Opinion
F086783
12-24-2024
CARMEN DORANTES, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. FRANCISCO JIMENEZ REYES et al., Defendants and Respondents.
Freeman Firm, Thomas H. Keeling; Broderick Legal Group, William Broderick-Villa, for Plaintiff and Appellant. Law Offices of Bart Barringer, Bart Barringer and Nicholas J. Loncarich, for Defendants and Respondents.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County, No. CV-19-006045 Sonny S. Sandhu, Judge.
Freeman Firm, Thomas H. Keeling; Broderick Legal Group, William Broderick-Villa, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Law Offices of Bart Barringer, Bart Barringer and Nicholas J. Loncarich, for Defendants and Respondents.
OPINION
SMITH, J.
This matter pertains to a property dispute among family members over a family residence in Ceres. Plaintiff Carmen Dorantes brought the instant action against Defendants Silvia and Francisco Reyes, a married couple. Silvia is the sister of Dorantes's deceased husband, Armando Ramirez. Armando Ramirez owned the Ceres residence along with the Reyeses, as joint tenants. Armando Ramirez and Dorantes had lived in the Ceres house for years. Upon Armando Ramirez's death, the Reyeses recorded an affidavit of death ofjoint tenant and subsequently sought to evict Dorantes, who responded by filing this action. After a short trial, the trial court ruled in favor of the Reyeses. Dorantes appealed. We affirm.
We resort to first names for clarity where necessary.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The instant dispute is centered on a property located on Joppa Lane in Ceres (Ceres property or the property). The property in question is a family residence. Concepcion Ramirez was the family patriarch; his wife was Condelaria Flores. Concepcion and Condelaria had four children. The oldest was their daughter, Silvia Reyes; there followed three sons, Mario, Julian, and Armando Ramirez. Silvia Reyes married Francisco Reyes in 1983. Armando Ramirez married Carmen Dorantes in 2007. Dorantes is the plaintiff in this matter and Silvia and Francisco Reyes are the defendants.
In 1993, Concepcion Ramirez lived at the Ceres property, along with Mario, Julian, and Armando (Silvia never lived at the Ceres property). Julian moved out in 1995; Concepcion died in 1998; and Mario moved out in 2004. Thereafter, Armando was the only one living at the property. In 2005, Dorantes and her daughter from a prior relationship moved in with Armando (Armando did not have any biological or adoptive children). Armando died in July 2019. Dorantes continued to live at Ceres property after Armando's death and, at the time of trial, still lived there with her daughter.
The Ceres property was acquired by the Ramirez-Reyes family in 1988. Specifically, with regard to title to the Ceres property, a grant deed recorded on March 3, 1988, conveyed title to Julian Ramirez (an unmarried man); Armando Ramirez (an unmarried man); and Francisco Reyes and Silvia Reyes (husband and wife), all as joint tenants. The Ceres property was bought with funds obtained from the sale of another property owned by Concepcion, Silvia, and Julian in Patterson. Julian and Silvia applied their respective shares of the proceeds from the sale of the Patterson property to the downpayment for the purchase of the Ceres property. The Patterson property was bought in 1982 and sold in 1987.
In 1993, Julian gave up title to the Ceres property as he no longer wanted to contribute to paying the mortgage; the others remained on the title as joint tenants. A new deed was recorded in 1993 reflecting that title to the Ceres property was held in joint tenancy by Armando Ramirez, and Silvia Reyes and Francisco Reyes (husband and wife). Various Ramirez and Reyes family members contributed to the mortgage payments on the Ceres property until it was paid off, including Silvia Reyes and Francisco Reyes (both of whom made mortgage payments from their salaries). The mortgage was fully paid off in 2003.
Silvia Reyes was a production worker at a cannery and Francisco Reyes was a maintenance technician. Concepcion, Mario, Armando, and Julian Ramirez also made mortgage payments on the property between 1993 and 2002.
