Opinion
Cause No. IP00-0080-C-T/G
August 31, 2000
ENTRY ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This is yet another case which involves the rights of high school students. Defendant, Brownsburg Community School Corporation ("BCSC"), has a policy that prevents students who drive to school from parking off school grounds. Plaintiff, John Doe, was a senior at Brownsburg High School during the 1998-1999 school year who drove to school and wished to park off school grounds. He brought this action on his own behalf as well as on behalf of the class members who are all current and future students at Brownsburg High School who have licenses to drive issued by the State of Indiana and who are driving or who will drive to school. This action was certified as a class action for purposes of injunctive and declaratory relief.
Both parties have filed motions for summary judgment. This entry addresses those motions.
I. Statement of Facts
These facts were compiled from the Statement of Material Facts and Additional Statement of Material Facts submissions of the parties pursuant to L.R. 56.1 and the underlying supporting materials. Unless noted otherwise, these facts are not in dispute.
The Defendant, BCSC, is a school corporation which operates a number of schools in Brownsburg, Indiana, including Brownsburg High School. (Russell Hodgkin Dep. at 4.)
Russell Hodgkin is the principal of Brownsburg High School. (Hodgkin Dep. at 4.)
The high school is located on a plot of land stretching along Odell Street, a north-south street, in Brownsburg. (Id. at 5-6, Ex. 1.) There is a large parking area for student drivers on the grounds of the high school, north of the school. (Id. at 12-13, Ex. 1.) This parking area can accommodate up to 742 vehicles if all spaces are utilized. (Id. at 13-14.) It is the closest and safest place for a student driving to the high school to park. (Id. at 18.) In February 2000, there were 618 vehicles parked in the student parking area, (id. at 13), and there were approximately 1,330 students enrolled in the high school. (Id. at 8.)
Along Odell Street, in addition to the high school, there are a number of elementary schools and a middle school. (Id. at 5-6, Ex. 1.) Approximately 38-40 buses run in total for all BCSC schools, and approximately 2/3 of the total school bus traffic for all BCSC schools travel along Odell Street. (Id. at 21.) The buses run a double route so that in the morning the high school and junior high students are transported to school and then elementary school students and in the afternoon the junior high school and high school students are bussed home first and then the elementary school students are transported. (Id. at 21-22.) In the afternoon, as buses proceed north on Odell Street, traffic can back up if the flow of bus traffic is interrupted. (Id. at 21.) To prevent traffic tie ups and other problems, student drivers who park in the student parking lot on high school grounds are not allowed to leave the lot until 5 minutes after the dismissal bell so that the buses have a chance to leave before the student drivers. (Hodgkin Dep. at 21-22.)
Directly east of the main entrance to the high school, across Odell Street, is an area which is owned by the City of Brownsburg that contains ball fields, a number of parking spaces and a gravel lot. (Id. at 7, 17-18, 45, 57, Ex. 1.) During a period of construction in the 1998-99 school year, there were not enough parking spaces in the high school parking lot. In order to accommodate student parking needs, BCSC for a 4-month period of time rented part of the property across Odell Street, containing the gravel lot. (Id. at 14, 45-46, Ex.1.) The students who parked there had to cross Odell Street to get to their vehicles and had to leave the parking area by entering onto Odell Street. (Id. at 23, 24.) This led to added to congestion and near accidents as students crossed the street. (Id. at 24, 26.)
During the spring of the current year, construction at the high school required BCSC to again rent the gravel lot area across Odell Street to accommodate the parking needs of students. (Stipulation of Parties ¶¶ 1-5.)
Students who walk to the high school can walk along Odell Street. (Hodgkin Dep. at 25.) Students who are picked up by their parents exit the school's main entrance and can drive off onto Odell Street. (Id.) Neither walkers nor students who are picked up by their parents have to wait until bus traffic is clear to leave the school premises. (Hodgkin Dep. at 25.)
Although the high school has had a policy allowing students to register their vehicles and park on the school parking lot, BCSC had not until the 1999-2000 school year put into effect any policy that actually prohibited off-site parking by its students. (Hodgkin Dep. at 10-11, Exs. 7, 8.) The new policy was approved by the BCSC school board when it approved a policy statement indicating that "students who drive to school must park in the designated student parking lot." (Id., Ex. 8.) No State law or local ordinance prohibits students from parking off of school grounds. (Hodgkin Dep. at 15, 44-55.)
In Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Statement of Material Facts, the Defendant objects to the characterization of this as "new" policy and asserts that its policy "requiring students to park on school property has existed since at least the 1990-91 school year." (Resp. Pl.'s Statement Material Facts ¶ 33) (citing Hodgkin Dep. at 9, Ex. 2.) Neither the cited portion of Mr. Hodgkin's deposition nor Exhibit 2 to his deposition establishes that BCSC's policy prior to the 1999-2000 school year required students to park on school property. Rather, the 1990-91 policy stated in pertinent part only that:
Students who plan to drive to school at any time during the school year shall register their vehicle(s) in the Main Office and a parking assignment will be made for their use.
