Opinion
No. CV 08 6001385 S
May 20, 2009
DECISION RE MOTION TO STRIKE #104
The plaintiff, Michael Doolittle, Conservator of the Estate and Person of Melissa Doolittle, brought this action against the defendant, Donald Chasse (Chasse), the operator of a motor vehicle in which Melissa Doolittle was a passenger and against the defendant, Gregory Bouchard, the owner of that motor vehicle. In the first count, the plaintiff alleges that Chasse operated the vehicle negligently, causing a collision in which Melissa Doolittle was injured. In the second count, the plaintiff alleges that Chasse operated the vehicle with reckless disregard and seeks double or treble damages pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes § 14-295. In both counts, the plaintiff alleges that Gregory Bouchard is vicariously liable as owner of the vehicle under the common-law family car doctrine.
Gregory Bouchard now moves to strike both counts and the prayer for relief as to him on the ground that the owner of the vehicle involved in the accident cannot be held vicariously liable for a third-party operator's negligence where the owner gave a family member general authority to use the vehicle, who, in turn, permitted a third party to use the vehicle.
The plaintiff does not object to the motion to strike insofar as it seeks to strike the second count as to defendant Gregory Bouchard only and the prayer for relief for § 14-295 damages as to Gregory Bouchard only.
DISCUSSION
"Whenever any party wishes to contest (1) the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . or (2) the legal sufficiency of any prayer for relief in such complaint . . . that party may do so by filing a motion to strike the contested pleading or part thereof." Practice Book § 10-39. A motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading, specifically, the allegations contained therein. Therefore, all "well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted" and must be construed "broadly" and "realistically" in a manner favorable to sustaining the plaintiff's complaint. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Violano v. Fernandez, 280 Conn. 310, 318 (2006). Nevertheless, a defendant's motion to strike must be granted where a plaintiff's complaint alleges legal conclusions unsupported by facts, or otherwise fails to sufficiently state a cognizable cause of action as a matter of law. Mora v. Aetna Life Casualty Ins. Co., 13 Conn.App. 208, 211 (1988).
The motion to strike is defective because it does not specify the grounds of insufficiency. See Practice Book § 10-41 and Stuart v. Freiberg, 102 Conn.App. 857, 861 (2007). The plaintiff has not objected to the motion in the form presented, and the defendant specifies the grounds in his memorandum, so the court will entertain it.
Family Car Doctrine
The family car doctrine is a cause of action deeply entrenched in Connecticut dating back to 1919 in the case of Wolf v. Sulik, 93 Conn. 431 (1919). Hunt v. Richter, 163 Conn. 84, 88 (1972). It proclaims that "when a car is maintained by its owner for the general use and convenience of his or her family, the owner is jointly and severally liable for the negligence of a family member, who, having general authority to drive the car, uses it negligently while embarked on a family purpose . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cook v. Nye, 9 Conn.App. 221, 225 (1986). In other words, for the doctrine to apply, a plaintiff must establish that: (1) the owner gave the operator general authority to use the vehicle; and (2) at the time of the accident, the operator was using the vehicle for his pleasure, convenience, or other family purpose for which vehicle's use was intended. Id.; O'Keefe v. Fitzgerald, 106 Conn. 294, 299 (1927).
Where a family member of the owner with general authority to use an automobile permits a third person to drive it, the owner may be liable for the third party's negligent operation of the vehicle if it was used in pursuit of a family member's pleasure or convenience. See Dibble v. Wolff, 135 Conn. 428, 432-34 (1949); Chen v. Bernadel, 101 Conn.App. 658, 666 (2007); Galland v. Bishop, Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex, Docket No. CV 088568 (January 9, 2001, Arena, J.) (28 Conn. L. Rptr. 690). In Chen, the court found the defendant-owner liable for an unrelated third-party operator's negligence where the defendant's son authorized the third party to drive the vehicle as they passed through New York because the son had an outstanding ticket and feared the consequences if stopped by police. Chen v. Bernadel, supra, 659-61, 668. The father had granted his son general authority to use the vehicle "as he pleased." Id., 663. Similarly, in Galland, the defendant-owner could be held vicariously liable for a third-party operator's negligence where the third party was driving the vehicle so that the defendant's daughter could retrieve a book at the Connecticut College library. Galland v. Bishop, supra. The defendant admitted that on the date of the accident, and prior thereto, he did not place any restrictions on his daughter's use of the vehicle, and even permitted her to allow her friends to drive it. Id. The third-party operator, therefore, had general authority to drive the car and was acting within the scope of that authority since the drive to Connecticut College was prompted "by the specific purpose for which the car was provided to the [daughter]," namely for her "benefit and convenience." Id.
