Opinion
4:19-CV-88-FL
12-16-2019
CHRISTOPHER R. DOLIN, Plaintiff, v. WELLPATH d/b/a CORRECT CARE SOLUTIONS, LLC; LIEUTENANT JONES; JORDAN KINDRED; KAREN CRAIG; JEFFERY NEWTON; and WALTER MINTON, Defendants.
ORDER and MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
This pro se case is before the court on the application to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) (D.E. 1) by plaintiff Christopher R. Dolin ("plaintiff") and for a frivolity review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). These matters were referred to the undersigned magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B), respectively. See Unnumbered D.E. dated 12 June 2019.
ORDER ON MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
The court finds that plaintiff has adequately demonstrated his inability to prepay the required court costs. It is therefore ORDERED that plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis is ALLOWED.
MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION ON
FRIVOLITY REVIEW
Having found that plaintiff is financially eligible to proceed in forma pauperis, the court must now undertake a frivolity review of this case, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). See Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 27 (1992) (standard for frivolousness). Based on this review and for the reasons stated below, it will be recommended that this case be dismissed.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff's proposed complaint consists of a completed pro se complaint form (D.E. 1-1) to which are attached eight exhibits (D.E. 1-2 to 1-9). Plaintiff asserts diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) as the basis of the court's jurisdiction over the case. See Compl. § II at 2; Civ. Cover Sheet (D.E. 1-10) § II.4.
Read liberally, as it must be, see Denton, 504 U.S. at 32; White v. White, 886 F.2d 721, 722-23 (4th Cir. 1989), the proposed complaint alleges as follows:
Plaintiff's spouse, Christina Rawls-Dolin ("Rawls-Dolin"), was employed at Riverside Regional Jail ("Riverside") in North Prince George, Virginia as a qualified mental health professional through a contract between Riverside and Rawls-Dolin's employer, defendant Wellpath d/b/a Correct Care Solutions, LLC ("Wellpath"). Compl. § III at 5. On 28 March 2019, Rawls-Dolin filed with Riverside's Office of Professional Review ("OPR") her second sexual harassment claim against defendant Jordan Kindred ("Kindred"). Id. Defendants Karen Craig ("Craig"), Jeffery Newton ("Newton"), and Walter Minton ("Minton") all condoned Kindred's sexual harassment of Rawls-Dolin. Id. § III at 5-6.
Although Riverside had a zero tolerance policy for sexual harassment, that policy was not extended to contract employees. Id. § III at 5. When Rawls-Dolin inquired about her claim, OPR directed her to speak to defendant Lieutenant Jones ("Jones"), who retaliated against her by revoking her security badge and ending her employment. Id. Despite Wellpath being Rawls-Dolin's employer, she was always treated as an employee of Riverside, which Craig, Newton, and Minton all admitted. Id. Defendants' actions toward Rawls-Dolin negatively impacted plaintiff's quality of life and financial stability. Id.
Plaintiff seeks over $3 million in damages, as follows:
PLAINTIFF is requesting damages in the amount of $3,250,000 (plus $110/day for failure to receive COBRA notification) for mental anguish, emotional distress, loss of spousal income, loss of enjoyment of life due to DEFENDANT WELLPATH's negligence in alternate workplace; DEFENDANT JONES' revokation [sic] of RawlsDolin's security badge to access the Riverside Regional Jail in retaliation [sic] for Rawls-Dolin filing sexual harrassment [sic] claim against DEFENDANT KINDRED & DEFENDANTS CRAIG, NEWTON & MINTON's faciliation [sic] of an environment where sexual harrassment by DEFENDANT KINDRED is prevelant.Id. § IV at 6; see also id. § II.B.3.
II. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Frivolity review
After allowing a party to proceed in forma pauperis, as here, the court must conduct a frivolity review of the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The court must dismiss the complaint if it determines that the action is frivolous or malicious, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i); fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, id. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); or seeks monetary relief from an immune defendant, id. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). See Denton, 504 U.S. at 27 (standard for frivolity).
Under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a pleading that states a claim for relief must contain "a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction . . . [and] a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1), (2). Case law explains that the complaint must "'state[ ] a plausible claim for relief' that 'permit[s] the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct' based upon 'its judicial experience and common sense.'" Coleman v. Md. Court of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)). Likewise, a complaint is insufficient if it offers merely "labels and conclusions," "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action," or "naked assertion[s]" devoid of "further factual enhancement." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
In evaluating frivolity specifically, a pro se plaintiff's pleadings are held to "less stringent standards" than those drafted by attorneys. White, 886 F.2d at 722-23. Nonetheless, the court is not required to accept a pro se plaintiff's contentions as true. Denton, 504 U.S. at 32. Instead, the court is permitted to "pierce the veil of the complaint's factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). Provided that a plaintiff's claims are not clearly baseless, the court must weigh the factual allegations in plaintiff's favor in its frivolity analysis. Denton, 504 U.S. at 32. The court must read the complaint carefully to determine if a plaintiff has alleged specific facts sufficient to support the claims asserted. White, 886 F.2d at 724.