As noted, Armando Ramirez, who had been living at the Ceres property with Carmen Dorantes and her daughter, died in July 2019. Thereafter, on August 21, 2019, Francisco Reyes recorded, with respect to the Ceres property and on behalf of the surviving joint tenants, an affidavit of death of joint tenant. Dorantes was eventually served with an eviction notice.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Carmen Dorantes filed a first amended complaint (complaint) on October 2, 2020, in the Stanislaus County Superior Court (the matter came before Judge Sonny S. Sandhu). The complaint alleged a cause of action for quiet title. Essentially, via this cause of action, Dorantes sought to quiet title to the Ceres property against the claims of title asserted by Silvia Reyes and Francisco Reyes on grounds that they took title to the property on Armando's death, as the surviving joint tenants. The complaint alleged that Silvia and Francisco's claims to the entirety of the property were invalid and that Dorantes succeeded to Armando's one-third interest in the property. In sum, the complaint sought an order quieting title in Dorantes's favor as owner of an undivided one-third interest as a tenant in common in the Ceres property. Dorantes's complaint also alleged ancillary causes of action for unjust enrichment and constructive trust, neither of which is at issue on appeal. For their part, the Reyeses filed a cross-complaint to quiet title as joint tenants with right of survivorship in the Ceres property.
On August 30, 2022, the trial court presided over a court trial on the parties' quiet title claims. The parties filed their respective post-trial briefs on November 18, 2022. Dorantes urged the trial court to apply In re Brace (2020) 9 Cal.5th 903 (Brace) to the instant matter. She argued that, under Brace, Silvia and Francisco's designated interests in the Ceres property were properly characterized as community property and that community property is incompatible with a joint tenancy. Dorantes argued the joint tenancy as to the Ceres property was therefore invalid ab initio and the three owners (Silvia, Francisco, Armando) should be determined to hold title as tenants in common, each with a one-third interest without any right of survivorship. The Reyeses, in their post-trial brief, posited that Brace was simply inapplicable to the present matter and urged the trial court to reject Dorantes's contentions regarding the invalidity of the joint tenancy as to the Ceres property.
On February 16, 2023, the trial court ruled in favor of the Reyeses. The court explained its ruling in a tentative decision and proposed statement of decision following trial. Carmen filed objections to the tentative decision and proposed statement of decision following trial. Thereafter, after hearing from the parties, the court issued, on May 18, 2023, its final statement of decision following court trial. As noted in the final statement of decision, the court determined that "our Supreme Court's holding in In re Brace (Brace) (2020) 9 Cal.5th 903 does not apply to the case at bar." The court further explained in the final statement of decision that Armando's interest in the Ceres property "transferred to [the Reyeses] by right of survivorship upon his passing, leaving no interest remaining for [Dorantes] to inherit." The court concluded, as reflected in the final statement of decision: "As such, there are no grounds to quiet title and the Court finds in favor of [the Reyeses]." This appeal followed.
The court declined to address Dorantes's objections in its statement of decision, noting that Dorantes deployed her objections merely to "reargue the merits."
DISCUSSION
I. The Trial Court Properly Determined There Were No Grounds to Quiet Title in Favor of Dorantes
A. Standard of Review
Dorantes contends the instant matter presents legal questions and that "[t]he facts material to resolution of those legal issues are undisputed." She notes that "[l]egal issues are reviewed de novo." (See Ghirardo v. Antonioli (1994) 8 Cal.4th 791, 799-800.) The Reyeses do not challenge Dorantes's position as to the standard of review.
" 'In reviewing a judgment based upon a statement of decision following a bench trial, we review questions of law de novo. [Citation.] We apply a substantial evidence standard of review to the trial court's findings of fact.'" (Veiseh v. Stapp (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 1099, 1104, quoting Thompson v. Asimos (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 970, 981.) We will independently review the trial court's determination that the Reyeses, along with Armando, properly held title to the Ceres property as joint tenants with right of survivorship, and that on Armando's death, his interest automatically transferred to the Reyeses. To the extent the trial court made any relevant factual determinations, we will review those for substantial evidence.