Where one of the two elements of the doctrine is lacking, the owner may not be held vicariously liable for a third party's negligent operation of the vehicle. For instance, where the child has been entrusted with the vehicle for a specific and limited purpose, and the child exceeds the scope of that purpose by authorizing a third party to operate the vehicle, the owner is not vicariously liable for the third-party operator's negligence. Costanzo v. Sturgill, 145 Conn. 92, 94 (1958). In Costanzo, the defendant-owner was not held liable for a third-party operator's negligence where the owner's son, entrusted with the vehicle solely to travel to and from the naval base, disobeyed his father's instructions by allowing a friend to drive him and others to a dance. Id., 95. In determining the applicability of the family car doctrine, the court ruled that the fact that a third party was operating the vehicle when the collision occurred was a "matter of secondary importance." Id. Rather, of primary significance, was the fact that the defendant furnished the vehicle to his son for a "specific and limited purpose" and his son exceeded that scope by using the vehicle for his general "pleasure and convenience" Id.
Also, where a third party is operating the vehicle in furtherance of his own affairs and not for the pleasure and convenience of a family member, for which the vehicle is maintained, the defendant-owner is not vicariously liable for any resulting negligence. Koops v. Gregg, 130 Conn. 185, 191-92 (1943). In Koops, the defendant was not liable for a third-party operator's negligence even though the defendant's son was acting within the scope of his general authority when he loaned his car to a friend so the friend could attend a party. Id., 192. The court asserted that in addition to establishing general authority, the plaintiff must also show that the operator was using the vehicle "in the execution of [the defendant's] business" or otherwise acting as her agent. Id., 191. Since the evidence presented by the plaintiff could not affirmatively prove that, a verdict could not properly be rendered against her. Id., 192.
The plaintiff alleges in paragraph 5 of both counts that "the Defendant, Donald Chasse, was operating said motor vehicle under the express authority of Carl Bouchard, the son of the Defendant, Gregory Bouchard. The authorization for the use of the Defendant, Gregory Bouchard's vehicle by the defendant, Donald Chasse was within the scope of Carl Bouchard to use said vehicle." The pleadings note that Chasse was operating the vehicle under the "express authority" of the defendant's son and that the defendant's son's authorization for use of the vehicle by Chasse was within the "scope of Carl Bouchard to use the vehicle." Construing the allegations in a light most favorable to the pleader and drawing reasonable inferences from them, the complaint satisfies the requirement that the owner's son was acting within the scope of the general authority conferred upon him. The complaint, while containing minimal factual allegations as to the second requirement under the family car doctrine, that is, whether Chasse, the driver, was operating the vehicle in pursuit of a "family purpose" or otherwise acting on behalf of the defendant or the defendant's son, is also, when construed in a light most favorable to the pleader, sufficient to support an inference that Chasse was acting on behalf of the defendant's son. As such, the complaint is sufficient to state a cause of action under the family car doctrine. Whether the facts as fleshed out by discovery will be sufficient to find that Chasse was operating the vehicle for the pleasure and convenience of a family member for which the vehicle was maintained and sufficient to hold Gregory Bouchard liable is for another day.
CONCLUSION
The defendant Gregory Bouchard's motion to strike Count One is denied.
The motion to strike Count Two and the Prayer for Relief for § 14-295 damages is granted absent objection.