Opinion
C.A. No. 04-427 ML.
January 14, 2005
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Seth I. Donohue ("Donohue") filed this pro se complaint against Defendant State of Rhode Island ("Rhode Island") in his own behalf and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated. Donohue alleges that Rhode Island violated both federal law and the United States Constitution through its application of family law. He charges Rhode Island, inter alia, with "[g]ross negligence and reckless disregard for duties owed in custody proceedings," "[refusing] to enforce and support lawful parenting time," entering into a "conspiracy with all others of the several States to enforce . . . unlawfully determined child custody orders," "[d]efrauding in regards to child support," participating in "[w]illful, reckless, and/or negligent government mismanagement," and engaging in "disparate taxation." He seeks injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and money damages.
The case is before the Court on Donohue's Motion for Certification of Class and Request for Appointment of Class Counsel, his Request for Three-Judge Panel, and his Motion for Consolidation and Transfer by the Judicial Panel on Multi District Litigation. Rhode Island objects to all of these motions and requests. This case also is before the Court on Rhode Island's Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Donohue objects to this motion.
I. Discussion
A. Motion for Certification of Class
Donohue has moved to certify the following class under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
United States citizens, 18 years of age or older on the date of filing this action, with each having conceived one or more natural children, of whom any one or more of which is/are currently: (a) living; (b) residing within the jurisdiction of any court of the United States; (c) not institutionalized; and (d) of age in years so that the very existence of such child(ren) either does, or could, give present or future rise to any legal or equitable proceeding in any court for the payment, by such plaintiff, of any form of child support, to any other person or party, in any form or method heretofore established by the State of Rhode Island.
Further, that each such above plaintiff has also been previously adjudicated, by any judge of any court of the State of Rhode Island, as a "noncustodial parent", [sic] or any other such similar term or phrase commonly applied to represent that such plaintiff does not equally enjoy the same full sets and degrees of physical, possessory, and legal rights to all aspects of the care, custody, and management of said child(ren) that are recognized to belong to, or enjoyed by, the other natural (commonly referred to as the "custodial") parent of said child(ren).
Lastly that each such above plaintiff, in addition to the above criteria, has either: (a) never been formally convicted, in any competent court of the several States or of the United States, and by proceedings performed with absolute accordance to the full protections of all constitutional due process rights normally afforded every criminal defendant, as having been either seriously abusive, or seriously neglectful, to the health, safety, or physical or emotional welfare, of any minor child — whatsoever — but, specifically excluding from the above criteria only those circumstances wherein such prosecution was solely related to nonpayment of child support; or, (b) obtained full reversal, vacation, overturning, or other like purging, of each, any, and all such convictions in any one or more competent courts of the several States, or of the United States.
Rule 23(a) requires parties seeking class certification to demonstrate that: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all parties is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims and defenses of the representative parties are typical of those of the class; and (4) the representative party or parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a). Individuals appearing pro se may not adequately represent and protect the interests of a class. See Fymbo v. State Farm Fire Cas. Co., 213 F.3d 1320, 1321 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that class representatives cannot appear pro se); McGrew v. Texas Bd. of Pardons Paroles, 47 F.3d 158, 162 (5th Cir. 1995) (stating that "because [the plaintiff] is proceeding pro se and his own complaint failed to state a cause of action, his ability to serve as an adequate representative of the class is dubious"); Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1975) (denying certification of a class with a pro se representative because "the competence of a layman representing himself [is] clearly too limited to allow him to risk the rights of others"); Avery v. Powell, 695 F.Supp. 632, 643 (D.N.H. 1988) (denying class certification because "[a] pro se plaintiff may not possess the knowledge and experience necessary to protect the interests of the class as required by Rule 23(a)(4)").
Donohue seeks to represent the proposed class pro se. He is not an attorney. This Court agrees with those courts that have denied class certification in such situations. This plaintiff simply cannot adequately protect the interests of those purported class members he seeks to represent. Donohue's motion for class certification is therefore denied.
Donohue also requests that the Court appoint class counsel. There is no constitutional right to appointed counsel in civil cases. Maroni v. Pemi-Baker Reg'l Sch. Dist., 346 F.3d 247, 257 (1st Cir. 2003); Andrews v. Bechtel Power Corp., 780 F.2d 124, 137 (1st Cir. 1985). Accordingly, this request is also denied. B. Motion to Dismiss
Rhode Island has moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a cause of action. It asserts that the Court may dismiss the complaint on a number of grounds, including Eleventh Amendment immunity,Younger abstention, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, the domestic relations exception, judicial immunity, lack of standing, and failure to state a cause of action.
The Court finds that the motion and the grounds for dismissal set forth within the supporting memorandum of law have merit. In addition to the bases upon which Rhode Island rests its Motion to Dismiss, the Court finds a more fundamental flaw with Donohue's complaint.
The Court acknowledges that Donohue's status as a pro se plaintiff permits a liberal reading of his complaint. See Rodi v. Southern New England School of Law, 389 F.3d 5, 13 (1st Cir. 2004); Boivin v. Black, 225 F.3d 36, 43 (1st Cir. 2000). However, pro se complaints are not immune from dismissal. Even pro se complaints must meet the requirements of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Wynder v. McMahon, 360 F.3d 73, 79 n. 11 (2nd Cir. 2004). Rule 8(a) requires that every complaint contain both a short and plain statement of the jurisdictional grounds for the action and a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a).
Donohue's complaint, which is one of at least forty "virtually identical" actions filed in federal courts across the country (Pl.'s Notice of Motion for Consol. and Transfer by the Judicial Panel on Multi Dist. Litig. ¶ 1) and was allegedly downloaded off of the internet (Def.'s Mem. Supp. Motion to Dismiss at 1), evidences no individual expression of this particular plaintiff's claims. Once stripped of all allegations pertaining to the purported class as a whole, the complaint consists of little more than hyperbolic generalities and conclusory statements. Nowhere in the complaint does Donohue allege any facts that would define the parameters of his claim(s). In short, Donohue has simply affixed his name to a document he printed from a website. The Court therefore dismisses the complaint because it violates the mandate of Rule 8. This dismissal is without prejudice to Donohue filing, if he so chooses, a complaint that comports with Rule 8.
See http://www.indianacrc.org/classaction.html (last updated Jan. 11, 2005).
II. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Donohue's Motion for Certification of Class and Request for Appointment of Class Counsel is denied. Donohue's complaint is dismissed without prejudice. Donohue's Request for Three-Judge Panel and his Motion for Consolidation and Transfer by the Judicial Panel on Multi District Litigation are denied. Rhode Island's Motion to Dismiss is rendered moot in view of the Court's sua sponte dismissal without prejudice.
SO ORDERED.