Opinion
Index No. 950231/2021 MOTION SEQ. Nos. 002 003
01-26-2024
SWNY 3 DOE, Plaintiff, v. THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHDIOCESE OF NEW YORK, THE CHURCH OF CATHERINE OF GENOA, RICARDO FAJARDO, DOES 1 THROUGH 5 Defendants.
Unpublished Opinion
MOTION DATE 02/17/2022, 09/10/2021
PRESENT: HON. ALEXANDER M. TISCH, Justice
DECISION + ORDER ON MOTION
The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 002) 15, 16, 17, 18, 23, 28, 29, 30 were read on this motion to/for DISMISS.
The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 003) 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41 were read on this motion to/for DISMISSAL.
Upon the foregoing documents, defendant The Church of St. Catherine of Genoa ("the Church") moves in Motion Sequence 002 for an order pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7) dismissing plaintiffs cause of action for fraudulent concealment.
Defendant The Roman Catholic Archdiocese of New York ("the Archdiocese") moves for the same relief in Motion Sequence Number 003, along with an order pursuant to CPLR 3024(b) striking paragraphs 10-13 of plaintiffs complaint.
BACKGROUND
This is an action commenced pursuant to the Child Victims Act ("CVA") in which plaintiff alleges that when she was approximately 16 years old, she was sexually abused by defendant Ricardo Fajardo, a priest employed by the Archdiocese and assigned to work at the
Church. Plaintiff alleges that the Church was aware of Fajardo's proclivity for abuse yet took no action to prevent him from having repeated private contact with plaintiff and her family.
The Church now moves for partial dismissal of plaintiffs complaint as against it, arguing that her cause of action for fraudulent concealment fails to state a claim. The Archdiocese also seeks dismissal of the same cause of action against it, and also moves to strike paragraphs 10-13 of the complaint, arguing that the allegations in those paragraphs are prejudicial and immaterial.
DISCUSSION
In deciding a motion to dismiss a complaint pursuant to CPLR §3211(a)(7), a court's role is determining "whether the pleading states a cause of action, and if from its four corners factual allegations are discerned which taken together manifest any cause of action cognizable at law a motion for dismissal will fail" (African Diaspora Maritime Corp, v Golden Gate Yacht Club, 109 A.D.3d 204 [1st Dept 2013]; Siegmund Strauss, Inc. v East 149th Realty Corp., 104 A.D.3d 401 [1st Dept 2013]). The standard on a motion to dismiss a pleading for failure to state a cause of action is not whether the party has artfully drafted the pleading, but whether deeming the pleading to allege whatever can be reasonably implied from its statements, a cause of action can be sustained (see Stendig, Inc. v Thorn Rock Realty Co., 163 A.D.2d 46 [1st Dept 1990]; Levilon Manufacturing Co., Inc. v Blumberg, 242 A.D.2d 205, 660 N.Y.S.2d 726 [1st Dept 1997] [on a motion for dismissal for failure to state a cause of action, the court must accept factual allegations as true]). The pleadings must be liberally construed (see CPLR §3026; Siegmund Strauss, Inc., 104 A.D.3d 401, supra), the court must "accept the facts as alleged in the complaint as true, accord plaintiffs 'the benefit of every possible favorable inference,"' and "determine only whether the facts as alleged fit into any cognizable legal theory" (Siegmund Strauss, Inc., 104 A.D.3d 401, supra; Normon v City of New York. 9 N.Y.3d 825 [2007]; Leon v Martinez, 84 N.Y.2d 83, 87-88 [1994]).
Fraudulent Concealment
Plaintiff asserts a claim for fraudulent concealment against both the Church and the Archdiocese, arguing that they engaged in a conscious plan to conceal Fajardo's abuse. "The required elements of a common - law fraud claim are a misrepresentation or a material omission of fact which was false and known to be false by [the] defendant, made for the purpose of inducing the other party to rely upon it, justifiable reliance of the other party on the misrepresentation or material omission, and injury" (see Ambac Assurance Corp, v Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 31 N.Y.3d 569, 578-579 [2018]). A cause of action for fraudulent concealment requires, in addition to the four foregoing elements, an allegation that the defendant had a duty to disclose material information and that it failed to do so" (see Gomez-Jimenez v New York Law School, 103 A.D.3d 13, 17-18 [1st Dept. 2012]. A duty to disclose arises only where "a fiduciary or confidential relationship exists between plaintiff and defendant" (see Mandarin Trading, Ltd. v Wildenstein, 16 N.Y.3d 173, 179 [2011]).
