Opinion
June 6, 1972.
Editorial Note:
This case has been marked 'not for publication' by the court.
Fishcher & Wilmarth, Elery Wilmarth, Fort Collins, for plaintiff-appellant.
Russell S. Pugh, Loveland, for defendant-appellee.
DWYER, Judge.
Preston A. Doerfler, plaintiff-appellant, brought this action to obtain a divorce from his wife, Helen R. Doerfler. The wife answered, and she also counterclaimed for a divorce. The court awarded decrees of divorce to both parties. The court subsequently entered orders relative to division of property, alimony, custody, and child support. Neither party complains of the custody order, but the husband has appealed the other final orders entered by the court. We affirm.
The parties were married in 1949. The husband was a successful businessman, and the wife was not employed. During the marriage the parties acquired an equity of approximately $13,625 in a house. They also accumulated, as joint owners, corporate securities having the value of approximately $54.627. They owned horses, two automobiles, furniture, and miscellaneous personal property, and they had $9,386 deposited in banks. The court divided the securities equally between the parties. The equity in the house, the bank accounts, and a note owned by the parties were awarded to the husband, and he was ordered to pay to the wife one-half of the value of these assets. Each of the parties received an automobile and part of the miscellaneous personal property.
Two children were born to the marriage. The oldest one was emancipated at the time of the divorce. The court found that both parties were fit and proper persons to have custody of the youngest child, a boy of 14 years of age. Custody of the younger child was awarded to the husband for ten months and to the wife for two months of each year.
The husband was ordered to pay alimony to the wife in the sum of $195 per month. He was also ordered to pay the wife $50 per month child support for the two months that the child was in her custody.
Matters of property division and alimony rest in the sound discretion of the trial court. If the court's award is supported by competent evidence, it will not be disturbed on review. Graves v. Graves, 171 Colo. 20, 464 P.2d 291; Nunemacher v. Nunemacher, 132 Colo. 300, 287 P.2d 662. The record reveals that the court received extensive testimony pertaining to the facts and circumstances pertinent to the award of property and alimony. Upon the basis of testimony and exhibits received, the trial court made detailed findings of fact which demonstrate that the court considered the value of the estate to be divided, the financial condition of the parties, the ability of each spouse to earn money, and the age and status of the parties. These considerations are in accord with those approved in Traynor v. Traynor, 146 Colo. 70, 360 P.2d 431, and Nunemacher v. Nunemacher, Supra, and the court did not abuse its discretion in the orders it entered.
The husband contends that the amount of child support and alimony awarded is excessive. The wife was 58 years old, unemployed, and had not been employed outside the home except for a short time during the marriage. The husband had a monthly take-home pay of $500 and received an additional $200 monthly from investments. The court suggested that the wife attempt to obtain employment and ordered her to report in writing to the husband every six months cncerning her income and employment status to provide the husband with a basis for obtaining a modification in alimony payments if warranted by a change in circumstances. When all of the facts and circumstances disclosed by the record are considered, it cannot be said that the court abused its discretion in entering the alimony and support money orders.
The husband also complains that the trial court improperly ordered him to pay alimony retroactively. The hearings on permanent orders were held on February 18, 1971, and February 26, 1971. The formal property division order was not signed by the court until March 29, 1971. The decree required the first semimonthly installment of alimony of $97.50 to be made on March 17, 1971. The order is technically erroneous. However, the court could have required the husband to pay the sum of $97.50 on March 29, 1971, or on any subsequent date. The husband was not prejudiced, and the technical error in the order does not require a reversal.
The husband also contends that the court erred in ordering him to pay the cost of preparing the transcript of the custody hearing which transcript the wife designated for inclusion in the record on appeal. The trial court determined that a transcript of the additional parts of the proceedings designated by the wife was essential to a full understanding of the controversy, and in the circumstances of this case, there was no error in this determination. The husband, as the party seeking reversal, was properly compelled to bear the cost of preparing the entire record on appeal. C.A.R. 10(b).
The other contentions of the husband are without substance.
Judgments affirmed.
SILVERSTEIN, C.J., and SMITH, J., concur.