Opinion
C097661
01-30-2024
JANE DOE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. THERMALITO UNION ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. 22CV01557
RENNER, J.
Plaintiff Jane Doe (Doe) filed a petition for relief from the claim presentation requirements of the Government Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 810, et seq.) in order to bring a complaint for damages against defendant Thermalito Union Elementary School District (the District) for alleged childhood sexual abuse by a former teacher. The trial court denied the petition in 2013, and that seemed to be the end of the matter.
Things changed in 2019, when the Legislature passed Assembly Bill No. 218 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 218), which revised Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1. (Stats. 2019, ch. 861, § 1.) As relevant here, Assembly Bill 218 extended the time for filing claims for childhood sexual abuse (§ 340.1, former subds. (a) and (c)) and provided for the revival of lapsed claims (§ 340.1, former subd. (q)).
Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 340.1 has since been amended. (See Stats. 2022, ch. 444, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2023 and Stats. 2023, ch. 655, § 1, effective Jan. 1, 2024.)
With Assembly Bill 218 enacted into law, Doe returned to the trial court. She filed a complaint against the District and her former teacher, asserting the same allegations as the previously rejected petition. The District demurred, arguing the order denying the petition was final for purposes of the separation of powers doctrine, such that Doe's claims could not be revived pursuant to section 340.1. The trial court sustained the demurrer and entered judgment in the District's favor.
Doe appeals. She argues the trial court erred in finding that the revival of her claims would violate separation of powers principles. She also argues that failure to revive her claims would violate her right to equal protection. We will reject these arguments and affirm the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Petition
Doe was a student at an elementary school within the District. She applied for leave to file a late claim under the Government Claims Act in 2012. (Gov. Code, § 911.4.) The application alleged Doe had been sexually molested by a former teacher beginning in June 2006 and continuing for two school years. The District denied the application.
Doe filed her petition for relief from claim presentation requirements in January 2013. (Gov. Code, § 946.6.) The District opposed the petition. The trial court entered an order denying the petition on March 18, 2013. The District filed and served notice of entry of judgment or order on Judicial Council form CIV-130 around the same time. Doe did not appeal.
B. Claim Presentation Requirements
The Government Claims Act "requires that any civil complaint for money or damages first be presented to and rejected by the pertinent public entity." (Munoz v. State of California (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1767, 1776.) Government Code section 905 exempts certain claims from the claim presentation requirements. At the time of the petition, Government Code section 905, former subdivision (m) exempted claims for childhood sexual abuse "arising out of conduct occurring on or after January 1, 2009." However, Government Code section 935 authorized local public entities to establish their own claim presentation procedures. (Gov. Code, § 935, subd. (a).) The District had its own claim presentation procedures (known as Board Policy 3320), which required notice of all claims for damages, including claims that would have otherwise been exempt under Government Code section 905, former subdivision (m).
C. Statutory Changes
The landscape for claims of childhood sexual abuse claims changed significantly in the years following the denial of Doe's petition. Two changes are relevant here. First, the Legislature amended Government Code section 935 in 2018 to clarify that local public entities cannot adopt claim presentation requirements for "claims of childhood sexual abuse made as described in subdivision (m) of Section 905." (Gov. Code, § 935, subd. (f); Sen. Bill No. 1053 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) Stats. 2018, ch. 153, § 1.) The Legislature added: "This subdivision is declaratory of existing law." (Stats. 2018, ch. 153, § 1.)
Second, the Legislature passed Assembly Bill 218, which amended section 340.1 to extend the statute of limitations for claims of childhood sexual abuse, and expanded Government Code section 905, former subdivision (m)'s exception to claims presentation requirements to all claims, regardless of date. (Gov. Code, § 905, subds. (m) &(p); Stats. 2019, ch. 861, § 3 [amending Gov. Code, § 905, subd. (m) to eliminate "on or after January 1, 2009" and adding subd. (p) to make the changes retroactive].) Assembly Bill 218 became effective January 1, 2020.
D. The Complaint
Doe filed the instant complaint in July 2022. The complaint alleges Doe was sexually abused by the same teacher from June 2006 through sometime in 2009. The complaint asserts causes of action for sexual abuse of a minor against the teacher, and negligence, negligent hiring, and negligent supervision against the District.
