Plaintiffs urge that a voluntary and unconditional tender of payment by defendant dispenses with the need for proof of facts that would otherwise be necessary in order for plaintiffs to recover upon their cause of action and that having made a tender of a part of the amount sued for, the defendant taxpayer is precluded from now denying the legality of all of it. See Murchison v. Post Independent School District, 258 S.W.2d 229 (Tex.Civ.App. Amarillo 1953, writ ref'd n. r. e.); Doneghy v. State, 240 S.W.2d 331 (Tex.Civ.App. Amarillo 1951, no writ); Bell v. Turkey Independent School District, 214 S.W.2d 834 (Tex.Civ.App. Amarillo 1948, writ ref'd n. r. e.); State Fair of Texas v. Seay, 98 S.W.2d 232 (Tex.Civ.App. Fort Worth 1936, writ dism'd); City of Rising Star v. Dill, 259 S.W. 652 (Tex.Civ.App. Fort Worth 1923) Aff'd, 269 S.W. 769 (Tex. 1925). These cases stand for the general proposition that by tendering part of the taxes claimed the taxpayer admits the justness of the tax to the extent of the amount tendered and is estopped from disputing his liability to that extent.
If the excluding of this portion of appellant's pleadings was error, which we do not so hold, it would be harmless as it does not show that such denial caused the jury to return an improper verdict. Rule 434, T.R.C.P.; Doneghy v. State, 240 S.W.2d 331, 334 (Tex.Civ.App. Amarillo 1951, n. w. h.). Appellant complains in point of error number 8 of the exclusion of the Wysong Clinic hospital records.
Since the appellants offered no evidence that their property was overevaluated and since the appellants have paid taxes on some of their property, they cannot come into court now and complain of the system as being illegal and arbitrary as to the other tracts of land which were taxed under the same system by the City of Port Lavaca. See Doneghy v. State, Tex.Civ.App., 240 S.W.2d 331 (1951); Bell v. Turkey Independent School District, Tex.Civ.App., 214 S.W.2d 834 (1948), ref. n.r.e.; Republic Insurance Co. v. Highland Park Independent School District, Tex.Civ.App., 123 S.W.2d 784 (1938), err. dism. 133 Tex. 545, 125 S.W.2d 270. Judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
The decisions of the Tax Board in the matter of valuations are quasi judicial in nature and a collateral attack cannot be justified in the absence of fraud, or something equivalent thereto; lack of jurisdiction; an obvious violation of the law; or the adoption of a fundamentally wrong principle or method, the application of which substantially injured the complainant. Druesdow v. Baker, Tex.Com.App., 229 S.W. 493; Doneghy v. State, Tex.Civ.App., 240 S.W.2d 331; State v. Whittenburg, supra. The burden, after introduction of the necessary official records by plaintiff, then rested on defendant to go forward with proof which would meet the requirements of law for avoiding the valuation.