B. The Brace Decision
In Brace, our Supreme Court considered the interaction of the form of title presumption of Evidence Code section 662 and the community property presumption of Family Code section 760, in the context of a dispute between a married couple and a bankruptcy trustee. At issue in Brace was the status of two pieces of real property the couple had acquired with community funds. The couple held title to both properties as"' "husband and wife as joint tenants." '" (Brace, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 913.) The husband subsequently filed a bankruptcy petition, which his wife did not join. Under the Bankruptcy Code, if the properties were community property, then the entirety of the couple's interests in the properties would become part of the husband's bankruptcy estate; if the properties instead were held in joint tenancy, then only the husband's one-half separate property interest would become part of his bankruptcy estate. (Ibid.)
The Brace court held that "when a married couple uses community funds to acquire property with joint tenancy title on or after January 1, 1975, the property is presumptively community property under Family code section 760 in a dispute between the couple and a bankruptcy trustee." (Brace, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 912.) Brace explained: "It would carve a major hole in the community property system to hold that Evidence Code section 662, a general statute that addresses the import of legal title-and not Family Code section 760, a statute that specifically addresses the characterization of property acquired during marriage-governs the characterization of property acquired during marriage for all purposes other than divorce." (Id. at p. 928.)
Brace also clarified that joint titling of property acquired by spouses using community funds is not sufficient by itself to transmute community property into separate property in situations like the one at issue in Brace, where the Family Code section 760 presumption controls. (Brace, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 938.)
Our Supreme Court further held, however, that a different rule applies in the probate context. The court stated: "[O]ur approach does not undermine the stability of title in the context of probate.... [¶] Courts have consistently held that for property titled in joint tenancy, the form of title controls at death[, and] . we see no indication that . any subsequent development suggests an intent by the Legislature to disturb the rule that the form of title controls the disposition of joint tenancy property at death." (Brace, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 931-932.) Brace emphasized: "Our decision today does not alter the well-established default rule that form of title controls at death, nor does it alter the procedures through which a surviving joint tenant may clear title to real property held in joint tenancy." (Id. at p. 934, italics added.)
C. The Trial Court's Ruling
As noted, the trial court issued a statement of decision following the trial in this matter. Preliminarily, the trial court observed that Dorantes's initial complaint sought quiet title to the Ceres property on an adverse possession theory. However, after the issuance of the California Supreme Court's Brace decision, Dorantes filed a first amended complaint. The trial court noted: "[Dorantes's first amended complaint] asserted the theory that the deed purporting to establish title in joint tenancy was ineffective . based on the holding in Brace that the general community property presumption for acquisitions during marriage supersedes the common law presumption that the title reflected by a recorded deed controls." The trial court observed that the bench trial on the issue "consumed three hours and 28 minutes over the span of two court days." (Boldface omitted.) The trial court also noted that "the issue presented is primarily a question of law as to the application of Brace and relevant legal authorities to the facts," which are "largely undisputed."
The trial court summarized the parties' theories and arguments. The trial court stated at the outset that Dorantes's argument relied "almost exclusively on Brace" but that such reliance appeared to be misplaced, given that Brace itself limited application of its holding "to the context of dissolution cases and related bankruptcy proceedings." Dorantes's argument was that under Brace, the community property presumption of Family Code section 760 trumped the form of title presumption of Evidence Code section 662 in virtually every type of situation, including here, where the Reyeses entered, with Armando, into a joint tenancy in the Ceres property. Dorantes argued that Brace had rendered joint tenancy incompatible with community property in circumstances such as those of the instant case. According to Dorantes, to the extent Silvia and Francisco's interest in the Ceres property was community property under Family Code section 760, they could not be said to individually own equal but separate interests in the joint tenancy with Armando, thereby severing the joint tenancy in the Ceres property. Dorantes further contended that, under Brace, transmutation of community property into separate property required an express declaration and could not be accomplished merely by a joint tenancy deed itself and, consequently, the joint tenancy deed for the Ceres property was of no import.
