Opinion
24A-SC-1354
11-19-2024
Gerald Lee Doll, Appellant-Plaintiff v. Ron Neal, et al., Appellees-Defendants
APPELLANT PRO SE GERALD DOLL MICHIGAN CITY, INDIANA ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES THEODORE E. ROKITA ATTORNEY GENERAL OF INDIANA JOHN R. OOSTERHOFF DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the LaPorte Superior Court The Honorable Greta Stirling Friedman, Judge The Honorable John A. Link, Magistrate Trial Court Cause No. 46D04-2312-SC-2033
APPELLANT PRO SE GERALD DOLL MICHIGAN CITY, INDIANA
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES THEODORE E. ROKITA ATTORNEY GENERAL OF INDIANA JOHN R. OOSTERHOFF DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Tavitas, Judge
Case Summary
[¶1] Gerald Lee Doll, an inmate at the Indiana State Prison ("ISP"), filed a small claims action against the Indiana Department of Correction ("DOC") and various employees of the DOC ("the Defendants"). The small claims court granted the Defendants' motion to dismiss, and Doll appeals. Doll argues that the small claims court erred in granting the motion to dismiss because Indiana Code Section 22-2-9-8, which provides that DOC inmates cannot bring actions under the Wage Claims Act, is unconstitutional. We conclude that Doll's arguments are waived. Accordingly, we affirm.
The other named Defendants are: Ronald Neal, the Warden of the ISP; Dawn Buss, the Superintendent of the ISP; Christine Vorrier, ISP Unit Team Manager; Kimberly Watkins-Bradley, who works at the ISP Law Library; and Christina Reagle, the DOC Commissioner.
In his Statement of the Issues, Doll lists another argument-whether the grant of the Defendants' motion to dismiss was arbitrary and capricious. Doll, however, fails to develop this argument. We, therefore, consider it waived. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a).
Issue
[¶2] Doll presents one issue for our review, which we restate as whether Indiana Code Section 22-2-9-8 is unconstitutional.
Facts
[¶3] Doll is an inmate at the ISP. In October 2023, Doll worked at the prison law library, but he was terminated from this position. Doll subsequently filed two prison grievances claiming that he was wrongfully terminated from his position and that he was still owed money for the work he had performed while employed at the library. In the second grievance, Doll claimed that he was owed $136.00 in wages. In February 2024, the ISP responded to Doll's grievance regarding his pay. This response acknowledged that there had been an error and that Doll's pay would be corrected.
[¶4] The amount Doll received was apparently not as much as he believed he was owed. Accordingly, on March 21, 2024, Doll filed a pro se notice of claim in the small claims court against the Defendants in which he requested $82.00 in back wages. The small claims court set the matter for a trial by affidavit. On April 12, 2024, the Defendants filed a motion to dismiss in which they argued that Doll's claim was barred by Indiana Code Section 22-2-9-8. On May 16, 2024, the small claims court granted the Defendants' motion to dismiss. Doll now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
I. Standard of Review
[¶5] In Hipps v. Biglari Holdings, Inc., we summarized our standard of review of a trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim as follows:
Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6) allows a party to request dismissal for [f]ailure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted .... A motion to dismiss under Trial Rule 12(B)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the [plaintiff's] claim, not the facts supporting it. Dismissals are improper under Trial Rule 12(B)(6) unless it appears to a certainty on the face of the complaint that the complaining party is not entitled to any relief. We review a Trial
Rule 12(B)(6) dismissal de novo, giving no deference to the trial court's decision. In reviewing the complaint, we take the alleged facts to be true and consider the allegations in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, drawing every reasonable inference in that party's favor.136 N.E.3d 629, 635 (Ind.Ct.App. 2019) (citations and internal quotations omitted).
