Opinion
HHBCV155016759S HHBCV155017022S HHBCV145017357S
12-20-2017
Jane DOE v. Robert RACKLIFFE Jane Doe #3 v. Robert Rackliffe; James Doe et al. v. Robert Rackliffe
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Robert E. Young, Judge
There are six companion actions brought by a total of seven plaintiffs against defendant Robert Rackliffe. The allegations in each of these actions are similar. Rackliffe was a doctor specializing in pediatric medicine in New Britain. The plaintiffs were minor patients of Rackliffe from the early 1970s until the 1980s. During that period, the plaintiffs visited Rackliffe annually for physical checkups. On numerous occasions during these checkups, Rackliffe digitally penetrated each plaintiff’s anus. This conduct resulted in severe and potentially permanent physical and emotional injury.
Rackliffe died on December 16, 2015. William J. Forbes, executor of the estate of Robert Rackliffe was substituted as the defendant on November 16, 2016. For ease of comprehension, the defendant is referred to as " Rackliffe."
Each plaintiff claims that Rackliffe committed acts of medical malpractice and sexual assault. The court has granted partial summary judgment in favor of Rackliffe in all six actions as to the medical malpractice claims as they are barred by the statute of limitations, General Statutes Section 52-584. Specifically, as to the following three actions, this court granted summary judgment in Jane Doe and Jane Doe #3 on March 29, 2017 and granted summary judgment in James Doe on October 25, 2017.
The plaintiffs in the above three actions seek an immediate appeal of the granting of the motions for summary judgment and have filed timely motions for written determination pursuant to Practice Book Section 61-4, to which Rackliffe filed objections. These matters appeared on the December 18, 2017 calendar and were claimed for adjudication.
Practice Book Section 61-4(a) provides:
This section applies to a trial court judgment that disposes of at least one cause of action where the judgment does not dispose of either of the following: (1) an entire complaint, counterclaim, or cross complaint, or (2) all the causes of action in a complaint, counterclaim or cross complaint brought by or against a party. If the order sought to be appealed does not meet these exact criteria, the trial court is without authority to make the determination necessary to the order’s being immediately appealed.
This section does not apply to a judgment that disposes of an entire complaint, counterclaim, or cross complaint (see Section 61-2); and it does not apply to a trial court judgment that partially disposes of a complaint, counterclaim, or cross complaint, if the order disposes of all the causes of action in that pleading brought by or against one or more parties (see Section 61-3).
When the trial court renders a judgment to which this section applies, such judgment shall not ordinarily constitute an appealable final judgment. Such a judgment shall be considered an appealable final judgment only if the trial court makes a written determination that the issues resolved by the judgment are of such significance to the determination of the outcome of the case that the delay incident to the appeal would be justified, and the chief justice or chief judge of the court having appellate jurisdiction concurs. If the procedure outlined in this section is followed, such judgment shall be an appealable final judgment, regardless of whether judgment was rendered on the granting of a motion to strike pursuant to Section 10-44, by dismissal pursuant to Section 10-30, by summary judgment pursuant to Section 17-44, or otherwise.
A party entitled to appeal under this section may appeal regardless of which party moved for the judgment to be made final.
" The jurisdiction of the appellate courts is restricted to appeals from judgments that are final ... The policy concerns underlying the final judgment rule are to discourage piecemeal appeals and to facilitate the speedy and orderly disposition of cases at the trial court level ..." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Mazurek v. Great American Insurance Co., 284 Conn. 16, 33, 930 A.2d 682 (2007). " [T]he purpose of Section 61-4 is to create a narrow exception to our final judgment rule for those rare and special cases where interlocutory review of a trial court’s pretrial ruling will resolve or greatly streamline the resolution of the entire case. In those limited circumstances, the purpose of the final judgment rule- to promote efficiency in the handling of cases by avoiding the added cost, delay and administrative burden of piecemeal litigation- is better served by granting the right to an immediate appeal• than, as usual, postponing any appeal until the rights of all parties have been fully adjudicated in the trial court. Only if the trial judge, who knows the case personally and understands the interplay among its several claims, and the chief judge of the appellate court having jurisdiction, who knows the current status of his or her appellate docket, are mutually satisfied that the possible benefits of early appellate review exceed the likely costs and burdens of such review should the motion be granted. Other considerations include whether an appellate ruling would likely have the practical effect of ending the case in the trial court, so that the appellate court would not be faced with deciding the same case twice ..." Fortin v. Hartford Underwriters Insurance Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex, Complex Litigation Docket at Middletown, Docket No. X04 CV 03 0103483 (January 19, 2007, Beach, J.).