Dorantes posited that since the joint tenancy in the Ceres property was invalid, title defaulted, by operation of law (Civ. Code, § 686) to a tenancy in common. More specifically, Dorantes theorized that the joint tenancy in the Ceres property defaulted to a tenancy in common in which Silvia and Francisco collectively owned two thirds share and Armando owned a one third share. Dorantes contended Armando's one third share would be devisable, upon his death, to Carmen, his statutory heir under Probate Code section 7000.
The trial court stated that Dorantes noted that Silvia and Francisco had acknowledged in their interrogatory responses that their interests in the Ceres property were community property interests and further that they had not effected any transmutation declarations. Dorantes also pointed out that Silvia and Francisco had made mortgage payments on the Ceres property using community property funds.
The trial court next summarized the contentions of the Reyeses. The trial court stated: "Francisco and Silvia argue that the subsequent history of Brace offers no cases applying its holding to a situation involving facts analogous to the case at bar and, were the Court to do so, the result would mean 'countless' properties in California held by married couples in joint tenancy would suddenly be called into question, a result that our Supreme Court could not have intended."
The trial court further noted that the Reyeses made an alternative argument as well: "Next, Francisco and Silvia argue that because the funds used to purchase the Property were from the sale of another residence in Patterson by Concep[c]ion [Ramirez], Silvia Reyes and Julian Ramirez Flores, there were no community property funds belonging to Francisco and Silvia involved. They point to language in Brace referring to a married couple using community funds to acquire property in joint tenancy as the basis for [the primacy of] the community property presumption [there]. (Brace, supra, 9 Cal.5th at 911.) In contrast, the [Ceres] Property was acquired using the separate property funds of Concep[c]ion, Silvia and Julian. Accordingly, Brace does not apply."
The trial court then turned to analyzing the dispute at hand. The trial court first concluded that Brace did not control the outcome of the instant dispute. Specifically, the trial court observed:
"Contrary to [Dorantes's] argument ... Brace does not abrogate the 'common law presumption' arising from the state of title in situations other than those in which characterization of community property between extant spouses and/or third-party creditors (including Bankruptcy proceedings) are at issue. (Estate of Wall (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 168, 175 [acknowledging 'well-established' rule that 'form of title controls at death' in dispute between decedent's widow and his children and holding trial court erred in concluding Fam. Code, § 760 community property presumption prevailed over Evid. Code, § 662 when determining character of real property titled in decedent's name]; see also, Pearce v. Briggs (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 466, 482 [testator's attempted severance [of joint tenancy] by will failed to rebut title presumption established by parties' joint tenancy deed [on testator's death]].)
"For instance, [Dorantes] ignores that some property characterization principles apply only for purposes of a property division upon marriage dissolution or legal separation, most notably the Family Code section 2581 presumption that title taken jointly by spouses during marriage is community property, subject to the [Family Code] section 2640 right of reimbursement if the source of funds may be traced to separate property. (Dorn v. Solomon (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 650, 651.) If this were a dissolution action between Silvia and Francisco prior to Armando's death, being the more specific of the two, [Family Code] section 2581 would obtain and resort to [Family Code] section 760 would be of no import. Simply put, the fundamental flaw of [Dorantes's] argument is that it treats Brace as an all-encompassing pronouncement about the supremacy of the community property presumption when, in reality, marital acquisitions may be characterized one way when the dispute arises in a dissolution or legal separation proceeding and another way when the issue arises upon the death of a spouse and/or a non-spouse co-owner. Importantly, Brace also concluded that in the probate context the importance of stability of title means that 'the form of title controls at death.' (Brace, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 931 and 934; Estate of Wall, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p 175.)"
