Opinion
Case No. 00-3144-JAR
May 5, 2003.
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion to Alter or Amend Court's Order Dated March 17, 2003 (Doc. 31). Defendants' have filed a response (Doc. 32). Plaintiff has filed a reply (Doc. 33) and a supplemental reply (Doc. 34). After reviewing all pleadings, the Court is now prepared to rule. For the following reasons, Plaintiff's motion is denied.
I. Standard
A motion to alter or amend judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) may be granted only if the moving party can establish: (1) an intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence that could not have been obtained previously through the exercise of due diligence; or (3) the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice. Such a motion does not permit a losing party to rehash arguments previously addressed or to present new legal theories or facts that could have been raised earlier.
Brumark Corp. v. Samson Resources Corp., 57 F.3d 941, 948 (10th Cir. 1995).
Brown v. Presbyterian Healthcare Services, 101 F.3d 1324, 1332 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied 520 U.S. 1181 (1997).
II. Analysis
In this case, Plaintiff does not base his motion upon new evidence that was not previously available or an intervening change in controlling law. Instead, Plaintiff requests the Court to alter or amend its judgment to correct what he characterizes as a clear error of law.Plaintiff makes several arguments as to the preclusive effective given state court judgments by this Court. However, those arguments are of no consequence. This Court concluded that all of Plaintiff's claims, save the § 1983 malicious prosecution claim, were barred by both the Rooker-Feldman doctrine as well as the applicable statute of limitations. All of those claims accrued no later than February 13, 1998, with most of them accruing in 1996, when he was initially arrested. This action was not filed until April 26, 2000. Thus, there has been no error of law in granting summary judgment on all of Plaintiff's claims, other than the § 1983 malicious prosecution claim, based on the expiration of the statute of limitations.
As to Plaintiff's arguments regarding the § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution, Plaintiff argues that the claim should have been analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment, that the court erred in finding probable existed for the filing of charges and that Defendant Rask did not have qualified immunity for filing charges against Plaintiff. Plaintiff is merely rehashing the same arguments he presented in his original petition, which is not the purpose of a motion to alter or amend.
Id.
Plaintiff's argument that his claim was one under the Fourteenth Amendment is unfounded. A claim for a constitutional violation involving pre-trial detention is one under the Fourth Amendment. This is the correct analysis, unless Plaintiff's claim is one where the misuse of the legal process was so egregious as to constitute a denial of due process, then a § 1983 claim may be actionable under the Fourteenth Amendment. No egregious misuse of the legal process occurred here, thus this claim is properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment.
Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994); Taylor v. Meachum, 82 F.3d 1556, 1561 (10th Cir. 1996).
Taylor, 82 F.3d at 1561.
As to Plaintiff's claim that no probable causes existed, he focuses on the wrong probable cause determination. Because the only claim not barred by the statute of limitations is Plaintiff's § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution, the probable cause determination is that for bringing charges. Whether probable cause existed for the arrest for criminal trespass or for the search warrant affidavit is of no consequence. Defendant Rask had sufficient probable cause, at the time the charges were filed, to bring an action against Plaintiff, regardless of the subsequent suppression of evidence from the search warrant based on a lack of probable cause.
Additionally, Defendant Rask is shielded from liability by qualified immunity. While Defendant Rask stepped out of his role as a prosecutor by swearing out the affidavit in Plaintiff's case, that merely puts him in the position of one who generally swears out affidavits, an investigating officer. Thus, Defendant Rask is entitled to qualified immunity.
As to Plaintiff's arguments regarding Defendant Blundell, this Court has already set out in its March 17, 2003 order that a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim does not apply against Defendant Blundell as he did not initiate, continue or procure criminal charges against Plaintiff. Blundell merely arrested Plaintiff for criminal trespass and any claim as to that incident is barred by the statute of limitations.
No error of law or manifest injustice occurred in granting Defendants' motion for summary judgment.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion (Doc. 31) is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.