Id. at 30. See also Donalson v. Coca-Cola Co., 164 Ga. App. 712 (2) ( 298 S.E.2d 25) (1982) (both parties to contract must intend that third person should be beneficiary). Looking at the contract in the record between Borg-Warner and ACOG as well as the uncontroverted testimony by ADI's president regarding the terms in its contract with ATT's agent, there was no intent in the contracts to confer a benefit on Centennial Olympic Park visitors and that under the terms thereof the security services companies neither owed nor assumed any duty to protect or warn appellants. See id. Therefore, applying the "right for any reason" principle, we affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Borg-Warner and ADI.
Regent argues that the presence of its corporate seal is insufficient to establish it signed the Easement under seal because the purpose of a corporate seal is to show that the individual signing the document on behalf of a corporation has the authority to do so. Further, Regent maintains, Donalson v. Coca-Cola Co. , 164 Ga.App. 712, 298 S.E.2d 25 (1982) is inconsistent with McCalla . See Donalson , 164 Ga.App. at 713, 298 S.E.2d 25 ("The contract between DHS and Coca-Cola was under both of their corporate seals. Thus, any action properly brought under the contract could be brought within 20 years.
Regent argues that the presence of its corporate seal is insufficient to establish it signed the Easement under seal because the purpose of a corporate seal is to show that the individual signing the document on behalf of a corporation has the authority to do so. Further, Regent maintains, Donalson v. Coca-Cola Co. , 164 Ga.App. 712, 298 S.E.2d 25 (1982) is inconsistent with McCalla . See Donalson , 164 Ga.App. at 713, 298 S.E.2d 25 ("The contract between DHS and Coca-Cola was under both of their corporate seals. Thus, any action properly brought under the contract could be brought within 20 years.
Some are in essence third party beneficiaries of the subcontract. See, e.g., Donalson v. Coca-Cola Co., 164 Ga. App. 712, 714 (2) ( 298 SE2d 25) (1982). We next determine whether any of Dalton Paving's claims were raised during arbitration.
See Morris v. Stillwell.Donalson v. Coca-Cola Co., 164 Ga. App. 712, 713 (2) ( 298 SE2d 25) (1982).Morris v. Stillwell, 257 Ga. 3, 4 ( 354 SE2d 133) (1987).
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Donalson v. Coca-Cola Co., 164 Ga. App. 712, 713(2) ( 298 S.E.2d 25) (1982). Or, stated a slightly different way,
6. Third Party Beneficiary. Under OCGA § 9-2-20 (b), a third-party beneficiary to a contract may sue in their own name to enforce the contract; however, the contract must expressly specify and identify the person as a third-party beneficiary to the contract. Miree v. United States, 242 Ga. 126, 135 (3) ( 249 S.E.2d 573) (1978); Backus v. Chilivis, 236 Ga. 500, 502 ( 224 S.E.2d 370) (1976); Stewart v. Gainesville Glass Co., 131 Ga. App. 747, 752-753 ( 206 S.E.2d 857) (1974), aff'd, 233 Ga. 578 ( 212 S.E.2d 377) (1975); see also Donalson v. Coca-Cola Co., 164 Ga. App. 712, 713-714 (2) ( 298 S.E.2d 25) (1982). The third-party beneficiary must be the intended beneficiary of the contract; the mere fact that a third-party would benefit incidentally from the performance of the contract is not alone sufficient to give such person standing to sue on the contract. Whitley v. Bryant, 198 Ga. 328 ( 31 S.E.2d 701) (1944); Culberson v. Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth., 201 Ga. App. 347, 349 (1) ( 411 S.E.2d 75) (1991), overruled on other grounds, Lemonds v. Walton County Hosp. Auth., 212 Ga. App. 369 ( 441 S.E.2d 821) (1994); Walls, Inc. v. Atlantic Realty Co., 186 Ga. App. 389, 391-392 (1) ( 367 S.E.2d 278) (1988); Bartley v. Augusta Country Club, 172 Ga. App. 289, 290 ( 322 S.E.2d 749) (1984); Southeast Grading v. City of Atlanta, 172 Ga. App. 798, 800 (1) ( 324 S.E.2d 776) (1984).
Assuming arguendo that appellee was in default and that appellant had not waived her right to seek a default judgment, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that this was a proper case for opening default. See Donalson v. Coca-Cola Co., 164 Ga. App. 712 (1) ( 298 S.E.2d 25) (1982). 2.
The record establishes that the parties to the sale contract intended that Joe Cohen should be the direct beneficiary of this provision, a position which granted Joe Cohen the standing to enforce the contract under OCGA § 9-2-20 (b). Compare Bartley v. Augusta Country Club, 172 Ga. App. 289, 290 ( 322 S.E.2d 749) (1984); Donalson v. Coca-Cola Co., 164 Ga. App. 712, 713-714 (2) ( 298 S.E.2d 25) (1982). It thus appears that appellees are claiming that a third-party beneficiary of the contract was tortiously interfering in the very contract under which he was to receive a benefit.
Southeast Grading v. City of Atlanta, 172 Ga. App. 798, 800 (1) ( 324 S.E.2d 776) (1984). See also Donalson v. Coca-Cola Co., 164 Ga. App. 712, 713 (2) ( 298 S.E.2d 25) (1982). As discussed, the subcontract, through incorporation by reference, does contain Walls' promise to indemnify Atlantic.