In sum, the trial court reasoned that Brace did not establish a universal rule that the community property presumption of Family Code section 760 always trumped the form of title presumption of Evidence Code section 662. Rather, the applicability of the community property presumption (Fam. Code, § 760) and the title presumption (Evid. Code, § 662), respectively, was contingent on the circumstances and context at issue. The court concluded that Brace did not control the outcome here.
The trial court went on to explain that the 1993 deed for the Ceres property that specified that Armando, Silvia, and Francisco held title to the property as joint tenants, was valid. The court noted:
"It is well-settled that spouses in California may co-own property as joint tenants, tenants in common, community property or community property with right of survivorship. (Fam. Code, §§ 750, 297.5.) That said, [Dorantes] is correct that community property ownership cannot coexist with joint tenancy or tenancy in common ownership in the same property between the same co-owners. Thus, each party's interest in joint tenancy or tenancy in common property is their own separate property. (Estate of Mitchell (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1378, 1385.) [¶] ... [¶]
"Here, it is undisputed (and there is no evidence to the contrary) that the source of funds used to acquire the [Ceres] Property originated from Silvia and the other[s]'s separate property. Consequently, [Dorantes's] reliance on [Family Code] section 852 and the express declaration requirement is a double-edged sword that cuts both ways. To transmute Silvia's separate property interest to community under [Family Code] section 852 an express declaration in writing would have been required and, as demonstrated by [Dorantes's] own citations, a mere deed or conveyance in joint tenancy (in contrast to an Inter Spousal Transfer Grant Deed) does not satisfy the express declaration requirement. And if Silvia's interest was separate property, it follows that Francisco's was as well. [¶] . [¶]
"In conclusion, the Court notes that [Dorantes's] evidence based on the Reyes[es'] discovery responses were not deemed by the Court to be relevant or persuasive evidence because a lay opinion or admission as to a question of law is generally not admissible, and certainly is not binding on the Court. (Evid. Code, §§ 702, 800.) [¶] ... [¶]
"The court holds that the interest of Plaintiff's decedent in the Property transferred to Defendants by right of survivorship upon his passing, leaving no interest remaining for Plaintiff to inherit. As such, there are no grounds to quiet title and the Court finds in favor of Defendants as to the first phase of this case."
As discussed below, we affirm the trial court's ultimate determination albeit our analysis diverges in part from that of the trial court.
D. Analysis
"Community property is all property, no matter where situated, acquired by a married person or registered domestic partner during the marriage/domestic partnership while domiciled in California, unless otherwise provided by statute." (Greenwald et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Real Property Transactions (The Rutter Group 2024), Ch. 4-C, ¶ 4:166; see Fam. Code, § 760; see also Fam. Code, § 297.5, subds. (a), (b), (c) (registered domestic partners have rights and obligations of spouses under California law).) "By contrast, a spouse's or registered domestic partner's separate property consists generally of premarital/prepartnership acquisitions; acquisitions during the marriage/domestic partnership by gift, devise or descent; the rents, issues and profits on all of such property; and the spouse's/domestic partner's postseparation earnings and accumulations not traceable to a community property interest." (Greenwald et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Real Property Transactions, supra, Ch. 4-C, ¶ 4:166; see Fam. Code, §§ 770, 771, subd. (a), 772.)
"During a marriage or registered domestic partnership, each spouse/domestic partner has 'present, existing and equal' interests in the parties' community property." (Greenwald et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Real Property Transactions, supra, Ch. 4-C, ¶ 4:169; Fam. Code, § 751.) "The parties' 'equal' interests are 50-50 interests in the whole of the community property-not 'exclusive' interests in only half of the community property." (Greenwald et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Real Property Transactions, supra, Ch. 4-C, ¶ 4:169, quoting In re McIntyre (9th Cir. 2000) 222 F.3d 655, 658 [applying California law].)
Family Code section 760 provides: "Except as otherwise provided by statute, all property, real or personal wherever situated, acquired by a married person during the marriage while domiciled in this state is community property."
