D'Orio v. Jacobs

8 Citing cases

  1. Seattle Times Co. v. Tielsch

    80 Wn. 2d 502 (Wash. 1972)   Cited 10 times

    The constitution and the relevant statutes provide no guidelines for choosing between these definitions. Since the prohibition is essentially penal in nature, D'Orio v. Jacobs, 151 Wn. 297, 275 P. 563 (1929), it becomes our role to find the narrowest interpretation of the constitutional prohibition which is consistent with the intent of the framers and the ongoing societal interest in preventing conduct harmful to individuals or to the state. I submit that posing the problem this way requires adoption of the narrower definition of the term "lottery."

  2. Johnson v. McDonald

    287 P. 220 (Or. 1930)   Cited 5 times

    The court held in the National Thrift Ass'n case that the voting plan was a subterfuge and intended to cover up the lottery that was the principal element in awarding prizes. The identical device involved in the case at bar was held legal in the following case: D'Orio v. StartupCandy Co. (Utah), 266 P. 1037, 60 A.L.R. 338; D'Orio v. Jacobs, 151 Wn. 297 ( 275 P. 563). The game in the instant case does not come within the meaning of a lottery or game of chance as defined in textbooks: 27 C.J. 968, §§ 4, 7; 13 C.J. 410-412, §§ 339-341; 12 R.C.L. 716.

  3. United States v. Frodenberg

    8 Alaska 251 (D. Alaska 1930)   Cited 2 times

    Counsel for the defendant cites three cases. D'Orio v. Startup Candy Company, 71 Utah, 410, 266 P. 1037, 60 A.L.R. 338, D'Orio v. Jacobs, 151 Wn. 297, 275 P. 563, 565, and D'Orio v. Leigh Cuthbertson, Limited (Canadian) 1 Western Weekly Reports, 122. Each of these cases is a suit by D'Orio against the defendant for the purchase price of Advertoshare boards, and the defense in each case is that the contract for the purchase was based upon an illegal consideration, in that the boards are gambling devices.

  4. State ex Rel. Schillberg v. Barnett

    79 Wn. 2d 578 (Wash. 1971)   Cited 18 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that a game which involves an element of chance, even if skill is also involved, is sufficient to qualify it as gambling under state law

    Simply stated, the test calls for a determination of whether or not skill predominates in a particular game. If it does, the activity may not be a game of chance. If skill is not predominate, and assuming the factors of consideration and prize are found, the activity may well be interpreted as a game of chance. The fallacy in defendants' argument is that the cases they rely upon, applying the predominate element test, are lottery cases, rather than gambling cases. For example, in D'Orio v. Jacobs, 151 Wn. 297, 275 P. 563 (1929), the court examined an Advertoshare board game (involving playing of checkers) and found that since skill was the predominate, if not the only, element involved, the game was not a lottery either within Rem. Comp. Stat. §§ 2464, 2465 and 2466 (presently RCW 9.59.010, .020, .030) prohibiting lotteries, or Rem. Comp. Stat. § 2472 (presently RCW 9.47.030) prohibiting possession of certain gambling devices such as slot machines. To the same effect, this court stated in Sherwood Roberts — Yakima, Inc. v. Leach, 67 Wn.2d 630, 409 P.2d 160 (1965), at page 634: "Chance within the lottery statute is one which dominates over skill or judgment."

  5. State ex Rel. Schillberg v. Safeway

    75 Wn. 2d 339 (Wash. 1969)   Cited 17 times

    Its elements, of course, are consideration, prize and chance. Society Theatre v. Seattle, 118 Wn. 258, 203 P. 21 (1922); D'Orio v. Jacobs, 151 Wn. 297, 275 P. 563 (1929). Although enjoined to give the lottery statute a strict construction, if the two elements prize and chance are undeniably present, we think that the third element, valuable consideration, encompasses not only other tangible or intangible forms of property but includes also the broader concepts of consideration universally deemed sufficient to support a contract.

