Commonly there should not be a rehearing." Doherty's Case, 222 Mass. 98, 101. Devine's Case, 236 Mass. 588, 595. When this court or the Superior Court has been of opinion that there should be a rehearing, it has ordered the case remanded to the Industrial Accident Board for that purpose.
The statute G.L.c. 152, § says that the "court shall render a decree in accordance therewith" (i.e., with the agreement, order or decision) and this has been held to mean in accordance with the law applicable to the facts presented by the papers. McNicol's Case, 215 Mass. 497, 501. Doherty's Case, 222 Mass. 98. Keohane's Case, 232 Mass. 487. Bell's Case, 238 Mass. 46. Chisholm's Case, 238 Mass. 412. Johnson's Case, 242 Mass. 489. Emma's Case, 242 Mass. 408. Gillard's Case, 244 Mass. 47. The Superior Court therefore before entering a decree has the duty of framing the decree and of satisfying itself that the decree so framed complies with the law. It must hear the parties, but it cannot revise findings of fact for which there is any legal basis in the evidence and papers submitted.
The introduction of new evidence is a matter of discretion and where, as here, no abuse of discretion is shown, there was no error in denying the motion. Doherty's Case, 222 Mass. 98. Devine's Case, 236 Mass. 588, 595. Lopes's Case, 277 Mass. 581, 585.
If there was any error in refusing to engage in such a futility it was of the most technical kind and did not prejudice the rights of anyone. See Doherty's Case, 222 Mass. 98, 100; Lopes's Case, 277 Mass. 581, 587-588; Mizrahi's Case, 320 Mass. 733, 738. It does not call for reversal.
It is plain from what has been said that the finding of the board that the employee's death was due to benzol poisoning which came from contact with materials used by the employee in his work, notably from paint remover, cannot be said to have been unwarranted by the evidence. The case is distinguishable from Doherty's Case, 222 Mass. 98, where a linotype operator who claimed to be suffering from lead poisoning failed to show the composition of the type upon which he worked, and from Breault's Case, 270 Mass. 256, where an employee who for years had been suffering from lead poisoning was properly found by the board to have been so suffering but there was no evidence warranting a finding that during the eight weeks he was employed by the insured he was exposed to lead. The claim was not filed until March 30, 1945.
Fred T. Ley Co. Inc. v. Sagalyn, 302 Mass. 488, 495. Johnson's Case, 242 Mass. 489, 495. Deficiencies in proof that the employee's injury arose out of and in the course of his employment were pointed out in the opinion. The Superior Court was justified in finding that the record was inadequate and, in the exercise of its discretion, was warranted in reopening the case for further hearing by the Industrial Accident Board. Nelson's Case, 217 Mass. 467, 470. Doherty's Case, 222 Mass. 98. Fierro's Case, 223 Mass. 378. Devine's Case, 236 Mass. 588, 595. Ward's Case, 286 Mass. 72, 77. It is contended by the insurer that the motion to recommit the case was not supported by a proper affidavit.
"If the evidence in the case supports the finding of fact, it may not be said that the commissioner acted without or in excess of his powers, even though a court, if trying the fact in the first instance, might reach a different conclusion. Milwaukee C. G. Co. v. Industrial Commissioner, 160 Wis. 247. See, also, In re Burns' Case, 218 Mass. 8; In re Doherty's Case, 222 Mass. 98."
On the other hand, it should not be so interpreted, or the procedure thereunder be of such a nature as to jeopardize the substantial rights of either party." Doherty's case, 222 Mass. 98, 109 N.E. 887; Madden's case, 222 Mass. 487, 111 N.E. 379; L.R.A., 1916-D, 1000; Rozek's case, 200 N.E., (Mass.), 903. In Madden's case, supra, referring to a report containing only the conclusion of the committee, it is said: "It simply is a categorical repetition of the words in the statute by which the result is reached entitling the employee to compensation, without a statement of what the personal injury was, out of which grows the right to money payments."
The claimant relies on the settled law of the Commonwealth that findings of fact by the Industrial Accident Board will not be disturbed if there is any evidence, no matter how slight, to sustain them. Doherty's Case, 222 Mass. 98. Savage's Case, 222 Mass. 205. Crowley's Case, 223 Mass. 288. Devine's Case, 236 Mass. 588. Cooper's Case, 271 Mass. 38. The reported evidence warranted the finding of facts, in substance, as follows: The deceased resided in the town of Princeton.
We agree that it is the duty of the board so to deal with cases before it that when a certified copy of the record is presented to the Superior Court, that court can determine with reasonable certainty whether or not correct rules of law have been applied to facts which could properly be found and that whenever a record presented does not conform to this standard it is the duty of the court to recommit the case to the board for further findings or rulings until a proper record is obtained, as the court would do where a case comes before it on a master's report. Doherty's Case, 222 Mass. 98. Mathewson's Case, 227 Mass. 470. Brown's Case, 228 Mass. 31, 38. Sciola's Case, 236 Mass. 407. Emma's Case, 242 Mass. 408, 414. Lopes's Case, 277 Mass. 581, 585, and cases cited.