Donalson v. Coca-Cola Co.

17 Citing cases

  1. Anderson v. Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games

    273 Ga. 113 (Ga. 2000)   Cited 56 times
    Finding that evidence that the ACOG derived financial benefits for pecuniary gain from the businesses that occupied Centennial Olympic Park, and that those businesses "gained untold advertising and promotional value due to their conspicuous presence in the Park," was relevant and admissible to the extent that it showed ACOG made the venue available to the public for free for the purpose of conducting a for-profit activity intended to involve the public

    Id. at 30. See also Donalson v. Coca-Cola Co., 164 Ga. App. 712 (2) ( 298 S.E.2d 25) (1982) (both parties to contract must intend that third person should be beneficiary). Looking at the contract in the record between Borg-Warner and ACOG as well as the uncontroverted testimony by ADI's president regarding the terms in its contract with ATT's agent, there was no intent in the contracts to confer a benefit on Centennial Olympic Park visitors and that under the terms thereof the security services companies neither owed nor assumed any duty to protect or warn appellants. See id. Therefore, applying the "right for any reason" principle, we affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Borg-Warner and ADI.

  2. One Buckhead Loop Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Regent Tower Holdings, LLC

    798 S.E.2d 633 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017)

    Regent argues that the presence of its corporate seal is insufficient to establish it signed the Easement under seal because the purpose of a corporate seal is to show that the individual signing the document on behalf of a corporation has the authority to do so. Further, Regent maintains, Donalson v. Coca-Cola Co. , 164 Ga.App. 712, 298 S.E.2d 25 (1982) is inconsistent with McCalla . See Donalson , 164 Ga.App. at 713, 298 S.E.2d 25 ("The contract between DHS and Coca-Cola was under both of their corporate seals. Thus, any action properly brought under the contract could be brought within 20 years.

  3. One Buckhead Loop Condo. JE-067 Ass'n, Inc. v. Regent Tower Holdings, LLC

    798 S.E.2d 633 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017)

    Regent argues that the presence of its corporate seal is insufficient to establish it signed the Easement under seal because the purpose of a corporate seal is to show that the individual signing the document on behalf of a corporation has the authority to do so. Further, Regent maintains, Donalson v. Coca-Cola Co. , 164 Ga.App. 712, 298 S.E.2d 25 (1982) is inconsistent with McCalla . See Donalson , 164 Ga.App. at 713, 298 S.E.2d 25 ("The contract between DHS and Coca-Cola was under both of their corporate seals. Thus, any action properly brought under the contract could be brought within 20 years.

  4. Dalton Paving v. South Green Constr

    284 Ga. App. 506 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007)   Cited 13 times
    Holding that a new cause of action is barred by res judicata "even if some new factual allegations have been made" or "some new relief has been requested"

    Some are in essence third party beneficiaries of the subcontract. See, e.g., Donalson v. Coca-Cola Co., 164 Ga. App. 712, 714 (2) ( 298 SE2d 25) (1982). We next determine whether any of Dalton Paving's claims were raised during arbitration.

  5. Haldi v. Piedmont Nephrology Assoc

    283 Ga. App. 321 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007)   Cited 32 times
    Holding that the plaintiff did not have standing to challenge the contract because he was neither a party to the contract nor an intended beneficiary of it

    See Morris v. Stillwell.Donalson v. Coca-Cola Co., 164 Ga. App. 712, 713 (2) ( 298 SE2d 25) (1982).Morris v. Stillwell, 257 Ga. 3, 4 ( 354 SE2d 133) (1987).