The plaintiffs assert that " early resolution of the issues sought to be appealed would likely obviate the need for duplicative proceedings thereby promoting judicial economy." The plaintiffs argue that, if the court’s decisions are reversed, a remand " exposes the parties to potential muddled and inconsistent results. At best, the litigation would be duplicative and cumulative ..." The court disagrees.
The claims which survive the granting of summary judgment, that of sexual assault and intentional infliction of emotional distress, are separate and distinct from those which were disposed, medical malpractice and negligent infliction of emotional distress. While they share some of the facts, those facts do not appear to be disputed by Rackliffe, who admitted that he conducted anal manipulations at his deposition. The plaintiffs have repeatedly asserted that Rackliffe’s deviation from the standard of care " is inextricably intertwined and indispensable to the outcome of [these cases]." However, the remaining disputed issues rest on different elements of proof, primarily based on intent. Proof of sexual assault does not rely upon the standard of care pertaining to medical malpractice. Thus, there is no significant duplication if the causes of action were tried serially. Moreover, the claim that there would be duplication and accumulation does not arise to the " narrow exception to our final judgment rule for those rare and special cases where interlocutory review of a trial court’s pretrial ruling will resolve or greatly streamline the resolution of the entire case." Fortin, supra.
There are no claims of intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress in the James Doe action. The claims are for " sexual assault" and " negligence."
Compare F.B. Mattson Co., Inc. v. Tarte, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 96013291 (March 10, 1997, Vertefeuille, J.) (19 Conn.L.Rptr. 276). In that case, the court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff on the first count of its complaint, seeking the foreclosure of a mechanic’s lien, with the plaintiff’s remaining two counts, for fraudulent conveyance and unjust enrichment, left in abeyance. The court granted the defendant’s motion for written determination under Practice Book § 4002C (which is the predecessor to Practice Book § 61-4). After noting that the plaintiff would pursue its second and third counts only if the appeal resulted in a reversal of the judgment in the plaintiff’s favor on the first count, the court held that " an immediate appeal of the judgment on the first count will promote judicial economy and save the parties the additional expense of a trial which may ultimately prove to be unnecessary." Id.
In contrast, in the present case, the plaintiffs likely would pursue their remaining claims and proceed to trial regardless of whether this court’s rulings on the medical malpractice and negligent infliction of emotional distress counts were upheld on appeal. See Moore v. Brower, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. X10UWYCV054010227S (July 26, 2006, Munro, J.) .
Lastly, the plaintiffs assert that an immediate appeal will resolve an important issue of state law, that of the applicability of General Statutes Section 52-577d to medical malpractice and battery claims, citing Doe v. Boy Scouts of Am. Corp., 323 Conn. 303, 309, 147 A.3d 104 (2016), reconsideration en banc denied, 323 Conn. 942, 151 A.3d 841 (2016). This court has ruled that Doe does not extend General Statutes Section 52-577d to the medical malpractice and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims asserted by the plaintiffs. While an appellate court decision extending the application of the statute would certainly be " an important issue of state law, " there is no immediacy for such determination.
ORDER
The plaintiffs’ motions for a written determination under Practice Book Section 61-4 are denied. The objections are sustained.