Opinion
C.A. No. CPU4-14-003664
01-13-2016
JULIET DONALD, Plaintiff-Below, v. RODNEY DONALD, Defendants-Below.
Brian T. Jordan, Esquire Jordan Law, LLC 704 N. King Street, Suite 600 Wilmington, DE 19801 Attorney for Plaintiff Rodney Donald 365 Norman Drive Wilmington, DE 19702 Pro Se Defendant
Brian T. Jordan, Esquire
Jordan Law, LLC
704 N. King Street, Suite 600
Wilmington, DE 19801
Attorney for Plaintiff Rodney Donald
365 Norman Drive
Wilmington, DE 19702
Pro Se Defendant
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Dear Ms. Donald and Mr. Donald:
This is an appeal de novo brought pursuant to 10 Del. C. § 9571. Trial in the above-captioned matter took place on December 15, 2015 in the Court of Common Pleas, New Castle County, State of Delaware. Following the receipt of documentary evidence and sworn testimony, the Court reserved decision. The issues before the Court are: (1) whether a landlord-tenant relationship existed between Juliet Donald ("Plaintiff") and Rodney Donald ("Defendant"); (2) whether Defendant, in violation of the Residential Landlord-Tenant Code (the "Code"), wrongfully ousted Plaintiff; and (3) whether Defendant converted personal property Plaintiff left at Defendant's home. This is the Court's Final Decision and Order entering judgment in favor of Plaintiff for $2,848.92, the value of the converted dresser, bed frame, box spring, and mattress.
Plaintiff's introduced the following exhibits: Exhibit 1, a self-prepared list of Plaintiff's personal possessions; Exhibit 2, another self-prepared list of those items allegedly seized by Defendant. Defendant introduced the following exhibits: Exhibit A, a copy of the J.P. Court Order; Exhibit B, a copy of Plaintiff's J.P. Court Complaint; Exhibit C, two letters referencing the mediation agreement with attached itemized price quotes; Exhibit D, a letter to Plaintiff's Counsel discussing property returned to Plaintiff; and Exhibit E, documentation that Defendant reimbursed Plaintiff for the money she spent on her overnight hotel stay.
Def. Exh. C (letter and itemized list dated November 2, 2015).
I. The Facts
This is an action filed by Plaintiff for conversion, and unlawful ouster brought pursuant to 25 Del. C. § 5313. Plaintiff alleges that she entered into a landlord-tenant relationship with her father, Defendant, when in August of 2013 she moved from Missouri to his home located in Wilmington, Delaware. Plaintiff contends in her complaint that pursuant to the terms of the Delaware Code she is entitled to treble damages for costs incurred as a result of Defendant's alleged wrongful ouster of Plaintiff from his home. Plaintiff also contends that Defendant deprived her of possession of some of her property, thereby converting it. Plaintiff seeks a total of $7950.51 in damages. Defendant contends that he never entered into a landlord-tenant relationship with Plaintiff and that Plaintiff should not recover because the Delaware Code landlord tenant provisions do not apply. Defendant also alleges that he has not, in fact, converted Plaintiff's property.
This sum includes $7661.90 worth of property that Plaintiff claims remains in Defendant's possession and $288.61 in damages for costs incurred as a result of Defendant's allegedly wrongful ouster of Plaintiff. Plaintiff admitted into evidence an itemized list of property purportedly seized by Defendant (the "Seized Property List").
The testimony at trial was as follows: Plaintiff lived in Missouri from 2004 - 2013. After experiencing various personal problems and some financial difficulty, Plaintiff moved to Delaware to live with the Defendant, her father, and his wife. Prior to the move, Defendant sent Plaintiff money two to three times in order to help with her expenses. Shortly thereafter, Defendant flew out to Missouri, rented a sixteen foot truck for approximately $700.00, and loaded Plaintiff's possessions onto the truck. The two drove back to Delaware, and moved Plaintiff's belongings into Defendant's home.
At the outset, Plaintiff agreed to pay Defendant $250.00 a month in what was characterized at trial as rent. While Plaintiff lived at the home, Defendant paid for groceries; took Plaintiff to interviews and doctor's appointments; and when Plaintiff's cat became ill paid the veterinary bills. Ultimately, points of contention developed within the Donald household. These grew from the fact that Plaintiff would not use her food stamps to offset the increased grocery expenses, would not pray at the dinner table, and would not get rid of her cat. At some point Plaintiff expressed a desire to move to her mother's home in Georgia.
