Opinion
21-ALJ-22-0391-AP
12-29-2021
James R. Dooley, Appellant, v. South Carolina Department of Employment and Workforce and SL Horning Woodworks, Inc., Respondents.
ORDER
Deborah Brooks Durden, Judge, SC Administrative Law Court.
STATEMENT OF CASE
This matter is an appeal by James R. Dooley (Appellant) from a decision of the South Carolina Department of Employment and Workforce (Department) indefinitely disqualifying Appellant from receiving unemployment benefits. The Department found Appellant voluntarily left his employment without good cause attributable to the employment. On appeal, Appellant argues he resigned due to a hostile work environment and an inability to comply with his employer's mask mandate due to autism and Tourette's syndrome. The Administrative Law Court (Court) has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. section 41-35-750 (2021). Upon consideration of the briefs and record, the Court affirms, finding substantial evidence supports the Department's decision.
BACKGROUND
Appellant worked at SL Horning Woodworks, Inc. (Employer) from January 14, 2019, to February 3, 2021, as a cabinet maker. The president of Employer, Shannon Horning (Horning) was Appellant's boss. Appellant communicated to Horning that he had autism and Tourette's syndrome and required specialized tools and alterations to his workspace to accommodate his disability. Horning provided these accommodations, going so far as to purchase tools meeting Appellant's needs with a total value of approximately $40,000. On January 26, 2021, Appellant informed Horning that he had recently been in close contact with an individual that later tested positive for COVID-19. Horning told Appellant that South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control guidelines required Appellant get a negative COVID-19 test result no earlier than five days after contact with the individual that tested positive before Appellant could return to work.
While Appellant was away from work, Employer's employees held a meeting and agreed Employer should require all employees wear a mask while in Employer's building. Appellant returned to work on February 1, 2021, and learned about the new mask policy. Appellant spoke to Horning about the mask policy and told Horning he could not comply because his autism and Tourette's syndrome made wearing a mask unbearable. Appellant told Horning he would quit due to the mask policy. Horning offered to negotiate a salary increase for Appellant to retain his employment. Horning also offered to accommodate Appellant by only requiring Appellant to wear a mask when moving through the facility outside his personal workspace and when interacting with others. Appellant returned to work on February 2, 2021. Prior to Appellant coming in for work that day, other employees placed a sign on the building entrance prohibiting entry to individuals not wearing a mask. Appellant confronted Horning about the sign and raised his voice to the point other employees overheard the discussion. Later that day, Appellant sent Horning a text message informing him other employees were smoking in the facility and this posed a safety hazard.
On February 3, 2021, Appellant showed his concealed firearm to another employee near or on Employer's premises. Other employees witnessed Appellant showing his firearm and told Horning. Later that day, Horning communicated to Appellant that Employer would no longer allow smoking in the building. In the same communication, Horning stated "masks will be worn at all times while inside the building." Finally, Horning told Appellant other employees felt unsafe after seeing Appellant with a gun outside the building. Therefore, Horning told Appellant guns would no longer be allowed on the premises outside of a locked vehicle. Horning stated the employees would have a meeting the next morning to discuss the policies. Appellant responded he believed these policies were retaliation for his reporting of other employees smoking. Appellant told Horning he would come to collect his tools before the weekend. Horning responded his attorney advised him to "enforce all concerns" in the management of the business. Appellant did not return to work following this exchange.
Appellant filed a claim for unemployment benefits with the Department on February 5, 2021. The Department's Claims Adjudicator found on May 14, 2021 that Appellant was separated from employment due to a lay off and was eligible for unemployment benefits. Employer appealed to the Department's Appeal Tribunal (Tribunal). Appellant and Employer participated in an evidentiary hearing via telephone conference on June 28, 2021, with Horning participating on behalf of Employer. The Tribunal reversed the Claims Adjudicator in a July 13, 2021 decision finding Appellant voluntarily left work without good cause attributable to the employment and was indefinitely disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits effective January 31, 2021. Appellant appealed the Tribunal on July 18, 2021. After reviewing the record, the Department's Appellate Panel (Panel) affirmed the Tribunal's decision on August 24, 2021. Appellant filed his notice of appeal with the Court on September 24, 2021. This appeal followed.