Plaintiff fails to allege a fiduciary relationship between her and defendants. While plaintiff alleges Fajardo visited her family and that she spent time with him privately before the abuse, plaintiff has not alleged elements of "de facto control and dominance" between herself and Defendants that would establish the existence of a fiduciary relationship separate from Defendants' relationship with other parishioners (See Marmelstein v Kehillat New Hempstead, 11 N.Y.3d 15, 21 [2008]). Without a fiduciary relationship and a duty to disclose, the fraudulent concealment claim fails.
The Archdiocese's Motion to Strike Paragraphs 10-13 of the Complaint
Paragraphs 10-13 of Plaintiff's complaint speak to historic documentation of the problem of clergy sexual abuse of minors in the Roman Catholic Church. Paragraph 10 discusses the 2002 reporting of the sexual abuse by the Boston Archdiocese in the Boston Globe. Paragraphs 11-12 discuss a grand jury investigation by the Pennsylvania Attorney General into patterns of abuse and coverup by several Pennsylvania state dioceses. Paragraph 13 concludes by alleging that such reports led New York to pass the CVA.
In reviewing a motion pursuant to CPLR § 3024 (b), "the inquiry is whether the purportedly scandalous or prejudicial allegations are relevant to a cause of action" (Soutnayah v Minnelli, 41 A.D.3d 390, 392 [1st Dept 2007]: see Wegman v Dairylea Coop., 50 A.D.2d 108, 111 [4th Dept 1975]). "Matter that is scandalous or prejudicial will not be stricken if it is relevant to a cause of action in a complaint or petition or its material elements" (Pisula v Roman Catholic Archdiocese of N.Y., 201 A.D.3d 88, 97 [2d Dept 2021]; see Irving v Four Seasons Nursing & Rehabilitation Ctr., 121 A.D.3d 1046, 1048 [2d Dept 2014]). Whether the statement in controversy is "scandalous or prejudicial" depends upon a determination of whether the statement, when evaluated in context of the pleading as a whole, "is gratuitous and solely designed to inflame the reader or listener" (Aronis v TLC Vision Centers, Inc, 49 A.D.3d 576 [2d Dept 2008]).
Plaintiff argues that the information contained in paragraphs 10-13 is proper as it demonstrates "the widespread sexual abuse that was taking place throughout the Catholic Church and being covered up in jurisdictions across the globe." However, the Court finds that the allegations regarding the Boston and Pennsylvania dioceses are too removed from the allegations here. Viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the allegations show that the Archdiocese, as a religious order, may have had general knowledge of the fact that some priests had issues with sexual abuse. However, such general knowledge is still not probative of the central questions in this action- namely, whether in New York, the Archdiocese had notice of Fajardo's proclivities specifically such that they were negligent in his hiring and retention. Allegations regarding other priests in different ecclesiastical territories do nothing to bolster plaintiffs causes of action herein and are thus unnecessarily prejudicial.
Accordingly, the Court grants this portion of the Archdiocese's motion and strikes paragraphs 10-13 of the complaint.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, it is hereby
ORDERED that the motions of defendants The Church of St. Catherine of Genoa ("the Church") and the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of New York ("the Archdiocese") for partial dismissal of this action (Motion Seqs. 002 and 003) are both granted in their entirety; and it is further
ORDERED that plaintiffs cause of action for fraudulent concealment is dismissed against both movants; and it is further
ORDERED that paragraphs 10-13 of the complaint are stricken pursuant to CPLR 3024(b); and it is further
ORDERED that counsel for the Archdiocese shall serve a copy of this order with notice of entry within 14 days of the date this order.