Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-4514-11T1
08-06-2014
ANN M. DOOLEY, Appellant, v. BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, AND LITE DEPALMA GREENBERG, LLC, Respondents.
Ann M. Dooley, appellant pro se. John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent Board of Review (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Arupa Barua, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Epstein, Becker & Green, PA, attorneys for respondent Lite DePalma Greenberg, LLC (Carmine A. Iannaccone, of counsel; Denise Merna Dadika, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Harris and Kennedy. On appeal from the Board of Review, Department of Labor, Docket No. 307,289. Ann M. Dooley, appellant pro se. John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent Board of Review (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Arupa Barua, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Epstein, Becker & Green, PA, attorneys for respondent Lite DePalma Greenberg, LLC (Carmine A. Iannaccone, of counsel; Denise Merna Dadika, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Ann Dooley appeals from a final agency action of the Board of Review affirming a decision of the Appeal Tribunal that disqualified her from unemployment compensation benefits under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) because she left work without good cause attributable to the work. Appellant argues that the Board's decision was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable, and that both the Board and Appeal Tribunal did not engage in a "careful consideration" of the facts in the case. Having considered these arguments in light of the record and applicable law, we affirm.
Appellant was an attorney at Lite DePalma Greenberg, LLC ("the firm") from 2005 until July 22 or 23, 2010, working primarily on securities class actions. At the time of her resignation, appellant was one of the lead attorneys on a nationwide class action and needed assistance in order to complete filings that were due on August 2, 2010.
On July 20, 2010, with the approval of her supervisor, Allyn Lite, appellant contacted a partner, Katrina Carroll, who was returning from maternity leave, for assistance, and she agreed to help. Subsequently, another partner, Joseph DePalma, discovered that appellant reached out to Carroll and became angry. He entered appellant's office and berated appellant for reaching out to an attorney on maternity/disability leave. DePalma left appellant's office and returned to his own to calm down. Shortly thereafter, appellant went to DePalma's office to continue the conversation and DePalma, who was still angry, asked her to leave.
Appellant, who was very upset and feeling as if she could no longer work for DePalma, went to Lite's office and told him she would like to resign her position. Lite, a long time mentor and friend of appellant, advised her to take the night and think about it. Later that evening, appellant contacted Carroll and informed her of her resignation. The following day, appellant called Lite and confirmed her resignation as of that week.
Appellant applied for unemployment benefits and was initially approved. On October 29, 2010, the firm appealed from the Deputy's determination of eligibility without disqualification. The Appeal Tribunal conducted a hearing and determined that appellant was disqualified from benefits because she left work voluntarily. This appeal followed.
Our scope of review of "administrative agency decisions is limited." Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997). "Our function is to determine whether the administrative action was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable." Burris v. Police Dep't, Twp. of W. Orange, 338 N.J. Super. 493, 496 (App. Div. 2001) (citing Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980)). "The burden of demonstrating that the agency's action was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable rests upon the person challenging the administrative action." In re Arenas, 385 N.J. Super. 440, 443-44 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 188 N.J. 219 (2006). See also Barone v. Dep't of Human Servs., 210 N.J. Super. 276, 285 (App. Div. 1986), aff'd, 107 N.J. 355 (1987).
In matters involving unemployment benefits, we accord particular deference to the expertise of the Board of Review, and its construction and application of Title 43. See generally Brady, supra, 152 N.J. at 210; Doering v. Bd. of Review, 203 N.J. Super. 241, 245 (App. Div. 1985). If the Board's factual findings are supported "by sufficient credible evidence, courts are obliged to accept them." Brady, supra, 152 N.J. at 210 (quoting Self v. Bd. of Review, 91 N.J. 453, 459 (l982)).
The purpose of unemployment compensation "'is to provide some income for the worker earning nothing because he is out of work through no fault or act of his own.'" Futterman v. Bd. of Review, 421 N.J. Super. 281, 288 (App. Div. 2011) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Brady, supra, 152 N.J. at 212). A person is disqualified for benefits
[f]or the week in which the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work, and for each week thereafter until the individual becomes reemployed and works eight weeks in employment . . . .An employee who has left work voluntarily has the burden of proving that he or she "did so with good cause attributable to work." Brady, supra, 152 N.J. at 218; N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(c).
[N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a).]
While N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a) does not define "good cause," we "have construed [it] to mean 'cause sufficient to justify an employee's voluntarily leaving the ranks of the employed and joining the ranks of the unemployed.'" Domenico v. Bd. of Review, 192 N.J. Super. 284, 287, 469 (App. Div. 1983) (quoting Condo v. Bd. of Review, 158 N.J. Super. 172, 174 (App. Div. 1978)). N.J.A.C. 12:17-9.1(b) defines "good cause attributable to such work" as "a reason related directly to the individual's employment, which was so compelling as to give the individual no choice but to leave the employment." The test is one "of ordinary common sense and prudence." Heulitt v. Bd. of Review, 300 N.J. Super. 407, 414 (App. Div. 1997).
Applying these principles, we find no error in the Board's decision to deny benefits. Mere "over-sensitiv[ity] to criticism, whether warranted or not, which may be expected in the normal course of employment[,]" is not sufficient justification for quitting a job. Assoc. Util. Servs., Inc. v. Bd. of Review, 131 N.J. Super. 584, 589 (App. Div. 1974 ). We also stated in Gerber v. Board of Review, that "on-the-job reprimands administered to claimant by her supervisor . . . while public and arguably improper and humiliating, [are] not so burdensome as to justify a claimant's departure from the job." Gerber v. Bd. of Review, 313 N.J. Super. 37, 40 (App. Div. 1998).
We are satisfied that the Board's determination that Dooley left work voluntarily, without good cause attributable to the work, is supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole, and is not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. We find no basis to disturb the Board's finding.
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF APPELLATE DIVIDION