Opinion
07-03-2024
Joshua R. DOOBES, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Jillian M. DOORES, Defendant-Appellant.
MAUREEN A. PINEAU, ROCHESTER, FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. JOSHUA R. DOORES, PLAINTIFFRESPONDENT PRO SE.
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Ontario County (Cynthia L. Snodgrass, R.), entered May 4, 2023, in a divorce action. The judgment, inter alia, equitably distributed the parties’ assets and debts.
MAUREEN A. PINEAU, ROCHESTER, FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
JOSHUA R. DOORES, PLAINTIFFRESPONDENT PRO SE.
PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., CURRAN, MONTOUR, NOWAK, AND DELCONTE, JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.
Memorandum: In this divorce action, defendant appeals from a judgment of divorce that, among other things, equitably distributed the parties’ assets and debts, declined to make an award to defendant for maintenance, and made awards to defendant for child support and attorney’s fees. We affirm.
[1, 2] We reject defendant’s contention that Supreme Court erred in its determination of equitable distribution. "It is well settled that [e]quitable distribution presents issues of fact to be resolved by the trial court, and its judgment should be upheld absent an abuse of discretion" (Haggerty v. Haggerty, 169 A.D.3d 1388, 1390, 92 N.Y.S.3d 773 [4th Dept. 2019] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Wagner v. Wagner, 136 A.D.3d 1335, 1336, 25 N.Y.S.3d 471 [4th Dept. 2016]). " Tt is also well settled that trial courts are granted substantial discretion in determining what distribution of marital property[— including debt—]will be equitable under all the circumstances’ " (Wagner, 136 A.D.3d at 1336, 25 N.Y.S.3d 471; see Haggerty, 169 A.D.3d at 1390, 92 N.Y.S.3d 773). Here, upon considering the requisite statutory factors set forth in Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (5) (d), we conclude that the court properly exercised its broad discretion in making an equitable distribu- tion of the marital debts and assets (see Haggerty, 169 A.D.3d at 1391, 92 N.Y.S.3d 773; Wagner, 136 A.D.3d at 1337, 25 N.Y.S.3d 471).
[3–6] Contrary to defendant’s further contention, the court did not err in declining to award maintenance to her. "[A]s a general rule, the amount and duration of maintenance are matters committed to the sound discretion of the trial court" (Anastasi v. Anastasi, 207 A.D.3d 1131, 1131, 170 N.Y.S.3d 794 [4th Dept. 2022] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Mehlenbacher v. Mehlenbacher, 199 A.D.3d 1304, 1307, 158 N.Y.S.3d 450 [4th Dept. 2021]). This Court’s authority in determining issues of maintenance is "as broad as that of the trial court" (Anastasi, 207 A.D.3d at 1131, 170 N.Y.S.3d 794 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Reed v. Reed, 55 A.D.3d 1249, 1251, 865 N.Y.S.2d 414 [4th Dept. 2008]). Nevertheless, where, as here, the court gave appropriate consideration to the statutory factors under Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (6), this Court "will not disturb the determination of maintenance absent an abuse of discretion" (Anastasi, 207 A.D.3d at 1131, 170 N.Y.S.3d 794 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Wilkins v. Wilkins, 129 A.D.3d 1617, 1618, 12 N.Y.S.3d 451 [4th Dept. 2015]). Among other things, the court considered the length of the marriage, defendant’s edu cation, employment history, and earning potential, and the fact that defendant was the beneficiary of many expenses paid by plaintiff while the divorce was pending (see generally Lisowski v. Lisowski, 218 A.D.3d 1214, 1217, 193 N.Y.S.3d 834 [4th Dept. 2023]; Mehlenbacher, 199 A.D.3d at 1307, 158 N.Y.S.3d 450; Myers v. Myers, 87 A.D.3d 1393, 1394-1395, 930 N.Y.S.2d 124 [4th Dept. 2011]). The court balanced "[defendant’s] needs and [plaintiff’s] ability to pay" (Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 193 A.D.3d 1363, 1364, 143 N.Y.S.3d 275 [4th Dept. 2021] [internal quotation marks omitted]), and the court properly determined that defendant is capable of self-support (see Weidner v. Weidner, 136 A.D.3d 1425, 1426, 24 N.Y.S.3d 845 [4th Dept. 2016], lv dismissed 28 N.Y.3d 1101, 45 N.Y.S.3d 362, 68 N.E.3d 89 [2016], rearg denied 29 N.Y.3d 990, 53 N.Y.S.3d 256, 75 N.E.3d 674 [2017]; see also Zufall v. Zufall, 109 A.D.3d 1135, 1136-1137, 972 N.Y.S.2d 749 [4th Dept. 2013], lv denied 22 N.Y.3d 859, 2014 WL 113961 [2014]).
