Opinion
Civil Action 24-7522 (SDW)(CLW)
08-08-2024
JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, Plaintiffs, v. NEW YORK CITY, et al., Defendants.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
WHEREAS OPINION
SUSAN D. WIGENTON, U.S.D.J.
THIS MATTER having come before this Court upon pro se Plaintiffs John Doe and Jane Doe's (“Plaintiffs”) Complaint (D.E. 1 (“Compl.”)), filed on April 22, 2024 in the Southern District of New York and transferred to this Court on June 7, 2024. This Court having sua sponte reviewed the Complaint for sufficiency pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 8(a); and
WHEREAS Plaintiff John Doe voluntarily revealed his identity as Bouazza Ouaziz in his 102-page Complaintwith 634 paragraphs, sixty-nine causes of action, and over 150-pages of exhibits. (See generally Compl.) The body of the Complaint is largely incoherent and confusing. (Id.) In it, Plaintiff Ouaziz appears to assert claims related to, inter alia, familial disputes, domestic violence incidents, immigration fraud, assault/sexual assault, deprivation of constitutional rights, judicial misconduct, and medical services rendered to him. (Id.) Plaintiff Ouaziz names a myriad of Defendants, including, inter alia, his wife and her family, his wife's boyfriend, law firms, lawyers, medical providers, agencies of the State of New Jersey, law enforcement officers, New Jersey state court judges, and prosecutors. (Compl. at ¶¶ 1-3); and
See D.E. 1 at 3 (“Come now the plaintiff [sic] Bouazza Ouaziz and Jane does, and for their claims for relief against Defendants ....”).
WHEREAS Plaintiff Ouaziz had filed at least two virtually identical suits with this Court that were dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6): Ouaziz v. City of Jersey City, et al., No. 22-4546 (“Ouaziz I”) and Ouaziz v. Murphy, et al., No. 23-2696 (“Ouaziz II”). Having reviewed the present Complaint and the complaints in Ouaziz I and Ouaziz II, this Court finds that the instant action arises from allegations essentially similar to those pled in Ouaziz I and Ouaziz II, albeit against new Defendants; and
The instant Complaint is equally as incoherent and confusing as those in Ouaziz I and Ouaziz II.
WHEREAS “[A] court may sua sponte dismiss a claim on res judicata grounds ‘if a court is on notice that it has previously decided the issue presented.'” See Copeland v. U.S. Bank Cust PC5 Sterling Nat'l, No. 20-7016, 2021 WL 2134942, at *7 (D.N.J. May 26, 2021) (quoting Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 412 (2000)). This Court in Ouaziz II sua sponte held that the doctrine of res judicata barred all of Plaintiff's claims because the allegations and claims underlying the Ouaziz II complaint were essentially similar to those in Ouaziz I, which was previously dismissed. See Ouaziz II, 2024 WL 397708, at *4; and
WHEREAS to determine whether res judicata applies, courts within the Third Circuit do not employ a mechanical approach. Marmon Coal Co. v. Dir., Off. of Workers' Comp. Programs, 726 F.3d 387, 394 (3d Cir. 2013) (“We have disavowed attempts to create a simple test for determining what constitutes a cause of action for res judicata purposes.” (quoting Duhaney v. Att'y Gen., 621 F.3d 340, 348 (3d Cir. 2010))). Instead, courts focus on the “essential similarity of the underlying events giving rise to the various legal claims.” Id. (citation omitted). Factors relevant to this determination include “(1) whether the acts complained of were the same; (2) whether the material facts alleged in each suit were the same; and (3) whether the witnesses and documentation required to prove such allegations were the same.” Id. at 394-95 (citation omitted); and
WHEREAS res judicata bars the instant action because its underlying claims and allegations are essentially similar to those in Ouaziz I and Ouaziz II. To the extent this action names new defendants who were not part of Ouaziz I and Ouaziz II, res judicata bars the instant action against the newly named Defendants, too. See Ouaziz II, 2024 WL 397708, at *5 (citing Gambocz v. Yelencsics, 468 F.2d 837, 841 (3d Cir. 1972) (holding that res judicata applies “where there is a close or significant relationship between successive defendants”)). Here, as in Gambocz, the sole material change in this suit is the addition of defendants who were not previously sued; and
WHEREAS even if res judicata does not bar all of Plaintiff's claims, the Complaint does not comply with Rule 8. The Complaint, which is 102 pages with over 600 paragraphs and sixty-nine causes of action, is dense and difficult to follow, and comes nowhere near the “short and plain statement” requirement of Rule 8. See In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 703 (3d Cir. 1996) (finding the district court did not abuse its discretion when dismissing a complaint which was “unnecessarily complex and verbose,” featuring more than “600 paragraphs and 240 pages”); McDaniel v. N.J. State Parole Bd., No. 08-0978, 2008 WL 824283, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 26, 2008) (dismissing a “rambling and sometimes illegible” 17-page, single-spaced complaint as not in compliance with Rule 8). Indeed, the Complaint fails to provide a clear narrative of either the factual or legal basis for Plaintiff's claims. See Rule 8(a)(2) (providing that an adequate complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (stating that although Rule 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation”); and
Accordingly, Plaintiffs' Complaint is sua sponte DISMISSED without prejudice. An appropriate order follows.
cc: Cathy L. Waldor, U.S.M.J.