More specifically, a spouse's real property acquisitions during the marriage are presumptively community property unless traceable to a separate property source. (Civ. Code, § 687; Fam. Code, §§ 760, 770; see Brace, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 935-938 [finding (i) community property presumption of Fam. Code, § 760 applies outside the context of dissolution proceedings (that is, it applies not only to interspousal disputes, but also to disputes between one or both spouses and a bankruptcy trustee), and (ii) the community property presumption takes precedence over the statutory presumption from the form of title (that is, titling deed as joint tenancy by itself does not transmute property at issue into separate property for purposes of such disputes)]; see also Trenk v. Soheili (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 1033, 1046 (Trenk) [in the context of certain disputes necessitating property characterization (that is, interspousal disputes or disputes of one or both spouses with a bankruptcy trustee), community property presumption "cannot be rebutted simply by the form of title in which a married couple holds property"; thus, the fact that in Trenk a couple "held title" to property as "joint tenants" was not sufficient to show the relevant property "in fact was separate property"].)
As explained in Trenk, the source of funds does not have to be proven in order for the community property presumption of Family Code section 760 to apply. "To the contrary: The law is clear that the presumption may be rebutted with proof that separate funds were used to purchase the property at issue." (Trenk, supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 1048.)
Contrary to Dorantes's suggestion, there is no categorical or absolute contradiction between community property and joint tenancies. Married couples "may hold property as joint tenants or tenants in common instead of community property." (Greenwald et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Real Property Transactions, supra, Ch. 4-C, ¶ 4:166; see Fam. Code, § 750.) Indeed, courts have noted that "[o]rdinarily, holding community property in joint tenancy form is mutually advantageous, during marriage as well as after dissolution." (Raney v. Cerkueira, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 321.) Similarly, our Supreme Court explained in Brace that a married couple may hold property" 'as joint tenants or tenants in common, or as community property, or as community property with right of survivorship.' [Citation.] These various forms of title give rise to different incidents of ownership. Joint tenancy creates a right of survivorship, whereby title passes to the surviving spouse without going through probate. [Citation.] In addition, joint tenants typically have separate interests in the property. [Citation.] This means that one joint tenant's interest cannot be reached by the creditors of the other joint tenant. One joint tenant can also unilaterally sever the joint tenancy or alienate his or her share." (Brace, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 916.)
Family Code section 750 provides: "Spouses may hold property as joint tenants or tenants in common, or as community property, or as community property with a right of survivorship."
During the pendency of a dissolution proceeding, however,"' "it is illogical that [the] parties ... would envision or desire the operation of survivorship. An untimely death results in a windfall to the surviving spouse, a result neither party presumably intends or anticipates.' (Citation.) Thus, once a dissolution petition has been filed, a spouse may well wish to sever any joint tenancies with the other spouse.'" (Raney v. Cerkueira (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 311, 321.)
Brace further observed: "Community real property, by contrast, generally cannot be alienated by one spouse without the consent of the other spouse. (Fam. Code, § 1102.) In addition, 'the community estate is liable for a debt incurred by either spouse before or during marriage' except as otherwise expressly provided by statute. [Citations.] At death, there is no automatic right of survivorship; half of the community property belongs to the surviving spouse, and the other half belongs to the decedent. (Prob. Code, § 100, subd. (a).)" (Brace, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 917.)
Brace cautioned, however:" The various forms in which a married couple can vest title to property do not invariably reflect the underlying nature of the couple's ownership. _ Many couples use community funds to purchase a home and take title as 'husband and wife as joint tenants' without an additional indication in the deed as to whether the property is community or separate." (Brace, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 917.) The property characterization issues arising from the lack of clarity in such deeds become relevant only in certain types of disputes, for example interspousal disputes and disputes between one or both spouses and a bankruptcy trustee. (See, e.g., Fam. Code, § 2581 [property acquired in joint form during the marriage is, upon dissolution, presumptively community property -- discussed below); see also Brace, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 935 ["In sum, we hold that the community property presumption in Family Code section 760 applies not only to dissolution action, but also to a dispute between one or both spouses and a bankruptcy trustee, and that [in such cases,] Evidence Code section 662 (form of title presumption) does not apply when it conflicts with the Family Code section 760 presumption."].)
