Donahue v. City of Portland

9 Citing cases

  1. Hiram Ricker Sons v. Students Int'l Med

    501 F.2d 550 (1st Cir. 1974)   Cited 29 times
    Finding that one week is too long

    In addition, the Maine court has cited Randall with apparent approval in four other decisions, the most recent being in 1964. Thacher Hotel, Inc. v. Economos, 160 Me. 22, 197 A.2d 59 (1964); Lipman v. Thomas, 143 Me. 270, 61 A.2d 130 (1948); Donahue v. City of Portland, 137 Me. 83, 15 A.2d 287 (1940); Hinckley v. Giberson, 129 Me. 308, 151 A. 542 (1930). In Thacher Hotel, the court distinguished Randall in holding that a hotel-owner's recovery on a management contract was not precluded by an alleged defect in compliance with a liquor-license statute.

  2. Driscoll v. Gheewalla

    441 A.2d 1023 (Me. 1982)   Cited 82 times
    Finding that where "objectionable features of the old plan had been removed" there was a substantial difference between successive applications

    While herein it is not necessary to pass upon the constitutionality of this zoning ordinance as interpreted by the Superior Court, yet in construing an ordinance, as in the case of the construction of statutes, if the ordinance is susceptible of either of two interpretations, we should adopt the interpretation which would tend to sustain its constitutionality. See Warren v. Municipal Officers of Town of Gorham, Me., 431 A.2d 624, 630 (1981); Inhabitants, Town of Boothbay v. National Advertising Company, Me., 347 A.2d 419, 422-23 (1975); In re Stubbs, 141 Me. 143, 39 A.2d 853, 156 A.L.R. 400 (1944); Donahue v. City of Portland, 137 Me. 83, 15 A.2d 287 (1940); State v. Brown, 119 Me. 455, 111 A. 760 (1920). Therefore, we construe the ordinance to mean that a subsequent application for a variance will be barred within the two-year period from a previous denial if it seeks substantially the same relief as that sought in the previous one, but that, if the new proposal is materially different from that of the prior variance request, then the general rule will apply and the board of zoning appeals or adjustment has the power to entertain the request and adjudicate the matter under the changed circumstances, notwithstanding the seemingly absolute facial time-bar of the ordinance.

  3. State v. Donovan

    344 A.2d 401 (Me. 1975)   Cited 8 times

    The equal protection clause measures the rationality of statutory classifications and is offended only if those classifications rest on grounds wholly irrelevant to the protection of the public health, safety, morals or welfare. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961); State v. Rush, Me., 324 A.2d 748 (1974). Laws duly enacted by the legislature are presumed constitutional and, hence, their unconstitutionality must be clearly demonstrated by those who challenge them. Donahue v. City of Portland, 137 Me. 83, 15 A.2d 287 (1940). Defendant argues that the regulation of Cannabis in a substantially different manner than the regulation of alcohol and tobacco, both of which, he claims, are no less dangerous than Cannabis, is without a rational basis and is therefore offensive to the equal protection clause.

  4. Hiram Ricker & Sons v. Students International Meditation Society

    342 A.2d 262 (Me. 1975)   Cited 18 times
    Addressing a question certified by the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts

    " 95 Me. 35, 37, 49 A. 51, 52. In Donahue v. City of Portland, 137 Me. 83, 15 A.2d 287 (1940), the precise issue before the Court was whether an ordinance which imposed a different annual fee on those victuaters who sold beer from those who did not was discriminatory and void. In upholding the ordinance, the Court discussed Randall only collaterally as support for the proposition that an ordinance passed in pursuance of statutory authority is presumptively valid.

  5. State v. Rush

    324 A.2d 748 (Me. 1974)   Cited 30 times
    In State v. Rush, Me., 324 A.2d 748 (1974), the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine upheld an ordinance prohibiting on-street parking between 2 a.m. and 6 a.m. in the City of Portland.

    We examine the subject ordinance under this due process standard, bearing in mind that there is a presumption favoring the constitutionality of state laws; and in determining the validity of municipal ordinances, their reasonableness will be presumed. Donahue v. City of Portland, 137 Me. 83, 85, 15 A.2d 287, 288 (1940). The burden is on the party challenging the ordinance to establish the complete absence of any state of facts which would support the need for the laws enacted by the municipality.

  6. Town of Windham v. Lapointe

    308 A.2d 286 (Me. 1973)   Cited 24 times
    In Town of Windham v. LaPointe, 308 A.2d 286, 292 (Me. 1973), the Maine court made clear that it is proper for a court to sever an unconstitutional portion of a statute "[w]here it appears that the valid provisions would have been enacted, even if the invalid portion had been deleted."

    See, LaFleur, Atty. Gen. v. Frost, 1951, 146 Me. 270, 276, 80 A.2d 407. There is a presumption in favor of the validity of an ordinance passed in pursuance of statutory authority, and every presumption is to be made in favor of the constitutionality of such an ordinance, but such presumption is not absolute. Buck v. Kilgore, 1972, Me., 298 A.2d 107; Donahue v. City of Portland, 1940, 137 Me. 83, 86, 15 A.2d 287, 288. The burden rests upon the party attacking the constitutionality of an ordinance, and the standard of proof is by clear and irrefragable evidence that it infringes the paramount law.

  7. Buck v. Kilgore

    298 A.2d 107 (Me. 1972)   Cited 15 times

    This Court has long recognized a presumption favoring the validity of municipal ordinances but has recognized that this presumption is not absolute. In Donahue v. City of Portland, 137 Me. 83, 86, 15 A.2d 287, 288 (1940), the Court held: "As a general rule, it may be stated that there is a presumption in favor of the validity of an ordinance passed in pursuance of statutory authority.

  8. Inhabitants of Town of Windham v. Sprague

    219 A.2d 548 (Me. 1966)   Cited 30 times

    Prior decisions in this State have recognized that effective zoning ordinances must be enforced with a view to future needs and that provisions which permit nonconforming uses are generally strictly construed. York Harbor Village Corporation v. Libby et al., 126 Me. 537, 140 A. 382; Donahue v. City of Portland, 137 Me. 83, 15 A.2d 287; Toulouse et al. v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 147 Me. 387, 87 A.2d 670; Wright v. Michaud et al. supra. The Laws of Zoning and Planning, Rathkopf, Vol. 1, page 17-1, has this to say:

  9. Wright v. Michaud

    160 Me. 164 (Me. 1964)   Cited 29 times
    Involving an ordinance specifically excluding mobile homes

    It will not be declared unconstitutional without clear and irrefutable evidence that it infringes the paramount law. Donahue v. City of Portland, 137 Me. 83. If it does not appear unreasonable on its face, the objecting party must produce evidence to show that it is in fact unreasonable in its operation. State v. Small, 126 Me. 235, 237.