Opinion
1:22-cv-253
02-27-2023
MARIO DEWAYNE DOMINICK, Plaintiff v. ASSISTANT DA KHADIJA W. HORTON, et al., Defendants
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER, United States District Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
RICHARD A. LANZILLO, CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Recommendation
It is recommended that this action be dismissed as legally frivolous and/or for failure to state a claim in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
II. Report
A. Background
Plaintiff, an inmate confined at the Erie County Prison, commenced this action by filing a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Assistant District Attorney Khadija W. Horton and Public Defender Melisa Lafata Pagliari. ECF No. 1-1. The Court granted Plaintiffs motion to proceed in forma pauperis on February 21, 2023. ECF No. 5.
In his complaint, Plaintiff asserts the following claims: “conflict of interest, conspiracy to cover up a crime, ineffective counsel, bias, injustice, false imprisonment, mental anguish, physical distress.” ECF No. 1-1 at p. 3. Plaintiff describes the factual scenario underlying his claim as follows:
The facts are Khadija [] Horton was my Public Defender and District Attorney for the same Docket No. 3003 of 2017[.] I filed for a Public
Defender and was assigned Khadijah [] Horton for Docket No. 3003 of 2017[.] Once she joined the district attorney she was no longer representing me at this time[.] Melissa Pagliari was representing me at my plea hearing and Khadijah Horton was the district attorney and I told Mrs. Pagliari several times that what was taken place was illegal and she said no it's not!!Id. at 5. Plaintiff seeks $1,000,000,000 in damages. Id.
B. Standard for review
Having been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, see ECF No. 4, Plaintiff is subject to the screening provisions in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Among other things, that statute requires the Court to dismiss any action in which the Court determines that the action is “frivolous or malicious; fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Muchler v. Greenwald, 624 Fed.Appx. 794, 796-97 (3d Cir. 2015). A frivolous complaint is one which is either based upon an indisputably meritless legal theory (such as when a defendant enjoys immunity from suit) or based upon factual contentions which are clearly baseless (such as when the factual scenario described is fanciful or delusional). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). The determination as to whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted is governed by the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. D'Agostino v. CECOM RDEC, 436 Fed.Appx. 70, 72 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999)).
Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, his allegations, '‘however inartfully pleaded,” must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). Moreover, under the liberal pleading rules, during the initial stages of litigation, a district court should construe all allegations in a complaint in favor of the complainant. Gibbs v. Roman, 116 F.3d 83 (3d Cir. 1997).
C. Analysis
Plaintiffs claims are subject to dismissal pursuant to § 1915 for several reasons. The Court will address each of these deficiencies in turn.
1. Heck v. Humphrey
As an initial matter, Plaintiffs challenge to his conviction and subsequent detention is barred by the United States Supreme Court's holding in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 48687 (1994). In Heck, the Supreme Court held that: “to recover damages [or other relief] for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus[.]” Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87 (footnote and internal citation omitted). In other words, “a prisoner cannot use § 1983 to obtain damages where success would necessarily imply the unlawfulness of a (not previously invalidated) conviction or sentence.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81 (2005).
In his complaint, Plaintiff acknowledges that his conviction has not been invalidated or reversed. ECF No. 1-1 at 5 (noting that he is “currently serving out a sentence” on his allegedly illegal conviction). A review of his state court docket confirms this. See Commonwealth v. Dominick, No. CP-25-CR-3003-2017. Consequently, Plaintiffs claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey. See, e.g., Nash v. Kenney, 784 Fed.Appx. 54, 57 (3d Cir. 2019) (“Nash's malicious-prosecution and speedy-trial claims-which challenge his post-arraignment detainment-are barred by the favorable-termination rule of Heck v. Humphrey, Washington v. State Municipality Philadelphia City, 2020 WL 1922904, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 2020) (“Washington's malicious prosecution claim fails because, if his convictions have not been invalidated, he cannot establish favorable termination.”). That said, these claims should be dismissed without prejudice to Plaintiffs ability to file a new complaint challenging the same conduct if his conviction is later overturned.
2. Absolute immunity
Plaintiffs claims against his own attorney, Melisa Pagliari, are similarly precluded. It is well-settled that “public defenders and court-appointed counsel acting within the scope of their professional duties are absolutely immune from civil liability under § 1983.” Walker v. Pennsylvania, 580 Fed.Appx. 75, 78 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Black v. Bayer, 672 F.2d 309, 320 (3d Cir. 1982)). This immunity arises from the fact that a criminal defense attorney, even if employed by the state as a public defender, “does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer's traditional functions.” PolkCnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981). Plaintiffs claims against Pagliari should be dismissed on this basis.
3. Prosecutorial immunity
Finally, claim against Horton must be dismissed based on the doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity. This doctrine protects prosecutors from liability related to their official acts. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417-20 (1976). “More than a mere defense to liability, prosecutorial immunity embodies the right not to stand trial.” Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202, 207 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Under this doctrine, a prosecutor is absolutely immune from liability for money damages under § 1983 for acts “within the scope of his duties in initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution.” Imbler, 424 U.S. at 410. “Ultimately, whether a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity depends on whether she establishes that she was functioning as the state's ‘advocate' while engaging in the alleged conduct that gives rise to the constitutional violation.” Yarris v. Cnty. of Del., 465 F.3d 129, 136 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 274 (1993)).
Applying these principles to the instant case, the Court concludes that Horton's actions are protected by the doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity. Plaintiffs lone allegation is that Horton labored under an unconstitutional conflict of interest when she represented the Commonwealth during his plea hearing despite having previously served as his public defender. Courts have consistently held that advocating on behalf of the state during the trial and sentencing phases of a criminal prosecution falls squarely within the scope of a nrosecutor's duties. See Fogle v. Sokol, 957 F.3d 148, 160 (3d Cir. 2020) (“[P]rosecutors are immune from claims arising from their conduct in beginning a prosecution, including soliciting false testimony from witnesses in grand jury proceedings and probable cause hearings, presenting a state's case at trial, and appearing before a judge to present evidence.”) (internal quotations and quoting sources omitted); Simonton v. Ryland-Tanner, 836 Fed.Appx. 81, 84 (3d Cir. 2020) (“The conduct of a [hearing] and presentation of evidence are undeniably activities ‘intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process,' and therefore a prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity from suit based on those activities.”). The Court reaches the same conclusion here.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that this action be dismissed as legally frivolous and/or for failure to state a claim in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Considering the many deficiencies identified in this order, including Heck v. Humphrey and absolute immunity, it is further recommended that leave to amend be denied as futile. However, said dismissal should be without prejudice in two respects: (1) Plaintiff is not precluded from challenging his conviction in a timely-filed habeas corpus petition after his state PCRA proceedings have terminated; and (2) Plaintiff may file a renewed § 1983 seeking damages for malicious prosecution or abuse of process if his criminal conviction is later overturned. All other claims should be dismissed with prejudice.
IV. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties must seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the Objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of the Objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Extensions of time will not be granted. Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).