Opinion
Saunders, Dickson, Snyder & Ross, P.C., Glenn G. Saunders, John M. Dickson, Denver, Harry R. Sayre, Trinidad, for plaintiff in error.
Meer & Wolf, Albert B. Wolf, Denver, for defendant in error.
DUFFORD, Judge.
This case was transferred from the Supreme Court pursuant to statute.
The parties are before us in reverse of their trial court positions. We shall refer to them by their trial court designations. In the present action, the plaintiff sought a money judgment against the defendant based upon a promissory note made payable to the plaintiff and executed by one James C. Oxandaburu, who is not a party to this action. It is the contention of the plaintiff in the present case that the defendant, as the result of a settlement of a lawsuit involving defendant and James C. Oxandaburu, had entered into a written stipulation whereby the defendant assumed and agreed to pay the promissory note executed by Oxandaburu and payable to the plaintiff.
In the trial of the present case, the defendant attempted to introduce, as a defense, evidence of an oral agreement which the defendant contends was made contemporaneously with the execution of the settlement stipulation between him and Oxandaburu. Defendant contends that, under the terms of such oral agreement, his obligation to pay plaintiff's note was expressly conditioned upon Oxandaburu's conveying the title to certain real property to the defendant and upon the defendant's receiving the benefit of certain other considerations. Defendant's offer of proof on the evidence excluded was to the effect that such property and other considerations had either not been received by him or that he had been denied the benefit thereof by the actions of James C. Oxandaburu. This evidence, he argues, would have voided his obligation to render payment on plaintiff's note. The trial court's refusal to admit this evidence was based, to a large extent, upon the ground that the evidence related to legal issues which were res judicata between the parties in this action.
The promissory note in question was the subject matter of prior litigation involving the plaintiff and the defendant. In such action, the trial court found that the defendant, Donnelly, in consideration for the transfer to him of certain assets and properties had assumed the indebtedness evidenced by the subject promissory note; that the intended acceleration of the note by the plaintiff was ineffective as of the date of trial, but that there was due and owing under the note the sum of $3,000. The trial court further found that its action on the question of acceleration should not affect the validity of the plaintiff's note, and that after the payment of the $3,000 specified in the judgment there would remain due and owing from the defendant to the plaintiff the sum of $38,500.
We hold that the judgment of the trial court in the previous proceeding between the plaintiff and defendant is res judicata in this case on the issue of the defendant's liability on the note sued on in this action. Ballas v. Cladis, 167 Colo. 248, 447 P.2d 224, cert. denied, 395 U.S. 921, 89 S.Ct. 1772, 23 L.Ed.2d 238.
The purpose and intent of the doctrine of res judicata is to put an end to litigation once the parties have had a judicial determination of their controversy. Brennan v. Grover, 158 Colo. 66, 404 P.2d 544, cert. denied, 383 U.S. 926, 86 S.Ct. 929, 15 L.Ed.2d 845. In the cerlier action involving the plaintiff and defendant, the defendant conceded and admitted, and the trial court specifically found, that the defendant, for consideration received, had assumed and agreed to pay the sums evidenced by the subject promissory note. Certainly the principal defense which is raised in this action, namely: that conditions precedent to enforceability of the note had not been satisfied, thereby relieving the defendant of Any liability on the note, could have been advanced in the earlier proceeding. However, such defense was not asserted; and, to the contrary, the defendant conceded liability and defended only on the basis that he was legally excused from rendering payments that had become previously due under the obligation.
The ruling of the trial court in the present case, rejecting evidence offered by the defendant on the theory that it related to matters previously adjudicated in an action between these parties, is a correct ruling and is affirmed. The additional contention made by the defendant that James C. Oxandaburu was an indispensable party to this action is without merit and is rejected. Woodco v. Lindahl, 152 Colo. 49, 380 P.2d 234.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
SILVERSTEIN, C.J., and ENOCH, J., concur.