A court may consider subject matter jurisdiction as part of the frivolity review. See Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that "[d]etermining the question of subject matter jurisdiction at the outset of the litigation is often the most efficient procedure"); Cornelius v. Howell, No. 3:06-3387-MBS-BM, 2007 WL 397449, at *2-4 (D.S.C. 8 Jan. 2007) (discussing the lack of diversity jurisdiction during frivolity review as a basis for dismissal). "Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and are empowered to act only in those specific situations authorized by Congress." Bowman v. White, 388 F.2d 756, 760 (4th Cir. 1968). The presumption is that a federal court lacks jurisdiction in a particular case unless it is demonstrated that jurisdiction exists. Lehigh Min. & Mfg. Co. v. Kelly, 160 U.S. 327, 336 (1895). The burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction rests on the party invoking jurisdiction, here plaintiff. Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1219 (4th Cir. 1982) ("The burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction . . . is on the plaintiff, the party asserting jurisdiction."). The complaint must affirmatively allege the grounds for jurisdiction. Bowman, 388 F.2d at 760. If in a frivolity review the court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it must dismiss the action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). More generally, "[i]f the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
One basis for subject matter jurisdiction, so-called federal question jurisdiction, is that a claim arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Another basis is diversity of citizenship or so-called diversity jurisdiction, which requires that the citizenship of each plaintiff be different from that of each defendant and the amount in controversy exceed $75,000. Id. § 1332(a)(1); see Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372-74 (1978); Turner v. Cooper, No. 2:13-CV-02017-JMC, 2013 WL 5587856, at *3 (D.S.C. 16 Aug. 2013) ("Complete diversity of parties in a case means that no party on one side may be a citizen of the same State as any party on the other side."), rep. & recomm. adopted, 2013 WL 5587856, at *1 (10 Oct. 2013). For purposes of diversity jurisdiction, an individual is deemed to be a citizen of the state in which he is domiciled. Axel Johnson, Inc. v. Carroll Carolina Oil Co., 145 F.3d 660, 663 (4th Cir. 1998) ("As the Supreme Court has consistently held, however, state citizenship for purposes of diversity jurisdiction depends not on residence, but on national citizenship and domicile, . . . and the existence of such citizenship cannot be inferred from allegations of mere residence, standing alone."); Comm'r v. Nubar, 185 F.2d 584, 587 (4th Cir. 1950) ("'Residence' means living in a particular locality, but 'domicile' means living in that locality with intent to make it a fixed and permanent home." (internal quotation marks omitted)). There are also statutes conferring jurisdiction for particular types of cases.
B. Standing
The jurisdiction of federal courts to entertain suits is limited by Article III of the United States Constitution to "Cases" and "Controversies." U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see also Bishop v. Bartlett, 575 F.3d 419, 423 (4th Cir. 2009). "'[T]he doctrine of standing serves to identify those disputes which are appropriately resolved through the judicial process,' and thus meet the requirements of Article III," including the case and controversy requirement. Bishop, 575 F.3d at 423 (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 154-55 (1990)); see also Friends for Ferrell Parkway, LLC v. Stasko, 282 F.3d 315, 319 (4th Cir. 2002) (noting that the standing requirement is designed to ensure that "the plaintiff has a sufficient personal stake in the outcome of a dispute to render judicial resolution of it appropriate").
Thus, to satisfy the Article III standing requirement, "a plaintiff must establish that a 'case or controversy' exists 'between himself and the defendant' and 'cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.'" Smith v. Frye, 488 F.3d 263, 272 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975)); Dyson v. Le'Chris Health Sys., Inc., No. 4:13-CV-224-BO, 2014 WL 5171542, at *1 (E.D.N.C. 14 Oct. 2014) ("'Generally, a litigant must assert his or her own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest a claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.'" (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991))). Specifically, a plaintiff must show that: "'(1) he has suffered an injury in fact; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will he redressed by a favorable decision.'" Emery v. Roanoke City Sch. Bd, 432 F.3d 294, 298 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Stasko, 282 F.3d at 320). As the foregoing indicates, the plaintiff bears the hurden of establishing standing. See Miller v. Brown, 462 F.3d 312, 316 (4th Cir. 2006).