[7] Defendant further contends that the court erred in determining the amount of child support. Preliminarily, we reject defendant’s contention that the court erred in calculating her income based on her actual rate of compensation for the job she obtained during the pendency of the divorce. Here, the parties submitted a joint stipulation of undisputed facts, which reflected that defendant had been employed in a full-time capacity earning certain hourly wages since approximately seven months before trial. Contrary to defendant’s contention, inasmuch as she was receiving higher rates of compensation at the time of trial than she had received before, the court was not required to determine her income based on previous tax returns or W-2s (see Eberhardt Davis v. Davis, 71 A.D.3d 1487, 1488, 897 N.Y.S.2d 376 [4th Dept. 2010]).
[8, 9] Defendant further contends that the court erred in ordering a downward deviation from the presumptive support obligation calculated pursuant to the Child Support Standards Act (CSSA) (see Domestic Relations Law § 240 [1-b] [c] [2]). "It is well settled that, where the statutory formula results in an unjust or inappropriate result, the court may resort to the factors set forth in section 240 (1-b) (f) (1)-(10) and order payment of an amount that is just and appropriate" (Jocoy v. Jocoy, 217 A D.3d 1588, 1588, 192 N.Y.S.3d 384 [4th Dept. 2023]; see Bast v. Rossoff, 91 N.Y.2d 723, 729, 675 N.Y.S.2d 19, 697 N.E.2d 1009 [1998]). The court here found that the presumptive amount would be unjust and inappropriate and considered several factors under section 240 (1-b) (f) in awarding a lower amount. We reject defendant’s contention that the court was in effect improperly applying the proportional offset method and conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in deviating from the presumptive amount of child support (see Jocoy, 217 A.D.3d at 1589, 192 N.Y.S.3d 384; Mehlenbacher, 199 A.D.3d at 1307, 158 N.Y.S.3d 450; cf. Wagner v. Wagner, 217 A.D.3d 1509, 1512, 193 N.Y.S.3d 460 [4th Dept. 2023]).
[10, 11] We reject defendant’s contention that the court erred in awarding her, "as ‘the non-monied spouse,’ [only] a portion of her attorney’s fees" (Aggarwal v. Aggarwal, 225 A.D.3d 1226, 1228, 207 N.Y.S.3d 780 [4th Dept. 2024]; see also Terranova v. Terranova, 138 A.D.3d 1489, 1489-1490, 30 N.Y.S.3d 468 [4th Dept. 2016]). "The award of reasonable counsel fees is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court" (Iannazzo v. Iannazzo [Appeal No. 2], 197 A.D.3d 959, 961, 152 N.Y.S.3d 756 [4th Dept. 2021] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Decker v. Decker, 91 A.D.3d 1291, 1291, 938 N.Y.S.2d 690 [4th Dept. 2012]). "In exercising its discretion to award such fees, a court may consider all of the circumstances of a given case, including the financial circumstances of both parties, the relative merit of the parties’ positions …, the existence of any dilatory or obstructionist conduct …, and the time, effort and skill required of counsel" (Iannazzo, 197 A.D.3d at 961, 152 N.Y.S.3d 756 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Terranova, 138 A.D.3d at 1490, 30 N.Y.S.3d 468). We perceive no abuse of discretion here.
We have reviewed defendant’s remaining contentions and conclude that none warrants reversal or modification of the judgment.