The judge did not abuse his discretion in concluding that the testimony of yet another psychologist would be cumulative. See Anthony's Pier Four, Inc. v. HBC Assocs., supra ("[i]t is also within the discretion of the judge to exclude excessively cumulative evidence, including expert testimony"); Doherty's Case, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 880, 881 (1980) (no error in refusing to allow employee to introduce testimony of witness where no offer of proof made and for all that appears on record testimony of witness would have been cumulative). Moreover, we are reluctant to conclude that the report should have been accepted as an offer of proof given the judge's conclusion, which is not contested on appeal, that the report itself should have been provided to all parties earlier in the proceedings.
We conclude that the recommittal order confined the single member to the existing record, that it did not empower him to receive further evidence by way of a second deposition of the employee's physician, and that the board acted properly in striking that deposition on the ground that its taking had not been authorized. Contrast Doherty's Case, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 880 (1980). Since the board's action can be sustained on the foregoing ground, there is no need to consider the propriety of the other ground suggested to the board by the self-insurer for striking the deposition.
The order of recommittal was limited to an assessment of the case absent the error of law in the first decision.Payton, supra at 629. It was not an order for a hearing de novo. SeeDoherty's Case, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 880, 881 (1988). Under these circumstances, the first decision and the second decision were both the result of one "hearing" for purposes of ยง 13A(5).