Brien, Ritter, Friedmann and Goldstein, JJ., concur.