ISSUE ON APPEAL
Did the Panel err in determining Appellant voluntarily quit without good cause attributable to his employment?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Department is an "agency" under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). See Gibson v. Florence Country Club. 282 S.C. 384, 386, 318 S.E.2d 365, 367 (1984) (finding the Employment Security Commission, a predecessor of the Department, was an agency within the meaning of the APA). Accordingly, the APA's standard of review governs appeals from decisions of the Department. See, SC Code Ann. §§ 1-23-380, 1-23-600(D) (Supp. 2020); Gibson, at 386, 318 S.E.2d at 367; McEachern v. S.C. Employment Sec. Com'n. 370 S.C. 553, 557, 635 S.E.2d 644, 646-47 (Ct. App. 2006). The standard used by appellate bodies to review agency decisions is provided by S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(5) (Supp. 2020). See § 1-23-600(D) (directing administrative law judges to conduct appellate review in the same manner prescribed in § 1-23- 380(5)). That section states:
The court may not substitute its judgment for the judgment of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision [of an agency] if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(c) made upon unlawful procedure;
(d) affected by other error of law;
(e) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or
(f) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.§ 1-23-380(5).
A decision is supported by "substantial evidence" when the record as a whole allows reasonable minds to reach the same conclusion as the agency. Friends of the Earth v. Pub Serv. Com'n of S.C, 387 S.C. 360, 366, 692 S.E.2d 910, 913 (2010). The fact the record, when considered as a whole, presents the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent the agency's findings from being supported by substantial evidence. Waters v. S.C. Land Res. Conservation Com'n, 321 S.C. 219, 226, 467 S.E.2d 913, 917 (1996). In applying the substantial evidence rule, "a reviewing court will not overturn a finding of fact by an administrative agency 'unless there is no reasonable probability that the facts could be as related by a witness upon whose testimony the finding was based.'" Sea Pines Ass'n for Prot. of Wildlife, Inc. v. S.C. Dept. of Natural Res., 345 S.C. 594, 603-04, 550 S.E.2d 287, 292 (2001) (quoting Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 276 S.C. 130, 136, 276 S.E.2d 304, 307 (1981)).
DISCUSSION
Appellant argues the Panel's finding he voluntarily quit his most recent employment without good cause attributable to his employment is erroneous because the Panel's decision is not supported by substantial evidence in the record. The Court disagrees.
S.C. Code Ann. section 41-35-120(1) (2021) states a worker is ineligible for unemployment benefits if he left his most recent employment voluntarily, "without good cause." The phrase "good cause" as used in section 41-35-120(1) contemplates "a cause attributable to or connected with claimant's employment." Stone Mfg. Co. v. S.C. Employment Sec. Com'n, 219 S.C. 239, 247, 64 S.E.2d 644, 647 (1951); see also, State-Record Pub. Co. v. S.C. Employment Sec. Com'n, 254 S.C. 1, 9, 173 S.E.2d 144, 147 (1970) ("This court has heretofore, on more than one occasion, construed the phrase 'without good cause' as meaning without good cause connected with employment.").
A claimant has the burden to show he has met the benefit eligibility conditions. Hyman v. S.C. Employment Sec. Com'n, 234 S.C. 369, 373, 108 S.E.2d 554, 556 (1959). An employee who voluntarily leaves his employment has the burden of showing good cause for leaving. 76 Am. Jur. 2d Unemployment Compensation § 106, Westlaw Edge (database updated November 2021).
"Good cause" for quitting employment, for unemployment compensation purposes, is evaluated by an objective standard based on what an average person would do
acting reasonably and in good faith and is limited to instances where the unemployment is caused by external pressures so compelling that a reasonably prudent person would be justified in giving up employment. It has also been said that good cause means circumstances that would cause a reasonable person in a similar situation to leave employment rather than continue working and that the quitting must be for such a cause as would reasonably motivate, in a similar situation, the average able-bodied and qualified worker to give up his or her employment.76 Am. Jur. 2d Unemployment Compensation § 105, Westlaw Edge (database updated November 2021). "To be entitled to unemployment compensation benefits for voluntarily quitting a job for good cause, the claimant must have explored all viable options before making the decision to quit." 76 Am. Jur. 2d Unemployment Compensation § 104, Westlaw Edge (database updated November 2021). Thus, the claimant "has the 'responsibility to do whatever is necessary and reasonable in order to remain employed.'" Heulittv. Bd. of Review, 693 A.2d 155, 158-59 ( N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div. 1997) (quoting Zielenski v. Bd. of Review. 203 A.2d 635, 639 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div. 1964)); see also Craighead-Jenkins v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 796 A.2d 1031, 1033-34 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002) ("A claimant must. . . prove that she made a good faith effort to avoid having to quit a job, i.e., that the claimant acted with ordinary common sense in quitting and made a reasonable effort to preserve the employment relationship."). Nevertheless, "an unemployment compensation claimant is not required to take measures to resolve a problem with an employer before quitting if such measures would constitute nothing more than a futile gesture." 76 Am. Jur. 2d Unemployment Compensation § 104, Westlaw Edge (database updated November 2021).
