Doke v. United Pacific Insurance

12 Citing cases

  1. Woldrich v. Vancouver Police

    84 Wn. App. 1008 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996)   Cited 8 times
    In Woldrich, the police officer became disabled as a result of depression caused by his reaction to a disciplinary demotion and his supervisor's dissatisfaction with his job performance.

    Nowhere does LEOFF define the concept of "in the line of duty," nor do the parties direct us to a definition located elsewhere in statutory or administrative law. Nevertheless, in Doke v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 15 Wn.2d 536, 543-44, 131 P.2d 436 (1942), the Washington State Supreme Court found the phrase unambiguous. In Doke, a Washington National Guard soldier was injured while crossing the street on his way to the guard's weekly drill formation.

  2. Reserve Life Insurance Company v. Marr

    254 F.2d 289 (9th Cir. 1958)   Cited 20 times
    In Reserve Life Insurance Company v. Marr, 254 F.2d 289 (9th Cir 1958), cert den 358 U.S. 839, 79 S Ct 63, 3 L Ed 3d 74 (1958), the policy required the hospital to have operating facilities on the premises.

    The policies in question do not unequivocally contain such a requirement, and the ambiguity was properly construed by the trial court in favor of the policy holder. McCarty v. King County Medical Service Corp., 1946, 26 Wn.2d 660, 175 P.2d 653; Dorsey v. Strand, 1944, 21 Wn.2d 217, 222, 150 P.2d 702, 705; Doke v. United Pacific Ins. Co., 1942, 15 Wn.2d 536, 131 P.2d 436, 135 P.2d 71. The trial court found that the facilities furnished substantially complied with the terms of the policy.

  3. United States v. Campbell

    172 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1949)   Cited 57 times
    In United States v. Campbell, 5 Cir., 172 F.2d 500, 503, the court stated: "* * * the known purpose of the Tort Claims Act, as shown by its antecedent history, and the record made in its passage, to make the United States liable to third persons for the acts of its employees under the same circumstances, and no other, as those under which private persons would be liable for the acts of their employees according to the law of the place where the injury occurred."

    One of these cases, Globe Indemnity Co. v. Forrest, 165 Va. 267, 182 S.E. 215, involving an enlisted member of the Virginia National Guard, was brought under the Virginia workmen's compensation law. The other, Doke v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 15 Wn.2d 536, 131 P.2d 436, 135 P.2d 71, involved the construction of an insurance policy insuring all members of the National Guard of the State of Washington. The decision of the first cited case turned on the peculiar relationship of employer and employee existing between the National Guard and its members. It was claimed in defense that, when the claimant was given a pass to leave the military reservation and proceeded to avail himself of the privilege, there was a cessation of the relation of master and servant between himself and the State of Virginia.

  4. Boeing v. Aetna Casualty Surety Co.

    113 Wn. 2d 869 (Wash. 1990)   Cited 265 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that response costs are "damages" under the CGL clause at issue

    See, e.g., Stusser v. Mutual Union Ins. Co., 127 Wn. 449, 455, 221 P. 331 (1923); Guaranty Trust Co. v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 159 Wn. 683, 688, 294 P. 585 (1930); Braley Motor Co. v. Northwest Cas. Co., 184 Wn. 47, 52-53, 49 P.2d 911 (1935); Kane v. Order of United Comm'l Travelers of Am., 3 Wn.2d 355, 359-60, 100 P.2d 1036 (1940); Zinn v. Equitable Life Ins. Co., 6 Wn.2d 379, 385, 107 P.2d 921 (1940); Doke v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 15 Wn.2d 536, 544, 131 P.2d 436, 135 P.2d 71 (1942); Johnson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 70 Wn.2d 587, 590, 424 P.2d 648 (1967); Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. McManemy, 72 Wn.2d 211, 213, 432 P.2d 537 (1967); Continental Ins. Co. v. Paccar, Inc., 96 Wn.2d 160, 167, 634 P.2d 291 (1981).

  5. State v. Smith

    85 Wn. 2d 840 (Wash. 1975)   Cited 43 times
    Finding that a tape recording did not intercept a private conversation under § 9.73.030 because the sounds of gunfire, running, and shouting were not an oral exchange, discourse, or discussion

    That this court has recognized, accepted, and applied this exception to the hearsay rule is evidenced by our decisions in State v. Power, 24 Wn. 34, 63 P. 1112 (1901); State v. Paschall, 182 Wn. 304, 47 P.2d 15 (1935); Doke v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 15 Wn.2d 536, 131 P.2d 436 (1942); State v. Payne, 25 Wn.2d 407, 171 P.2d 227 (1946); State v. Hart, 26 Wn.2d 776, 175 P.2d 944 (1946); Raborn v. Hayton, 34 Wn.2d 105, 208 P.2d 133 (1949); Ford v. United Bhd. ofCarpenters, 50 Wn.2d 832, 315 P.2d 299 (1957); and Hall v. American Friends Serv. Comm., Inc., 74 Wn.2d 467, 445 P.2d 616 (1968). We are satisfied Mrs. Wesselius' testimony clearly falls within the ambit of this exception and was perforce properly admitted.