The District demurred to the complaint on various grounds. Among other things, the District argued Doe had previously litigated her claim of exemption from the Government Claims Act to finality, and thus section 340.1 could not apply to revive the claim. The District also argued the complaint was barred by the doctrine of res judicata and reviving Doe's claims would violate separation of powers principles.
The District requested and received judicial notice of Doe's petition for relief from claim presentation requirements and related documents.
The trial court sustained the demurrer. The trial court concluded the petition was not litigated to finality in the res judicata sense but was nevertheless "final" for separation of powers purposes, such that reviving Doe's claims would be unconstitutional. Accordingly, the trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. The trial court entered judgment in the District's favor on November 14, 2022. This appeal timely followed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
We independently review a judgment of dismissal based on an order sustaining a demurrer without leave to amend to determine whether the complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory. (Committee for Green Foothills v. Santa Clara County Bd. of Supervisors (2010) 48 Cal.4th 32, 42.) We assume all the facts alleged in the complaint are true. (Pineda v. Williams-Sonoma Stores, Inc. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 524, 528.) We accept all properly pleaded material facts but not contentions, deductions, or conclusions of fact or law. (Evans v. City of Berkeley (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1, 6.) We may also consider matters subject to judicial notice. (Ibid.) The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating a reasonable possibility that any defect can be cured by amendment. (Michael Leslie Productions, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1011, 1019.)
We also independently review the application of an interpreted statute to undisputed facts. (Boling v. Public Employment Relations Bd. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 898, 912913.) "When we interpret a statute, '[o]ur fundamental task . . . is to determine the Legislature's intent so as to effectuate the law's purpose. We first examine the statutory language, giving it a plain and commonsense meaning. We do not examine the language in isolation, but in the context of the statutory framework as a whole in order to determine its scope and purpose and to harmonize the various parts of the enactment. If the language is clear, courts must generally follow its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend.'" (Sierra Club v. Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 157, 165-166.)
B. Statutory Interpretation and Separation of Powers
Doe argues the trial court erred in sustaining the District's demurrer on separation of powers grounds. We disagree. We will explain why in three parts. First, we will introduce section 340.1, which authorizes the revival of certain child sexual abuse claims. (§ 340.1, former subds. (q) &(r); Stats. 2019, ch. 861, § 1.) Second, we will discuss Doe v. Marysville Joint Unified School District (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 910 (Marysville), in which another panel of this court recently considered the meaning and constitutionality of that statute's revival provisions. (Id. at pp. 914-920.) Our discussion of Marysville will also include an overview of separation of powers principles and Perez v. Roe 1 (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 171 (Perez), on which the trial court relied. Finally, we will consider whether the order denying Doe's petition for relief from the claim presentation requirements was "final" for separation of powers purposes. We will conclude that it was.
"Section 340.1 governs the period within which a plaintiff must bring a tort claim based upon childhood sexual abuse." (Quarry v. Doe I (2012) 53 Cal.4th 945, 952.) The Legislature has repeatedly amended section 340.1 to "expand the statute of limitations and decrease other barriers to victims seeking to bring their claims of abuse." (Marysville, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 915; see also § 340.1, former subds. (a) &(c) [extending statute of limitations to permit an action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault to be brought by age 40 or within five years of when the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered the resulting psychological injury or illness].)
Section 340.1, former subdivision (q) provided for a three-year revival period for all claims for damages brought under subdivision (a) that had "not been litigated to finality and that would otherwise be barred as of January 1, 2020, because the applicable statute of limitations, claim presentation deadline, or any other time limit had expired." (Stats. 2019, ch. 861, § 1.) Section 340.1, former subdivision (r) stated: "The changes made to the time period under subdivision (a) as amended by [Assembly Bill 218] apply to and revive any action commenced on or after the date of enactment of [Assembly Bill 218], and to any action filed before the date of enactment, and still pending on that date, including any action or causes of action that would have been barred by the laws in effect before the date of enactment." (Stats. 2019, ch. 861, § 1.) Together, former subdivisions (q) and (r) establish that "the statute only revives claims that have not already reached final adjudication." (Marysville, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 916; see also Safechuck v.
