Opinion
Court of Appeals No. A-10920 Trial Court No. 4SM-10-126 CR No. 5944
04-24-2013
DOREEN ONE, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Appearances: David D. Reineke, Assistant Public Defender, and Quinlan Steiner, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Mary Gilson, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Special Prosecutions and Appeals, Anchorage, and Michael C. Geraghty, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
NOTICE
Memorandum decisions of this court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d) and Paragraph 7 of the Guidelines for Publication of Court of Appeals Decisions (Court of Appeals Order No. 3). Accordingly, this memorandum decision may not be cited as binding authority for any proposition of law.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND JUDGMENT
Appeal from the District Court, Fourth Judicial District, St. Mary's, Dennis P. Cummings, Judge.
Appearances: David D. Reineke, Assistant Public Defender, and Quinlan Steiner, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Mary Gilson, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Special Prosecutions and Appeals, Anchorage, and Michael C. Geraghty, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Mannheimer, Chief Judge, Allard, Judge, and Smith, Superior Court Judge.
Sitting by assignment made pursuant to article IV, section 16 of the Alaska Constitution.
Judge SMITH.
Doreen One appeals her conviction for repeat minor consuming alcoholic beverages. She argues that her trial judge impermissibly refused to allow her attorney to cross-examine one of the State's witnesses, Jonathan Boots, about the fact that he was on misdemeanor probation. As we explain in this opinion, we conclude that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, both because the evidence against One was overwhelming and because the jury was aware, from other circumstances, that Boots might be biased in favor of the State.
AS 04.16.050(c).
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Factual and procedural background
The State presented the testimony of three witnesses at trial. The first witness was One's mother, Lulu, who testified that she called the village police officer, Andrea Shorty, to report that she had seen her daughter staggering, and that she thought that her daughter was probably drinking alcoholic beverages.
The State's second witness was Officer Shorty. Shorty testified that when she received Lulu One's call, she was driving her four-wheeler in the village, accompanied by her husband, Jonathan Boots. A few minutes after she received the call, Shorty and her husband saw One walking down the road, and both of them observed that One was staggering when she walked.
When Shorty approached One, she could smell alcohol on One's breath and person. One swayed, and her speech was slurred. Shorty then contacted One's mother, Lulu, but Lulu told Shorty that she did not want One to come home until she was sober. Accordingly, Shorty took One to the public safety building and kept her there for the night. One was upset, but she admitted to Shorty that she had been consuming alcohol.
The State's third and final witness was Shorty's husband, Jonathan Boots. Boots corroborated his wife's testimony about observing One staggering along the road. Boots added that, after his wife decided to take One into custody (rather than take her home), One jumped off the four-wheeler while they were on the way to the public safety building. Boots explained that he had to chase her and catch her — and that, when he did so, he too could smell alcohol on her breath.
Before trial, One's attorney asked the trial judge for permission to cross-examine Boots about the fact that he was on misdemeanor probation at the time of this incident. The defense attorney argued that this fact was relevant to show that Boots might be biased in favor of the State. The trial judge denied this request, concluding that the mere fact that Boots was on probation did not establish that he was biased in favor of the State.
Why we conclude that any error was harmless
On appeal, One contends that the judge's ruling improperly abridged her right to confront and cross-examine Boots. We need not resolve this issue, because we conclude that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
First, even though the jury did not hear about Boots's probationary status, the evidence at One's trial revealed significant reasons why Boots might be biased in favor of the State. The jury was aware that Boots was married to the village police officer, and the jury was also aware that Boots assisted his wife in taking One into custody.
(Conversely, the jury was also aware that Lulu One was Boots's aunt, and that Boots was a first cousin to One herself.)
Second, Boots's credibility as a witness was not a critical factor in the State's case, because his testimony added relatively little to the testimony of the other witnesses.
To prove the charged offense, the State did not have to prove that One was intoxicated — only that she had consumed some amount of alcoholic beverages. As we have explained, One's mother contacted Officer Shorty because she saw her daughter staggering on the road, and she believed that her daughter had been drinking. Soon after receiving this call, Shorty came upon One, and Shorty verified that One was staggering as she walked. When Shorty made contact with One, she found that One's speech was slurred, and that One smelled of alcoholic beverages. Later, One confessed to Shorty that she had been drinking.
One did not testify, and the defense offered no other witnesses.
Given the evidence as a whole, we conclude that even if the trial judge committed error by refusing to allow the defense attorney to cross-examine Boots about his misdemeanor probation status, this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Conclusion
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.