  6. R S Farms, Inc. v. Butler

    258 Ga. App. 784 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002)   Cited 11 times
    Reversing denial of summary judgment to janitorial service on plaintiff's tort claim where no evidence showed that the contracting parties intended to create third-party beneficiaries to the contract

    (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Donalson v. Coca-Cola Co., 164 Ga. App. 712, 713(2) ( 298 S.E.2d 25) (1982). Or, stated a slightly different way,

  7. Simpson Consulting v. Barclays Bank

    227 Ga. App. 648 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 36 times
    Noting that promissory estoppel is an equitable doctrine

    6. Third Party Beneficiary. Under OCGA § 9-2-20 (b), a third-party beneficiary to a contract may sue in their own name to enforce the contract; however, the contract must expressly specify and identify the person as a third-party beneficiary to the contract. Miree v. United States, 242 Ga. 126, 135 (3) ( 249 S.E.2d 573) (1978); Backus v. Chilivis, 236 Ga. 500, 502 ( 224 S.E.2d 370) (1976); Stewart v. Gainesville Glass Co., 131 Ga. App. 747, 752-753 ( 206 S.E.2d 857) (1974), aff'd, 233 Ga. 578 ( 212 S.E.2d 377) (1975); see also Donalson v. Coca-Cola Co., 164 Ga. App. 712, 713-714 (2) ( 298 S.E.2d 25) (1982). The third-party beneficiary must be the intended beneficiary of the contract; the mere fact that a third-party would benefit incidentally from the performance of the contract is not alone sufficient to give such person standing to sue on the contract. Whitley v. Bryant, 198 Ga. 328 ( 31 S.E.2d 701) (1944); Culberson v. Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth., 201 Ga. App. 347, 349 (1) ( 411 S.E.2d 75) (1991), overruled on other grounds, Lemonds v. Walton County Hosp. Auth., 212 Ga. App. 369 ( 441 S.E.2d 821) (1994); Walls, Inc. v. Atlantic Realty Co., 186 Ga. App. 389, 391-392 (1) ( 367 S.E.2d 278) (1988); Bartley v. Augusta Country Club, 172 Ga. App. 289, 290 ( 322 S.E.2d 749) (1984); Southeast Grading v. City of Atlanta, 172 Ga. App. 798, 800 (1) ( 324 S.E.2d 776) (1984).

  8. Boynton v. State Farm

    207 Ga. App. 756 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993)   Cited 13 times

    Assuming arguendo that appellee was in default and that appellant had not waived her right to seek a default judgment, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that this was a proper case for opening default. See Donalson v. Coca-Cola Co., 164 Ga. App. 712 (1) ( 298 S.E.2d 25) (1982). 2.

  9. Cohen v. Wm. Goldberg Co.

    202 Ga. App. 172 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991)   Cited 18 times
    Stating that under USCR 6.2 and OCGA § 9–11–56(c), “the entry of summary judgment without allowing the full 30 days to respond is not always reversible error when the record establishes that summary judgment was proper as a matter of law, so that the respondents could show no harm resulting from the procedural error”

    The record establishes that the parties to the sale contract intended that Joe Cohen should be the direct beneficiary of this provision, a position which granted Joe Cohen the standing to enforce the contract under OCGA § 9-2-20 (b). Compare Bartley v. Augusta Country Club, 172 Ga. App. 289, 290 ( 322 S.E.2d 749) (1984); Donalson v. Coca-Cola Co., 164 Ga. App. 712, 713-714 (2) ( 298 S.E.2d 25) (1982). It thus appears that appellees are claiming that a third-party beneficiary of the contract was tortiously interfering in the very contract under which he was to receive a benefit.

  10. Walls, Inc. v. Atlantic Realty Co.

    186 Ga. App. 389 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988)   Cited 28 times
    Holding that because the express terms of a contract explicitly limited beneficiaries of the contract to the signatory parties, the plaintiff could not allege contract claim as a third-party beneficiary

    Southeast Grading v. City of Atlanta, 172 Ga. App. 798, 800 (1) ( 324 S.E.2d 776) (1984). See also Donalson v. Coca-Cola Co., 164 Ga. App. 712, 713 (2) ( 298 S.E.2d 25) (1982). As discussed, the subcontract, through incorporation by reference, does contain Walls' promise to indemnify Atlantic.