  6. Malstrom v. Kalland

    384 P.2d 613 (Wash. 1963)   Cited 22 times

    "This latter rule is based upon the theory that there is a conflict in the testimony and that the trial court, having the witnesses before it, is in better position to arrive at the truth than is the appellate court. For this reason, the rule has no application in a case where there is no substantial dispute as to the facts and no question as to the credibility of witnesses or the weight to be given to their testimony, but where the sole question on appeal concerns the proper conclusions to be drawn from practically undisputed evidence; in such situation, this court has the duty of determining for itself the right and proper conclusions to be drawn from the evidence in the case. Westland v. Post Land Co., 115 Wn. 329, 197 P. 44; Doke v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 15 Wn.2d 536, 131 P.2d 436, 35 P.2d 71." Shultes v. Halpin, 33 Wn.2d 294, 305-306, 205 P.2d 1201 (1949).

  7. Ford v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America

    315 P.2d 299 (Wash. 1957)   Cited 9 times

    In Glover v. Orofino Mercantile Co., 53 Idaho 339, 23 P.2d 1115, the rule was held applicable on the issue of whether the decedent was acting for his employer, and his statement of intention to go to the town in question to attend to some work was admitted. The rule has also been recognized in this state in Doke v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 15 Wn.2d 536, 131 P.2d 436, 135 P.2d 71; State v. Payne, 25 Wn.2d 407, 171 837 P.2d 227, 175 P.2d 494; State v. Hart, 26 Wn.2d 776, 175 P.2d 944; State v. Paschall, 182 Wn. 304, 47 P.2d 15; and State v. Power, 24 Wn. 34, 63 P. 1112, 63 L.R.A. 902. The only limitations as to the use of such statements, Professor Wigmore points out, are that the statements must be of a present existing state of mind and must appear to have been made in a natural manner and not under circumstances of suspicion. It was natural for the decedent to explain to the woman with whom he had an engagement for the evening the reason why he would be unable to keep it; and the fact that the international representative did arrive in Wenatchee on the evening of the accident, and apparently did travel through Spokane, tends to corroborate that intention.

  8. Boyle v. Clark

    287 P.2d 1006 (Wash. 1955)   Cited 12 times

    [7] With regard to the alleged error in the admission of evidence, we do not think that the court erred in that respect. For the purpose of proving the change occurring in Mary Boyle's mental attitude and her state of mind, declarations made by her outside the presence of respondent were admitted in evidence over objection of respondent. The admission of this evidence for this purpose was not error. Wendell v. Brown, 142 Wn. 391, 253 P. 452; Doke v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 15 Wn.2d 536, 131 P.2d 436, 135 P.2d 71. [8] Evidence of the acts and conduct of respondent subsequent to the separation of the parties, and after the divorce decree was entered, was admitted to prove the course of conduct followed by respondent in alienating Mary Boyle's affection from appellant.

  9. Raborn v. Hayton

    34 Wn. 2d 105 (Wash. 1949)   Cited 23 times
    In Raborn v. Hayton, 34 Wn.2d 105 (1949), the court cancelled a deed and quieted title to property in the heir of the grantor under the deed.

    We have recognized and applied the rule unconditionally. Klein v. Knights, Etc., 87 Wn. 179, 151 P. 241, L.R.A. 1916B 816, noted in 86 A.L.R. 138, 158 and Ann. Cas. 1918C 1050; Harringer v. Keenan, 117 Wn. 311, 314-15, 201 P. 306, noted in 82 A.L.R. 822, 832, 842; Doke v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 15 Wn.2d 536, 539-42, 131 P.2d 436. Noted in 20 Am. Jur. 491. In other cases, we have applied the rule to admit the challenged evidence but the rule itself was not identified. Leonard v. Territory, 2 Wn. Terr. 381, 396, 7 P. 872; Beach v. Brown, 20 Wn. 266, 271, 55 P. 46, 43 A.L.R. 114, 72 Am. St. 98, noted in 82 A.L.R. 822, 832, 847; State v. Mayer, 154 Wn. 667, 673-4, 283 P. 195, noted in 113 A.L.R. 264, 274, 303.

  10. Shultes v. Halpin

    205 P.2d 1201 (Wash. 1949)   Cited 35 times

    This latter rule is based upon the theory that there is a conflict in the testimony and that the trial court, having the witnesses before it, is in better position to arrive at the truth than is the appellate court. For this reason, the rule has no application in a case where there is no substantial dispute as to the facts and no question as to the credibility of witnesses or the weight to be given to their testimony, but where the sole question on appeal concerns the proper conclusions to be drawn from practically undisputed evidence; in such situation, this court has the duty of determining for itself the right and proper conclusions to be drawn from the evidence in the case. Westland v. Post Land Co., 115 Wn. 329, 197 P. 44; Doke v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 15 Wn.2d 536, 131 P.2d 436, 35 P.2d 71. [3] In our opinion, there can be no doubt that the trial court was fully justified in finding the appellant driver, James Halpin, guilty of negligence which was a proximate cause of the collision and consequent injuries.