III. ANALYSIS
Here, plaintiff has alleged that he is a citizen of North Carolina, defendants are citizens of Virginia and Tennessee, and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Compl. §§ I.A at 1; I.B at 2; II.B.3 at 4. Based on these allegations, the court finds at this time that it has diversity jurisdiction over this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).
Plaintiff does not identify the claims he is attempting to assert. The court construes his proposed complaint to allege the following claims: (1) negligence hy Wellpath in its management of Rawls-Dolin's employment; (2) retaliation by Jones for his termination of Rawls-Dolin for her tiling of and inquiry about a sexual harassment claim; (3) allowance of an environment of sexual harassment in Rawls-Dolin's workplace by Kindred, Craig, Newton, and Minton; and (4) loss of consortium caused by all defendants. See Compl. § IV at 6. For the following reasons, each of these claims fails.
Plaintiff's first three claims all concern purported injury suffered by Rawls-Dolin arising from her employment. As explained above, a party may assert only claims arising from his or her own legal rights and interests. A plaintiff is not permitted to pursue claims that rest on the legal rights or interests of others. Because plaintiff's claims for negligence, retaliation, and sexual harassment each seek to redress an injury suffered by Rawls-Dolin, plaintiff does not have standing to assert such claims on his own behalf. See Long v. Wray Auto., Inc., No. CA 3:06-1199-JFA-JRM, 2007 WL 2579438, at *8 (D.S.C. 4 Sept. 2007) ("Generally, an employment discrimination plaintiff is without standing to redress discrimination directed toward others."); Endara v. New Life Fitness World of S.C., Lexington, Inc., No. CV 3:05-2691-MBS-JRM, 2006 WL 8445560, at *3 (D.S.C. 25 May 2006) ("[I]t has been held that an employment discrimination plaintiff lacks standing to redress discrimination directed toward others.").
A claim for loss of consortium "embraces service, society, companionship, sexual gratification and affection." Nicholson v. Hugh Chatham Mem. Hosp., Inc., 300 N.C. 295, 302, 266 S.E.2d 818, 822 (1980). The North Carolina Supreme Court held in Nicholson that "a spouse may maintain a cause of action for loss of consortium due to the negligent actions of third parties so long as that action for loss of consortium is joined with any suit the other spouse may have instituted to recover for his or her personal injuries." Nicholson v. Hugh Chatham Memorial Hospital, 300 N.C. 295, 304, 266 S.E.2d 818, 823 (1980). Here, Rawls-Dolin has not asserted any claims on her own behalf in this lawsuit. Therefore, plaintiff's independent claim for loss of consortium cannot stand.
The court assumes without deciding that North Carolina law applies to the dispute, but plaintiff's loss of consortium claim would fare no better under Virginia law. which does not recognize it as an independent claim. See Sirak v. Aiken, No. 3:19CV179, 2019 WL 6689912, at *3 (E.D. Va. 6 Dec. 2019) ("Virginia does not recognize loss of consortium as a viable cause of action."); Iannello v. Busch Entm't Corp., 300 F. Supp. 2d 400, 403 (E.D. Va. 2004) ("In Virginia, a husband's common-law right of action for loss of consortium has been abrogated by statute."). Further, to the extent plaintiff's claim for loss of consortium is derivative of a purported Title VII claim, Title VII also would preempt any such claim. Iannucci v. Rite Aid Corp., No. 1:11CV281, 2012 WL 1898914, at *6 (W.D.N.C. 24 May 2012).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that this action be DISMISSED.
IT IS DIRECTED that the Clerk serve a copy of this Oder and Memorandum and Recommendation on plaintiff. Plaintiff shall have until 30 December 2019 to file written objections to the Memorandum and Recommendation. The presiding district judge must conduct her own review (that is, make a de novo determination) of those portions of the Memorandum and Recommendation to which objection is properly made and may accept, reject, or modify the determinations in the Memorandum and Recommendation; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); Local Civ. R. 1.1 (permitting modification of deadlines specified in local rules), 72.4(b), E.D.N.C.
If a party docs not file written objections to the Memorandum and Recommendation by the foregoing deadline, the party will be giving up the right to review of the Memorandum and Recommendation by the presiding district judge as described above, and the presiding district judge may enter an order or judgment based on the Memorandum and Recommendation without such review. In addition, the party's failure to file written objections by the foregoing deadline will bar the party from appealing to the Court of Appeals from an order or judgment of the presiding district judge based on the Memorandum and Recommendation. See Wright v. Collins , 766 F.2d 841, 846-47 (4th Cir. 1985).
This 16th day of December 2019.
/s/_________
James E. Gates
United States Magistrate Judge