MJJ Productions, Inc. (2020) 43 Cal.App.5th 1094, 1100 ["The import of section 340.1, [former] subdivisions (q) and (r) is clear: the Legislature intended to preserve and revive all nonfinal claims"].) We must decide, then, whether Doe's claims were "litigated to finality" by means of the 2013 order denying the petition.
2. Marysville and Perez
The meaning of "litigated to finality" was addressed in Marysville. (Marysville, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at pp. 915-917.) There, three former students presented claims to a school district pursuant to the Government Claims Act in 2002 and then filed a complaint asserting claims of childhood sexual abuse by a school counselor. (Id. at p. 913.) The trial court granted the school district's motion for summary judgment, finding the students' causes of action accrued more than a year before they filed their claims, and were thus untimely. (Ibid.) The students appealed, and the court affirmed. (Ibid.) The Supreme Court denied the students' petition for review in 2006. (Ibid.)
The students returned to the trial court 14 years later, following Assembly Bill 218. (Marysville, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 914.) They filed another complaint alleging substantially the same claims as their earlier one in 2020. (Ibid.) The school district demurred, and the trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. (Ibid.)
The students appealed again. (Marysville, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 914.) They argued their claims were capable of being revived under section 340.1, former subdivision (q), because they had not been litigated to finality "on the merits" in the earlier proceeding. (Marysville, supra, at p. 916; see also Smart Corner Owners Assn. v. CJUF Smart Corner LLC (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 439, 461 (Smart Corner Owners) ["The words 'on the merits' have an accepted legal meaning. They refer to the substantive elements of a claim or defense, as distinguished from technical or procedural impediments to proceeding with a claim. [Citation.] A ruling that a claim is time-barred under the statute of limitations, for example, is considered a' "technical or procedural" ' ground for disposing of a claim, rather than a determination' "on the merits"' "].) They also argued revival would not violate separation of powers principles, but failure to revive would violate equal protection. (Marysville, supra, at p. 914.) The Marysville court disagreed. (Ibid.)
Focusing on the plain language of the statute, the Marysville court observed that section 340.1, former subdivision (q) "only revives claims that have not already reached final adjudication." (Marysville, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 916.) There was "no dispute" the students' claims had been "litigated to finality long ago." (Ibid.) Therefore, the Marysville court concluded the students' claims could not be revived. (Ibid.)
The Marysville court next considered the students' contention that section 340.1, former subdivision (q) should be interpreted to revive claims that were not litigated to finality "on the merits." (Marysville, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 916.) The court noted that an earlier version of section 340.1 provided for revival of claims that were not litigated to finality "on the merits," as the students proposed. (Marysville, supra, at pp. 916-917.) But the Legislature removed the phrase, "on the merits," and with good reason: "[R]eopening a case litigated to finality would be unconstitutional." (Id. at p. 917.) The Marysville court then considered the application of the separation of powers doctrine. (Id. at pp. 917-920.)
"The separation of powers doctrine holds that one branch of the government cannot exercise essential powers that our state Constitution has delegated to another branch." (Smart Corner Owners, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at p. 465.) "A core function of the Legislature is to make statutory law, which includes weighing competing interests and determining social policy. A core function of the judiciary is to resolve specific controversies between the parties. As part of that function, the courts interpret and apply existing laws such as statutes of limitation. [Citation.] Separation of powers principles compel the courts to carry out the legislative purpose of statutes and limit the courts' ability to rewrite statutes where drafting or constitutional problems appear. Those same principles also constrain legislative influence over judicial proceedings. When cases become final for separation of powers purposes, the Legislature may not interpret a statute or otherwise bind the courts with an after-the-fact declaration of legislative intent. While the Legislature may amend a statute and apply the changed law to pending and future cases, the amended statute may not readjudicate or otherwise disregard judgments that are already final." (Perez, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 177.)