In February of 2014, as a result of these issues, Defendant requested that Plaintiff move out, and then left her at a hotel in Elkton, Maryland. Plaintiff paid for a room and waited overnight for her mother to drive from Georgia to the hotel. About one year later, Defendant drove to Georgia to deliver some of Plaintiff's property. Defendant also brought Plaintiff's lamps and tables to her counsel's office in Delaware. Defendant testified that despite visiting Delaware multiple times, Plaintiff made no effort to retrieve what is left of her property from his home. The parties mediated the issue of unreturned property, however full performance of the agreement did not occur.
II. The Law
The existence of a landlord-tenant relationship is determined by examining the intent of the parties to enter such relationship. This analysis is conducted by looking objectively for a meeting of the minds. A meeting of the minds exists where, "...based upon an objective manifestation of assent" and the surrounding circumstances, a reasonable person would conclude the parties intended to enter such relationship. The Code defines a "rental agreement" as an agreement "which establishes or modi[fies] the terms, conditions, rules, regulations or any other provisions concerning the use and occupancy of a rental unit. The Code considers a tenant to be one who is "entitled under a rental agreement to occupy a rental unit to the exclusion of others."
Stickney v. Gooldstein, 2002 WL 31999358 at *10 (Del. Com. Pl. Mar. 14, 2002); see Doe v. Gray, 7 Del. 135, (Del. Super. 1859).
Stickney, 2002 WL 31999358 at *10.
Id.; see also, Industrial America, Inc. v. Fulton Industries, Inc. 285 A.2d 412 (Del. Super. 1971).
A person's personal property is converted when one acts to willfully interfere with any chattel without "lawful justification, [and] where any person entitled thereto is deprived of the possession of it."
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
III. Discussion
The Delaware Code landlord tenant provisions do not apply because Plaintiff has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the very existence of a landlord-tenant relationship between Plaintiff and Defendant. In reviewing the limited factual record, sworn testimony, documentary and stipulated evidence at trial the only objective evidence of the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship on record is the fact that Plaintiff was expected to pay $250.00 a month to live in the home. However, under the totality of the circumstances, this one fact is overshadowed by the parties' failure to adhere to the typical formalities of a landlord-tenant relationship: the Court must find that the parties did not enter into a written agreement; Plaintiff did not provide a security deposit; Defendant did not provide copies of a written lease, or provide a copy of the Delaware Code.
Moreover, there is no evidence that the parties created a rental agreement as envisioned by the Code by establishing terms, conditions, rules, or regulations concerning the use and occupancy of the home. Indeed, there is precious little evidence that Plaintiff's roll at the home fell within the Code's definition of tenant, as she has provided no evidence that she was entitled to occupy portions of the home "to the exclusion of others."
Plaintiff behaved in a manner consistent with that of an adult-child living at home with her parents and not a tenant sharing the common areas with her landlord. Plaintiff was expected to contribute to certain household expenses and get along with the other occupants of the home. Defendant and his wife took Plaintiff out on errands, to appointments, and helped take care of Plaintiff's cat. The trial record is rife with credible testimony, including Plaintiff's own, demonstrating that this relationship was not the detached, business-like relationship one might expect to observe between a landlord and tenant, but instead was a relationship which closely aligned with societies' expectation of how an adult-child living with her parent should behave.
With respect to Plaintiff's conversion claim, after careful consideration of the limited record and documentary evidence, the Court finds that Plaintiff, in her case-in-chief, proved by a preponderance of the evidence damages in the amount of $2,848.92. Although it is clear from the record that Defendant made multiple attempts to cooperate and return Plaintiff's property to her, Plaintiff has demonstrated that Defendant deprived her of possession of her dresser, bed frame, box spring, and mattress. Further, Defendant did not present any compelling argument that Plaintiff failed to mitigate her damages, or evidence of the converted items' condition and how that condition affected their value. Moreover, Defendant introduced into evidence, without objection, documentation referencing a mitigation agreement between the parties which, in the absence of testimony as to their value, served as an indicator of the value of the converted items.
Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate conversion of any of the other items on her Seized Property List. Plaintiff failed to provide any contemporaneous bills of lading or pay other contemporaneous writing, detailing which items she brought with her from Missouri to Delaware. More important, plaintiff has failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Defendant possessed the undelivered property to her exclusion. In light of the murky trial testimony with regards to which property has been returned versus retained, the Court is reluctant, without more, to award damages based on a list of missing property seemingly prepared from memory without any manner to differentiate between property lost, stolen, or left behind during the move. Judgment therefore is entered by a preponderance of the evidence in the amount of $2,848.92. Each party shall bear their own costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 13th day of January 2016.
/s/_________
John K. Welch
Judge cc: Ms. Tamu White, Civil Case Manager