" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe v. University of Chicago Medical Center , 2014 IL App (1st) 121593, ¶ 77, 386 Ill.Dec. 140, 20 N.E.3d 1. Defendant maintains that by "inform[ing] the jury that the court had ruled totally in favor of the plaintiffs," the court misled the jury by giving "no recognition of defendant's concession."¶ 32 But the trial court never instructed the jury that the court had "ruled totally in favor of the plaintiffs.

] In determining whether a party has been prejudiced, we consider whether the instructions, taken as a whole, were sufficiently clear so as not to mislead the jury." Doe v. University of Chicago Medical Center, 2014 IL App (1st) 121593, ¶ 87, 386 Ill.Dec. 140, 20 N.E.3d 1.¶ 41 In Schultz, our supreme court discussed the use of an assumption of risk instruction in an FELA case, explaining:

We emphasize that "[w]here IPI instructions accurately state the law applicable in a case and adequately charge the jury, they should be used exclusively." Doe v. University of Chicago Medical Center, 2014 IL App (1st) 121593, ¶ 80. ¶ 96 A plaintiff is entitled to have the jury instructed on his theory of the case, and the failure to do so may require a new trial.

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Doe v. University of Chicago Medical Center, 2014 IL App (1st) 121593, ¶ 77, 386 Ill.Dec. 140, 20 N.E.3d 1. The only contested legal issue for the jury to determine regarding plaintiff's pretext theory—whether defendant failed to rehire plaintiff because of her race or religion—was not provided to the jury. The failure to include this component in the elements instruction was both inaccurate and misleading. Given that we do not know which theory of liability the jury relied upon when it found in plaintiff's favor, we conclude the failure to provide such an instruction was prejudicial to defendant.

"Even if the plaintiff was prejudiced by the use of [an improper jury instruction], there must be a reasonable basis supporting the conclusion that, but for the error, the verdict might have been different." Doe v. University of Chicago Medical Center, 2014 IL App (1st) 121593, ¶ 87.¶ 43 We find that the evidence submitted supports giving both Illinois Pattern Instruction 20.01 (negligence) and 120.08 (premises liability) to the jury.

. "To show prejudice, 'there must be a reasonable basis supporting the conclusion that, but for the error, the verdict might have been different.'" Martin v. City of Chicago, 2023 IL App (1st) 221116, ¶ 37 (quoting Doe v. University of Chicago Medical Center, 2014 IL App (1st) 121593, ¶ 87).

To show prejudice, "there must be a reasonable basis supporting the conclusion that, but for the error, the verdict might have been different." Doe v. University of Chicago Medical Center, 2014 IL App (1st) 121593, ¶ 87. In addressing this question, the court "must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict."

We also note that, even if the court had abused its discretion, reversal would remain unwarranted because plaintiff cannot show prejudice from the use of IPI Civil No, 120.08. To show prejudice, "there must be a reasonable basis supporting the conclusion that, but for the error, the verdict might have been different," Doe v. University of Chicago Medical Center, 2014 IL App (1st) 121593, ¶ 87. In addressing this question, the court "must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict."

"Even if the plaintiff was prejudiced by the use of [an improper jury instruction], there must be a reasonable basis supporting the conclusion that, but for the error, the verdict might have been different." Doe v. University of Chicago Medical Center, 2014 IL App (1st) 121593, ¶ 87. ¶ 80 Here, Paccar does not contend that the negligence instructions were incorrectly given. Rather, Paccar appears to argue that the Illinois Pattern Instructions were inadequate and the instructions it offered were necessary to "explain to the jury what 'adequate' meant" as to the issue of whether the SCH system was adequately designed.

"A faulty jury instruction does not require reversal unless the error results in serious prejudice to the party's right to a fair trial." Doe v. University of Chicago Medical Center, 2014 IL App (1st) 121593, ¶ 87. ¶ 42 To review, count I of plaintiff's complaint asserted negligence against Green, and count II asserted negligence against Pan-Oceanic. Count III sought punitive damages against Green and Pan-Oceanic on the basis that their acts or omissions demonstrated a reckless disregard for the safety of others.