The Perez court applied these principles to an even earlier version of section 340.1, which provided for the revival of claims not" 'litigated to finality on the merits before January 1, 2003.'" (Perez, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 175.) That version of the statute provided that actions terminated for failure to comply with the previously applicable statutes of limitation were not" 'litigated to finality on the merits.'" (Ibid.) The Perez court concluded the Legislature's attempt to revive childhood sexual abuse claims not "litigated to finality on the merits" was an attempt to undo the finality of earlier judgments in violation of the separation of powers doctrine. (Id. at p. 183.) The Perez court explained: "Once the judgments against appellants in the previous action were upheld on appeal-for [one appellant] when the California Supreme Court denied her petition for review, and for [another appellant] when his appeal was dismissed-they became final for separation of powers purposes and could not be legislatively revived. Because the power to conclusively resolve cases by rendering dispositive judgments rests with the judiciary alone [citation,] the Legislature may not reverse final judgments such as those that were rendered under the previous limitations period of section 340.1." (Id. at p. 188.)
Relying on Perez, the Marysville court rejected the students' argument that section 340.1, former subdivision (q) revived claims not litigated to finality on the merits, stating: "Assembly Bill 218's amendments actually negate [the students'] interpretation, as the Legislature expressly removed language permitting plaintiffs to reopen cases disposed of on nonmerit-based grounds. This clearly indicates the Legislature's intent that all claims litigated to finality, regardless of the basis for their adjudication, may not be revived under section 340.1." (Marysville, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 918.)
Marysville teaches that section 340.1, former subdivision (q) cannot constitutionally revive claims that were "litigated to finality," regardless of how finality may have been achieved. (Marysville, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 918.) That lesson matters because Doe argues the order denying the petition was not final for separation of powers purposes. We are not persuaded.
3. Finality of Order Denying the Petition
Relying on Perez and Marysville, Doe argues the phrase "litigated to finality," as used in section 340.1, former subdivision (q), means litigated until entry of something expressly denominated as a "judgment." No such judgment was entered here; therefore, Doe concludes her claims were not "litigated to finality." We disagree.
It is true, as Doe observes, that the courts in Perez and Marysville each rejected attempts to revive claims following final judgments in earlier proceedings. (See Perez, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 174 [plaintiffs sued defendant a second time, after earlier complaints were dismissed under then applicable statute of limitations and judgments had long since become final]; Marysville, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 913 [students sued school district second time, after trial court entered judgment in district's favor, appellate court affirmed, and Supreme Court denied review].) However, neither case says claims of childhood sexual abuse must be litigated to the point of "final judgment"-or rather, to the point of entry of a document styled as a "final judgment"-to be "final" for separation of powers purposes. Doe does not offer any authority for the proposition that application of the separation of powers doctrine depends on such formalities, and we decline to so hold. We therefore return to the language of the statute.
By its terms, section 340.1, former subdivision (q) revives claims that have not been litigated to "finality." The concept of finality embraces multiple meanings. For example, a judgment may be final for some purposes and not others. (See Sullivan v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 288, 303-304 [" 'No hard-and-fast definition of "final" judgment applicable to all situations can be given, since its finality depends somewhat upon the purpose for which and the standpoint from which it is being considered, and it may be final for one purpose and not for another' "].) Likewise, a ruling styled as an "order" may constitute a judgment "where no issue is left for future consideration except the fact of compliance or noncompliance with the terms of the first decree." (See, e.g., Dhillon v. John Muir Health (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1109, 1113-1115 [ruling denominated as an "order" on a petition for writ of administrative mandate may constitute a "final judgment" when such order has the effect of a final judgment].) That is because it is"' "not the form of the decree but the substance and effect of the adjudication which is determinative." '" (Id. at p. 1115.)
Here, the trial court entered an order denying the petition for relief from claim presentation requirements in March 2013. Doe could have appealed the order but chose not to do so. (Ovando v. County of Los Angeles (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 42, 64 (Ovando) ["An order denying relief from the claim presentation requirement under Government Code section 946.6 is appealable"]; see also DeVore v. Department of California Highway Patrol (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 454, 459 [same].) The time for appeal has long since passed. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a) [60 days from service of notice of entry of order or 180 days from entry of order of dismissal if no notice].) Doe's claims were thus "litigated to finality" in the sense that the order was appealable, and the time for appeal has now passed.