Here, there is substantial evidence in the record to support the Panel's determination Employer's policies would not cause a reasonable person to become totally unemployed. Horning repeatedly demonstrated a willingness to work with Appellant and accommodate his needs to retain his employment. Appellant claims he quit due to his physical inability to comply with Employer's policies and due to the hostile manner in which the policies were enacted. There is no evidence in the record suggesting that a reasonable person would have found Employer's policies too onerous to work under. Although Appellant argues his disability created a special circumstance such that he could not comply with the masking policy, Appellant admitted in his testimony he would briefly wear a mask while working to avoid inhaling dust and smoke. Therefore, a reasonable person could conclude Employer's policies were not so onerous as to make a reasonable person in a similar situation as Appellant become totally unemployed rather than comply with the policies. The same applies to Appellant's claim of a hostile work environment. All three policies Horning announced on February 3 applied to every employee on the premises. The policies were based on reasonable concerns of Employer, such as protecting the health of employees from the spread of COVID-19 and easing the expressed concerns of employees worried about firearms on the premises. A reasonable person could conclude Employer enacted the policies to address actual problems in the workplace rather than to target Appellant.
Additionally, Appellant failed to take reasonable measures to resolve his dispute regarding Employer's policies before quitting. Appellant acknowledged he quit his job without attempting to find a better solution than quitting his job. Appellant claimed Horning told him to only contact him through his lawyer. However, Homing's February 3, 2020 communication to Appellant explicitly stated Employer would conduct an employee meeting the next day to discuss the policies. Appellant chose to quit rather than participate in the meeting and potentially urge Employer to modify the policies. Based on these facts, the Court finds a reasonable person could conclude Appellant did not make a reasonable effort to preserve the employment relationship.
Furthermore, Appellant failed to demonstrate taking additional measures to keep his job would have been futile. SeeKowalski v. Dir. of Div. of Employment Sec, 460 N.E.2d 1042, 1043 (Mass. 1984) ("[T]he claimant has the burden of proving a reasonable attempt to correct those conditions of employment which he now claims justified his leaving his employment, unless he can show that such an attempt would have been futile."). Appellant agreed Horning made multiple accommodations for his needs. The record shows Employer invested approximately $40,000 toward meeting Appellant's needs for the purpose of retaining Appellant's employment. Employer's behavior suggests Employer valued Appellant's work and was willing to undertake considerable effort to retain Appellant's employment. The record suggests Appellant stood a reasonable chance of securing further accommodations for his needs if he had attempted to pursue them, especially after Employer implicitly offered Appellant a chance to discuss the matter further at the proposed employee meeting on February 4, 2020. Appellant presented no evidence at the hearing to warrant a different conclusion. Therefore, the Court finds the Panel did not err in holding Appellant failed to take reasonable steps to attempt to preserve his employment.
Accordingly, because substantial evidence supports the conclusion Appellant failed to make a reasonable effort to preserve the employment relationship before resigning from Employer, the Court finds he did not have good cause to leave his employment. See Glenn v. Florida Unemployment Appeals Com'n, 516 So.2d 88, 90 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (holding claimant voluntarily relinquished his position without good cause where claimant "chose not to avail himself of an accessible avenue by which he might have retained his employment"); Ellis v. Northwest Fruit & Produce, 654 P.2d 914, 916 (Idaho 1982) (determining claimant left his employment without good cause because claimant "had a reasonable alternative to quitting"); Cent. Missouri Paving Co. v. Labor & Indus. Relations Com'n, 575 S.W.2d 889, 892 (Mo.Ct.App. 1978) (finding claimants did not quit for good cause because they did not make reasonable efforts to resolve the dispute before quitting their jobs). Similarly, the Court finds the evidence in the record supports the conclusion Appellant voluntarily quit without good cause.
ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Appellate Panel's decision is AFFIRMED
AND IT IS SO ORDERED