[¶6] We also note that Doll represents himself on appeal. We hold pro se litigants to the same standard as we do licensed attorneys. Stark v. State, 204 N.E.3d 957, 963 (Ind.Ct.App. 2023) (citing Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014)). Thus, "'pro se litigants are bound to follow the established rules of procedure and must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so.'" Id. (quoting Picket Fence Prop. Co. v. Davis, 109 N.E.3d 1021, 1029 (Ind.Ct.App. 2018)). On appeal, "[w]e will not become an advocate for a party, or address arguments that are inappropriate or too poorly developed or expressed to be understood." Lowrance v. State, 64 N.E.3d 935, 938 (Ind.Ct.App. 2016) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), trans. denied.
II. The Wage Claims Act
[¶7] The Wage Claims Act governs claims by employees who have been separated from work by their employer and employees whose work has been suspended as a result of an industrial dispute. St. Vincent Hosp. &Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Steele, 766 N.E.2d 699, 705 (Ind. 2002) (citing Ind. Code § 22-2-9-2). The Wage Claims Act would normally apply here because Doll was terminated from his position in the prison law library. However, "[e]ffective May 9, 2013, the Legislature amended the relevant statutes to exempt criminal offenders in a DOC facility from the Wage Payment and Wage Claim [Acts]." Adams v. ArvinMeritor, Inc., 60 N.E.3d 1022, 1024 n.2 (Ind. 2016) (citations omitted). Specifically, Indiana Code Section 22-2-9-8 provides: "Criminal offenders in a facility operated by the department of correction [ ] or operated by a private operator under contract with the department of correction are specifically exempt from this chapter," i.e., the Wage Claim Act. The corresponding section of the Wage Payment Act states that "[c]riminal offenders in a facility operated by the department of correction . . . or operated by a private operator under contract with the department of correction" are "specifically exempt from the provisions" of the Wage Payment Act. Ind. Code § 22-2-5-3(2). Accordingly, the Defendants argued, and the small claims court agreed, that Doll's claims are barred by Indiana Code Section 22-2-9-8.
In contrast, the Wage Payment Act applies to claims by current employees and those who have voluntarily left employment. St. Vincent Hosp., 766 N.E.2d at 705. (citing Ind. Code § 22-2-5-1(b)).
III. Doll's constitutional argument is waived.
[¶8] On appeal, Doll presents a new argument-that Indiana Code Section 22-2-9-8 deprives inmates such as Doll access to the courts. Doll claims that Indiana Code Section 22-2-9-8 is discriminatory under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and that this Court should, therefore, "repeal" the statute. Appellant's Br. p. 21.
[¶9] Our Supreme Court recently explained that:
[g]enerally, we limit appellate review to arguments the parties first presented to the trial court. Declining to review an issue not properly preserved for review is essentially a cardinal [principle] of sound judicial administration. The rule promotes efficiency by protecting parties from wasting time and money chasing moving targets, battling over arguments in the trial court only to start anew on appeal with different arguments. The rule promotes fairness by ensuring the parties can use the trial rules and the trial court to fully develop all their factual and legal arguments before obtaining appellate review. And the rule reflects the respective roles of trial and appellate courts, both because it facilitates the trial court's factual, procedural, and legal development of arguments before they are ripe for appellate review, and because we are generally hard-pressed to say through our appellate review that a trial court erred by not accepting an argument it was never even asked to consider.Expert Pool Builders, LLC v. Vangundy, 224 N.E.3d 309, 313 (Ind. 2024) (citations, internal quotations, and footnote omitted). This is true even for constitutional claims. Endres v. Ind. State Police, 809 N.E.2d 320, 322 (Ind. 2004). Because Doll did not present his current appellate arguments to the small claims court, they are waived for purposes of appeal. See id.
Even if we ignored this waiver, Doll's constitutional arguments lack coherence and would be waived for this reason as well. See App. R. 46(A)(8)(a).
Conclusion
[¶10] Doll waived his appellate arguments by failing to first present them to the small claims court. Accordingly, we affirm the small claims court's judgment.
[¶11] Affirmed.
May, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.