"A petition for relief from claim presentation requirements under Government Code section 946.6 is a special proceeding." (Ovando, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 64; see also § 1064 ["A judgment in a special proceeding is the final determination of the rights of the parties therein"].) "An order denying relief from the Government Claims Act prelawsuit claim-filing requirements in suits against government entities (Gov. [Code,] § 946.6) is appealable because, in legal effect, it is a final disposition of the action (order denying relief bars the lawsuit and thus terminates the litigation against the public entity)." (Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals &Writs (The Rutter Group 2023) ¶ 2:40; see also Santee v. Santa Clara County Office of Education (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 702, 710 ["An order denying a claim-relief petition is an appealable order because it effectively determines a petitioner's right to relief from the claim presentation requirements"]; and see Church v. County of Humboldt (1967) 248 Cal.App.2d 855, 857 [denial of petition for relief from claim presentation requirements "manifestly constitutes a final determination of a claimant's rights"].) Thus, as the trial court recognized, Doe's claims were also "litigated to finality" in the sense that the order finally determined Doe's right to bring an action against the District and effectively terminated the litigation between the parties. Again, Doe offers no authority for the proposition that additional finality was needed.
Doe argues "there was no litigation of the claim for damages because [she] never got up to bat." This argument fails to persuade. As noted, Doe's petition for relief from claim presentation requirements initiated a special proceeding in the trial court, which strikes us as a type of "litigation." (See Ovando, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 64.) Doe offers no argument or authority to suggest otherwise.
Another point warrants discussion. Doe argues her claims were not "litigated to finality" to the extent they encompassed claims based on conduct occurring after January 1, 2009. That conduct was exempt from claims presentation requirements pursuant to Government Code section 905, former subdivision (m); therefore, Doe says, they were not part of the petition. But the District had adopted its own claim presentation procedures, set forth in Board Policy 3320. Board Policy 3320 called for notice of all claims for damages, including claims that would have otherwise been exempt under Government Code section 905, former subdivision (m). Although the District may have exceeded its authority in adopting Board Policy 3320 (see Gov. Code, § 935, subd. (f)), the District relied on those procedures in opposing the petition, and specifically discussed their applicability to claims based on conduct subsequent to January 1, 2009. The trial court evidently accepted the District's arguments and denied the petition as to all claims. As we have explained, Doe could have appealed the order denying the petition, but failed to do so. (See Ovando, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 64.) She now fails to show the demurrer was sustained in error.
Because we affirm the judgment of dismissal on separation of powers grounds, we need not address the District's alternative grounds for sustaining the demurrer (including, inter alia, that reviving Doe's claims would constitute an unconstitutional public gift).That leaves us with Doe's equal protection challenge, to which we now turn.
Doe has asked that we take judicial notice of the Assembly Floor Analysis of Assembly Bill 218 in connection with her challenge to the District's argument that reviving her claims would constitute an unconstitutional public gift. Because we do not reach that argument, we have no reason to consider the Assembly Floor Analysis. Accordingly, we deny Doe's request for judicial notice. (See State Comp. Ins. Fund v. ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc. (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 422, 442 [denying request for judicial notice "on the ground that the materials are not relevant to our determination of the issues on appeal"].)
C. Equal Protection
Doe next argues the trial court's application of the separation of powers doctrine violates equal protection by "punishing" her for providing notice of her claims by way of the petition. She asks: "Why should summary denial of that Petition carry so much significance as to deprive this victim of childhood abuse the same protection of the laws enjoyed by all others who filed within the three year window?" The answer to that rhetorical question lies, again, in Marysville.
The Marysville court considered and rejected an identical equal protection challenge. (Marysville, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at pp. 920-921.) There, as here, the students argued the statute's revival provision violated equal protection by treating persons who litigated their claims to finality differently from persons who did not. (Id. at p. 920.) The court acknowledged that section 340.1 treats similarly situated groups differently. (Marysville, supra, at p. 920.) Nevertheless, the court concluded the Legislature had a rational basis for differentiating between them. (Id. at p. 921.) Specifically, the court concluded the Legislature "could not permit those who had litigated their claims to finality (on any grounds) to revive their claims, because doing so would violate the separation of powers." (Ibid.)
Doe does not offer any legal or logical basis for distinguishing Marysville or reaching a different conclusion here. We therefore reject Doe's equal protection challenge.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover its costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1) &(2).)
We concur: DUARTE, Acting P. J., KRAUSE, J.