These baseless assertions are shockingly irresponsible. Because we have a duty to "maintain public confidence in the legal profession" and "protect[ ] the integrity of the judicial proceeding," Doe v. Nielsen , 883 F.3d 716, 718 (7th Cir. 2018) (quotation marks omitted), we confronted Hoffman about his brief at oral argument. He replied that he is a "solo practitioner" who tries "to get the help of ... clients and whoever can provide help to [him]" and then "merge[s] that information." Whatever that means, it in no way excuses this unprofessional conduct.
More specifically, the SEC alleges that Kameli solicited over $88 million to invest in a number of new commercial enterprises, only to squander and misappropriate some of those funds." Doe v. Nielsen , 883 F.3d 716, 718 (7th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). The SEC complaint specifically identifies Elgin Memory Care as having been part of the scheme to defraud and sets forth specific allegations of misappropriation of the immigrant investors' capital.
Therefore, although motions to disqualify counsel may be "both legitimate and necessary," they "should be viewed with extreme caution for they can be misused as techniques of harassment." See Freeman, 689 F.2d at 721; see also Doe v. Nielsen, 883 F.3d 716, 718 (7th Cir. 2018) ("It is our duty to 'maintain public confidence in the legal profession and assist[ ] in protecting the integrity of the judicial proceeding.'"). Relevantly, "traditions of prosecutorial discretion do not immunize from judicial scrutiny cases in which the enforcement decisions of an administrator were motivated by improper factors or were otherwise contrary to law."
Doe v. Nielsen, 883 F.3d 716, 718-19 (7th Cir. 2018) (internal citations omitted).
Plaintiff apparently refers to the Seventh Circuit's decision in Doe v. Nielsen, 883 F.3d 716 (7th Cir. 2018), which held that defendant and his law firm had "at least two concurrent conflicts of interest, neither of which can be waived by informed client consent." Id., at 718-19 & n. 1 (holding that affidavit from defendant's client which purported to waive any conflict of interest had no legal effect because the "two conflicts at issue . . . [we]re not waivable"). The Court finds that it will promote the presentation of the merits to allow the parties to present their conflicting evidence as to the legal effect of plaintiff's signature on this and various other documents.
"[A] conflict of interest arises when an attorney has an incentive to reject lines of inquiry or argument that might help his client’s case." Doe v. Nielsen, 883 F.3d 716, 719 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing United States v. Algee, 309 F.3d 1011, 1014 (7th Cir. 2002)). Plaintiffs appear to be doing so here with respect to the "female harassment" allegations identified by Defendant.
catch-22 is the epitome of divided loyalty and thus makes Kameli's continued representation untenable.Doe v. Nielsen, 883 F.3d 716, 718-19 (7th Cir. 2018) (internal citations omitted).
Since at least 1998, the agency administering the EB-5 program has required the applicant to demonstrate that, where a company is involved, the "full amount" of the investor's money has been "made available to the business(es) most closely responsible for creating the employment upon which the [immigration] petition is based." In re Izummi , 22 I. & N. Dec. 169, 179 (Assoc. Comm. 1998) ; see also FAC ¶ 49 (quoting USCIS memorandum issued in May 2013 describing this requirement); Doe v. Johnson , 2017 WL 1151036, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2017), non-dispositive op. on appeal sub nom.Doe v. Nielsen , 883 F.3d 716 (7th Cir. 2018) (discussing rule in related litigation and noting that the plaintiff did not challenge the USCIS' reliance on the rule). B. The Parties, Projects, and Funds
Counsel for a chapter 7 debtor has only one client to whom he owes the duty of undivided loyalty - the debtor. See, e.g. , Doe v. Nielsen , 883 F.3d 716, 719 (7th Cir. 2018) (noting that an attorney owes his client an undivided duty of loyalty); Oakland Police and Fire Retirement System v. Mayer Brown, LLP , 861 F.3d 644, 651-52 (7th Cir. 2017) (recognizing the general rule that an attorney owes professional duties only to the attorney's client, not to third parties). The debtor hires the lawyer and pays him.