In considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must assume that all facts alleged in the plaintiff's complaint are true, and must liberally construe those allegations. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-02, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Doe v. Norwest Bank Minn., N.A., 107 F.3d 1297, 1303-04 (8th Cir. 1997) ("In considering a motion to dismiss, we assume all facts in the complaint are true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and affirm the dismissal only if 'it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle the plaintiff to relief,'" quoting Coleman v. Watt, 40 F.3d 255, 258 (8th Cir. 1994));

We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. LaBarre's complaint alleges the following facts, which we assume to be true for the purposes of LaBarre's appeal. See Doe v. Norwest Bank Minnesota, N.A., 107 F.3d 1297, 1303-04 (8th Cir. 1997). When LaBarre purchased a used vehicle from a Minnesota car dealer, she signed a retail installment contract that stated the dealer was assigning the contract to CAC, a company which provides financing and collection related services to car dealers.

Other courts have announced a more truncated three-part test that does not require a specific conclusion that the defendant's conduct constitutes the business of insurance. See Doe v. Norwest Bank Minn., 107 F.3d 1297, 1305 n.8 (8th Cir. 1997); United States. v. Rhode Island Insurers' Insolvency Fund, 80 F.3d 616, 619 (1st Cir. 1996).

In considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must assume that all facts alleged in the plaintiff's complaint are true, and must liberally construe those allegations. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-02, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Doe v. Norwest Bank Minn., N.A., 107 F.3d 1297, 1303-04 (8th Cir. 1997) ("In considering a motion to dismiss, we assume all facts in the complaint are true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and affirm dismissal only if `it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle the plaintiff to relief,'" quoting Coleman v. Watt, 40 F.3d 255, 258 (8th Cir. 1994)); WMX Techs., Inc. v. Gasconade County, Mo., 105 F.3d 1195, 1198 (8th Cir. 1997) ("In considering a motion to dismiss, the court must construe the complaint liberally and assume all factual allegations to be true."); First CommercialTrust v. Colt's Mfg. Co., 77 F.3d 1081, 1083 (8th Cir. 1996) (same). The court is mindful that in treating the factual allegations of a complaint as true pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court must "reject conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences."

; Wisdom v. First Midwest Bank, 167 F.3d 402, 405 (8th Cir. 1999) (same); Duffy v. Landberg, 133 F.3d 1120, 1122 (8th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 119 S.Ct. 62, 142 L.Ed.2d 49 (1998); Doe v. Norwest Bank Minn., N.A., 107 F.3d 1297, 1303-04 (8th Cir. 1997) (same); WMX Techs., Inc. v. Gasconade County, Mo., 105 F.3d 1195, 1198 (8th Cir. 1997) (same); First Commercial Trust v. Colt's Mfg. Co., 77 F.3d 1081, 1083 (8th Cir. 1996) (same).

Firstar cites a number of circuit court cases for the proposition that in order for a banking practice to violate section 1972(1), it not only must violate the literal language of the statute but also must be shown to be an anticompetitive practice. See, e.g., Doe v. Norwest Bank Minnesota, 107 F.3d 1297 (8 Cir., 1997); B.C. Recreational Indus. v. First Nat'l Bank, 639 F.2d 828 (1 Cir. 1981). In B.C. Recreational Industries, plaintiff had entered into a factoring arrangement with the defendant bank and had assigned its accounts receivable to the defendant as collateral.

Under the three-prong test derived from Fabe, plaintiff's RICO claim must be dismissed. First, RICO contains no specific reference to insurance, and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has determined that RICO does not relate to the insurance business. Doe v. Norwest Bank Minnesota, N.A., 107 F.3d 1297, 1306 (8th Cir. 1997). Second, in Minnesota, state statutes have been enacted to regulate the business of insurance.

In considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must assume that all facts alleged in the plaintiff's complaint are true, and must liberally construe those allegations. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Doe v. Norwest Bank Minn., N.A., 107 F.3d 1297, 1303-04 (8th Cir. 1997) ("In considering a motion to dismiss, we assume all facts in the complaint are true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and affirm the dismissal only if `it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle the plaintiff to relief,'" quoting Coleman v. Watt, 40 F.3d 255, 258 (8th Cir. 1994)); WMX Techs., Inc. v. Gasconade County, Mo., 105 F.3d 1195, 1198 (8th Cir. 1997) ("In considering a motion to dismiss, the court must construe the complaint liberally and assume all factual allegations to be true."); First Commercial Trust v. Colt's Mfg. Co., 77 F.3d 1081, 1083 (8th Cir. 1996) (same). The court is mindful that in treating the factual allegations of a complaint as true pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the court must "reject conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences."

In Ludwick's case, by contrast, the federal claims and the state determinations boil down to the same issue, namely, how the alleged sham transactions, properly accounted for, affected F&G's balance sheet. Cf. Doe v. Norwest Bank Minn., N.A. , 107 F.3d 1297, 1307-08 (8th Cir. 1997) (concluding state insurance regulation would be impaired by RICO claims against an insurer where, "in contrast to National Securities , the federal and state statutes at issue ... are directed toward the same end"). Ludwick's final attempt to save at least a subset of her claims is also meritless.

It goes without saying that if appraisal fees and credit reporting fees are excluded from the term interest, so too is a claimed benefit from the misallocation and theft of collateral and loan payments. See Doe v. Norwest Bank Minn., N.A, 107 F.3d 1297, 1302 (8th Cir. 1997) ("We have little difficulty concluding that the Comptroller's interpretation of 'interest' as excluding insurance premiums is reasonable."). The first amended complaint, alleging broadly that the Bank Defendants received compensation from Hobson's fraudulent acts, simply fails to state a claim under § 1831d.