Regarding joint tenancy arrangements, "[b]roadly, a joint tenancy is co-ownership title among two or more persons created by a single transfer that expressly declares the form of co-ownership to be a joint tenancy." (Greenwald et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Real Property Transactions, supra, Ch. 4-C, ¶ 4:146.) More specifically, a joint tenancy is defined by statute as a property "owned by two or more persons in equal shares, by a title created by a single will or transfer, when expressly declared in the will or transfer to be a joint tenancy, or by transfer from a sole owner to himself or herself and others, or from tenants in common or joint tenants to themselves or some of them, or to themselves or any of them and others, or from spouses, when holding title as community property or otherwise to themselves or to themselves and others or to one of them and to another or others, when expressly declared in the transfer to be a joint tenancy, or when granted or devised to executors or trustees as joint tenants." (Civ. Code, § 683.)
"The creation of a joint tenancy is subject to the statute of frauds and, therefore, generally must be evidenced by a writing expressly declaring the joint tenancy." (Greenwald et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Real Property Transactions, supra, Ch. 4-C, ¶ 4:146; Civ. Code, § 683.)
"For property owners concerned about disposition at death, the right of survivorship generally is viewed as representing the greatest advantage of joint tenancy title over tenancies in common. ... [A] deceased joint tenant's interest vests immediately in the surviving joint tenant(s) without legal action. In addition, the surviving joint tenant(s) take title to the deceased's interest free and clear of all involuntary liens and claims against the deceased joint tenant." (Greenwald et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Real Property Transactions, supra, Ch. 4-C, ¶ 4:152, italics added.) Joint tenancy between spouses presumptively passes by right of survivorship upon the joint tenant spouse's death, not as community property pursuant to the Family Code section 2581 presumption (see above). (Dorn v. Solomon (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 650, 652.)
With regard to the downsides of holding property as a joint tenancy, it bears mention that "[t]hough a joint tenant's interest may be the subject of a lifetime conveyance [citation], it cannot be bequeathed by will (the right of survivorship prevails . unless, of course, the decedent is the last remaining joint tenant)." (Greenwald et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Real Property Transactions, supra, Ch. 4-C, ¶ 4:154.)
The Family Code section 760 definition of community property (see footnote 6, ante) is applied as a general presumption that all marital/domestic partnership acquisitions are community property. (Greenwald et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Real Property Transactions, supra, Ch. 4-C, ¶ 4:167.) However, Brace emphasized that it did not change the long-standing principle applicable to joint tenancies that the form of title presumption takes precedence over the Family Code section 760 presumption upon the death of a joint tenant. Brace stated: "Our decision today does not alter the well-established default rule that form of title controls at death, nor does it alter the procedures through which a surviving joint tenant may clear title to real property held in joint tenancy." (Brace, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 934, italics added.)
The situation is different when marriage dissolution bears on a joint tenancy involving spouses. Unlike the general Family Code section 760 presumption, the Family Code section 2581 presumption is a special, superseding community property presumption that attaches to property acquired during the marriage/domestic partnership in any joint title form and only for purposes of a property division upon marriage/domestic partnership dissolution or legal separation. (Greenwald et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Real Property Transactions, supra, Ch. 4-C, ¶ 4:168; Hogoboom et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law (The Rutter Group 2024), Ch. 8-A, ¶ 8:24, Ch. 8-B, ¶ 838.) Under Family Code section 2581, the acquisitions of spouses in "joint form" are presumptively community property for purposes of property division upon dissolution or legal separation. Thus, upon dissolution, under Family Code section 2581, "[a]bsent adequate rebuttal, the separate property incidents of ownership are swallowed up by the right to a 50-50 community property division." (Hogoboom et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law, supra, Ch. 8-A, ¶ 8:24.)