  6. Minges v. City of Birmingham

    251 Ala. 65 (Ala. 1948)   Cited 10 times
    Contrasting the English Rule and the American Rule

    .W. 794, Ann.Cas. 1915B, 170; State v. Lindsay, 110 Vt. 120, 2 A.2d 201; Brenard Mfg. Co. v. Jessup Barrett Co., 186 Iowa 872, 173 N.W. 101; Whitman v. Fournier, 233 Mass. 154, 125 N.E. 303; National Sales Co. v. Manciet, 83 Or. 34, 162 P. 1055, L.R.A. 1917D, 485; Conqueror Trust Co. v. Simmon, 62 Okl. 252, 162 P. 1098; Dion v. St. John Baptiste Soc., 82 Me. 319, 19 A. 825; Amlie Strand Hardware Co. v. Moose, 176 Minn. 598, 224 N.W. 158; Leonard v. Pennypacker, 85 N.J.L. 333, 89 A. 26; Millsaps v. Urban, 116 Ark. 90, 171 S.W. 1198; Post Pub. Co. v. Murray, 1 Cir., 230 F. 773. Where award of prize is determined by the skill, judgment or discretion of the participant or contestant, there is no lottery. Opinion of the Justices, supra; Brooklyn Daily Eagle v. Voorhies, C.C., 181 F. 579; Eastman v. Armstrong-Byrd Music Co., 10 Cir., 212 F. 662, 52 L.R.A., N.S., 108; Hoff v. Daily Graphic, 132 Misc. 597, 230 N.Y.S. 360; D'Orio v. Startup Candy Co., 71 Utah 410, 266 P. 1037, 60 A.L.R. 338; D'Orio v. Jacobs, 151 Wn. 297, 275 P. 563; Johnson v. McDonald, 132 Or. 622, 287 P. 220; Boatright v. State, 118 Tex.Cr.R. 381, 38 S.W.2d 87; Minton v. F. G. Smith Piano Co. 36 App.D.C. 137, 33 L.R.A., N.S., 305; People v. Monroe, 349 Ill. 270, 182 N.E. 439, 85 A.L.R. 605; Multnomah County Fair Ass'n v. Langley, 140 Or. 172, 13 P.2d 354; Rohan v. Detroit Racing Ass'n, 314 Mich. 326, 22 N.W.2d 433, 166 A.L.R. 1246; Holt v. Rural Weekly Co., 173 Minn. 337, 217 N.W. 345; Scott v. People's Monthly Co., 209 Iowa 503, 228 N.W. 263, 67 A.L.R. 413. Thos. E. Huey, Jr., of Birmingham, for appellees.

  7. State ex Inf. McKittrick v. Globe-Democrat

    341 Mo. 862 (Mo. 1937)   Cited 40 times
    Explaining the ‘qualitative sense’ to mean that ‘the fact that skill alone [would] bring contestants to a correct solution of a greater part of the problems does not make the contest any the less a lottery if chance enters into the solution of another lesser part of the problems and thereby proximately influences the final result'

    But it was held that skill was the predominant element in the contest, and that it was not a lottery. [See D'Orio v. Startup Candy Co., 71 Utah, 410, 266 P. 1037, 60 A.L.R. 338; D'Orio v. Jacobs, 151 Wn. 297, 275 P. 563; Johnson v. McDonald, 132 Or. 622, 287 P. 220; Boatwright v. State, 118 Tex.Crim. 381, 38 S.W.2d 87.] This brings us to several decisions in which the facts were closely similar to those in the case at bar.

  8. Boatwright v. State

    118 Tex. Crim. 381 (Tex. Crim. App. 1931)   Cited 6 times
    Defining lottery as any scheme where the elements of consideration, prize and chance are present

    " The device involved in the case under consideration was held not violative of statutes substantially the same as ours in the following cases: Johnson v. McDonald, 132 Or. 622, 287 P. 220; D'Orio v. Jacobs, 151 Wn. 297, 275 P. 563; D'Orio v. Startup Candy Co. (Supreme Court of Utah), 266 P. 1037. The county court for British Columbia sitting at Vancouver, B. C., in O'Orio v. Leigh and Cuthbertson, Limited, according to the report contained in Western Weekly Reports, 1929, vol. 1, page 122, held the identical game involved here to be one of skill and not within the inhibition of the statute prohibiting games of chance.