The purpose of voir dire is to "obtain[] an impartial jury, in part by disqualifying biased jurors." Doret v. United States, 765 A.2d 47, 53 (D.C. 2000). The task is made easy when the court has "received responses from the juror that permit an inference that the juror in question would not be able to decide the matter objectively." Id.
Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 114 S.Ct. 2431, 129 L.Ed.2d 476 (1994) (narrowly construing the term "statement"). See United States v. Hammond (Hammond I), 681 A.2d 1140, 1144-46 (D.C. 1996); see also Laumer, 409 A.2d at 199; Doret v. United States, 765 A.2d 47, 65 (D.C. 2000), abrogated in part on other grounds by Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60-65, 124 S.Ct. 1354. FED.R.EVID. 804(b)(3).
Id.Doret v. United States, 765 A.2d 47, 62 (D.C. 2000) (superseded in part by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004)). Under our Laumer decision, the trial court must "`undertake a three-step inquiry to ascertain (1) whether the declarant, in fact, made a statement; (2) whether the declarant is unavailable; and (3) whether corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.
Rule 804(b)(3) requires "a three-step inquiry to ascertain (1) whether the declarant, in fact, made a statement; (2) whether the declarant is unavailable; and (3) whether corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement." Laumer, 409 A.2d at 199; see also Doret v. United States, 765 A.2d 47, 64 (D.C. 2000). In the present case, it is undisputed that Aleem made a statement (although the judge held that the statement was not against Aleem's interest because it was made to Ingram's attorney and not to a law enforcement officer). It is likewise undisputed that Aleem was unavailable, for he invoked his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination and refused to testify.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. "`The central concern of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact.'" Doret v. United States, 765 A.2d 47, 62 (D.C. 2000) (quoting Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 123-24, 119 S.Ct. 1887, 144 L.Ed.2d 117 (1999)) (in turn quoting Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 111 L.Ed.2d 666 (1990)), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1030, 121 S.Ct. 1980, 149 L.Ed.2d 772 (2001). The Supreme Court's decision in Crawford, supra note 22, 541 U.S. at 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, altered prior Confrontation Clause jurisprudence for admissibility of hearsay statements in a criminal trial.
It is universally recognized that "accomplice testimony is inherently less reliable than that of other witnesses." Price v. United States, 531 A.2d 984, 986 (D.C. 1987) (quoting United States v. (Lloyd) Lee, 165 U.S.App.D.C. 50, 57, 506 F.2d 111, 118 (1974)); accord, (Millie) Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 541 (1986) (declaring that accomplices' confessions that incriminate defendants are "presumptively unreliable"); Doret v. United States, 765 A.2d 47, 66 (D.C. 2000) ("suspect at best") (quoting United States v. Hammond, 681 A.2d 1140, 1145 (D.C. 1996)). The reason for the courts' gingerly handling of uncorroborated accomplice accusations is simple.
No. 00-9233. DORET v. UNITED STATES. Ct. App.D.C. Certiorari denied. Reported below: 765 A.2d 47. No. 00-9236. ROSELLO v. UNITED STATES. C.A. 11th Cir. Certiorari denied.
However, "[t]he court is allowed to dismiss a juror on the ground of inferable bias only after having received responses from the juror that permit an inference that the juror in question would not be able to decide the matter objectively." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Doret v. United States, 765 A.2d 47, 53 (D.C. 2000), abrogated in part onother grounds by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004)). Historically, our rule has been that the trial court’s "rulings will be affirmed on appeal unless the record reveals an abuse of discretion resulting from an erroneous ruling coupled with substantial prejudice to the defendant."
However, there is no impediment to a grand jury calling a target of its investigation to testify. See, e.g., U.S. v. Williston, 862 F.3d 1023, 1027 (10th Cir. 2017) (addressing certain rights of grand jury witnesses, including "witnesses implicated in the criminal activities that the grand jury is investigating"); Gilbert v. United States, 203 F.3d 820 (unpublished disposition available at 2000 WL 20581, at *1) (acknowledging, in relation to an incident where the use of force by law enforcement officers had led to the hospitalization of an arrestee, that "a grand jury was investigating the incident and receiving testimony from many of the officers involved" (emphasis added)); Greenfield v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 382 N.J. Super. 254, 262, 888 A.2d 507, 511 (App. Div. 2006) (observing lack of rights available to "a target [who] is called as a witness by an investigating grand jury").
That discretion is not unlimited, however, and "[t]he court is allowed to dismiss a juror on the ground of inferable bias only after having received responses from the juror that permit an inference that the juror in question would not be able to decide the matter objectively." Doret v. United States , 765 A.2d 47, 53 (D.C. 2000) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted), abrogated in part on other grounds byCrawford v. Washington , 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004).Under these principles, we hold that the exclusion for cause of Juror 7575–B was erroneous.