Thus, to reiterate, the special presumption of Family Code section 2581 does not affect the right of survivorship that accrues to a joint tenant spouse upon the death of the other joint tenant spouse.
The community property joint title presumption is a "presumption affecting the burden of proof." (Fam. Code, § 2581.) "The party contesting community property status thus bears the burden of producing sufficient rebuttal evidence [citation] showing different ownership interests; the contestant's burden of proof is by a preponderance of the evidence." (Hogoboom et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law, supra, Ch. 8-B, ¶ 8:423.) "The [Family Code section] 2581 presumption may be rebutted only by a writing executed by the parties (including a clear statement in the deed or other documentary evidence of title) stating the joint title property is separate property. Tracing to a separate property source will not suffice but may support a statutory right of reimbursement." (Hogoboom et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law, supra, Ch. 8-B, ¶ 8:38; Fam. Code, §§ 2581, subds. (a) & (b), 2640, subd. (b); Brace, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 929.) "So long as the issue is properly before the court in a marriage dissolution or legal separation proceeding, the [Family Code section] 2581 presumption attaches to joint tenancy property acquired during marriage to effectively defeat the 'survivorship' interest that normally accompanies a joint tenant's title. I.e., absent evidence of a written agreement rebutting the § 2581 community property presumption, the § 2581 presumption controls over the form of title (joint tenancy) presumption." (Hogoboom et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law, supra, Ch. 8-B, ¶ 8:412.) "The joint tenancy right of survivorship prevails, however, if either spouse dies before entry of judgment terminating marital status." (Ibid.)
In short, "marital acquisitions may be characterized one way when the dispute arises in a dissolution or legal separation proceeding and another way when the issue arises upon the death of a spouse." (Hogoboom et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law, supra, Ch. 8-B, ¶ 8:45; see Abbett Elec. Corp. v. Storek (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1460, 1466-1468 [parties' characterization of joint tenancy residence as community property in dissolution proceeding, on assumption Fam. Code, § 2581 required such characterization for dissolution purposes only, was not binding in independent third-party creditor suit].) The present case concerns the death of a joint tenant (namely, Armando) and, therefore, the form of title presumption controls.
Once again, "[u]pon a joint tenant's death, joint tenancy property ordinarily passes by right of survivorship to the surviving joint tenant(s). However, if spouses acquire property as joint tenants during marriage, the Family [Code] § 2581 community property presumption attaches for property division purposes upon marriage dissolution or legal separation [citation] and, absent an adequate rebuttal, the joint tenant spouses' interests must be divided equally ([Fam. Code,] § 2550)." (Hogoboom et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law, supra, Ch. 8-B, ¶ 8:46.)
To sum up, Silvia and Francisco held property jointly with a third party, namely Armando, as evidenced by the 1993 deed for the Ceres property, and Armando predeceased Silvia and Francisco. In this scenario, property characterization questions with respect to Sylvia and Francisco's coownership of the property are simply not relevant. Silvia and Francisco together could properly hold their interests in the Ceres property as joint tenants with Armando, regardless of whether the couple's interests would be characterized as community property or separate property for purposes of any interspousal disputes or disputes with a bankruptcy trustee.
The trial court properly determined that nothing in Brace precluded title to the Ceres property from passing to Silvia and Francisco at Armando's death, upon the recording of an affidavit of death of joint tenant. On the contrary, the Brace court emphasized that its decision did not "alter the operation of the right of survivorship that is the main incident of joint tenancy title." (Brace, s upra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 939.) In light of our conclusion, we need not address the remaining arguments raised by Dorantes.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Each side to bear their own costs.
WE CONCUR: DETJEN, Acting P. J. SNAUFFER, J.