(Hodgkin Dep., Ex. 2 at 19.) The policy did provide that students had to register their vehicles, but it did not require them to park on school grounds. Rather, once a student registered his or her vehicle(s), a parking assignment was made available for his or her use. Furthermore, it is noted that BCSC did not contradict the Plaintiff's Statement of Material Fact No. 27 which states that BCSC had not put into an effect a policy prohibiting student parking off site until the 1999-2000 school year. Thus, it is undisputed that the policy requiring students to park on school grounds was, as of the 1999-2000 school year, a new policy.
In addition to the rented gravel lot area immediately east of the high school across Odell Street, there are other areas around the high school, but off of school grounds, where it is legal for the public to park. (Id. at 14-15, 25, 44-45, 58, Ex. 1.) These areas include areas immediately across from Odell Street, other than the gravel lot, as well as on the streets around the high school. (Id.) Until the 1999-2000 policy prohibiting off grounds parking, a number of students parked in these areas. (Id.)
Because of the policy, students cannot park on streets near the high school, even though it is legal to do so. (Def.'s Answer ¶ 12; Pls.' Compl. ¶ 13.) If a student violates the ban on off grounds parking, he or she is subject to student discipline in the same manner as if he or she had violated any other school rule. (Hodgkin Dep. at 26-27. Ex. 6.) This could, potentially, include suspension or expulsion. (Id., Ex. 6.)
Plaintiff John Doe was a senior at Brownsburg High School during the 1999-2000 school year. (John Doe Aff. ¶ 1.) He was duly licensed to drive by the State of Indiana and, until the 1999-2000 school year, parked off of school grounds in an area where parking was allowed by the town of Brownsburg. (Id. ¶¶ 2-4, 10.) He had to park on school grounds or be subject to discipline. (Id. ¶ 8.) He wished to continue to park off school grounds, but did not wish to risk suspension or expulsion. (Id. ¶¶ 8-9.)
II. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment should be granted when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
III. Analysis
The Plaintiff moves for summary judgment, contending that BCSC's parking policy is invalid under Indiana law and violates his substantive due process rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Unites States Constitution. He argues the policy is invalid under state law because BCSC exceeded its statutory authority in prohibiting student parking off of school grounds. He contends the policy violates substantive due process because it is arbitrary and unreasonable. The Defendant also moves for summary judgment. It argues that it should prevail because there is state statutory authority for its parking policy, a student has no right to park wherever he or she chooses, and its parking policy is rationally related to legitimate government interests.
A. Whether BCSC's Parking Policy is Invalid Under State Law
In arguing that the parking policy exceeds BCSC's statutory authority, the Plaintiff starts with the following quote from Board of Trustees v. Landry, 560 N.E.2d 102, 105 (Ind.Ct.App. 1990): "The power and authority of a school board in Indiana must be expressly conferred by statute or arise by necessary implication." That decision and the case upon which it relies, Myers v. Greater Clark County School Corporation, 464 N.E.2d 1323 (Ind.Ct.App. 1984), applied the general rule that school corporations "`have no powers other than those conferred by legislative act, either expressly or by necessary implication, and doubtful claims of power are resolved against them.'" Id. at 1329 (quotation omitted).
State v. School City of Anderson, 142 N.E.2d 914 (Ind. 1957), also relied upon by the Plaintiff, is cited for a similar rule: "unless a grant of power and authority can be found in the statute it must be concluded that there is none." Id. at 916.
That rule, however, is no longer the rule of law in the State of Indiana. In 1989, the Indiana General Assembly enacted Public Law 198-1989, § 1, known as the School Corporation Home Rule Act (the "Act"). The Act reflects the state policy "to grant school corporations all the powers that they need for the effective operation of each school corporation." IND. CODE § 20-5-1.5-2. To this end, "[t]he Act abrogated the common law rule that `any doubt as to the existence of a power of a school corporation shall be resolved against its existence.'" See Board of Trustees of Hamilton Heights Sch. Corp. v. Landry, 638 N.E.2d 1261, 1265 (Ind.Ct.App. 1994) (citing IND. CODE § 20-5-1.5-2, -3, and -4).
Under the Act, "[a]ny doubt as to the existence of a power of a school corporation shall be resolved in favor of its existence." IND. CODE § 20-5-1.5-3(b) (emphasis added). The Act further provides in part:
(a) The rule of law that a school corporation has only:
(1) powers expressly granted by statute;
(2) powers necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to powers expressly granted through rules adopted by the state board of education under IC 4-22-2 or otherwise; and
(3) powers indispensable to the declared purposes of the school corporation; is abrogated.
(b) A school corporation has:
(1) all powers granted it by statute or through rules adopted by the state board of education; and
(2) all other powers necessary or desirable in the conduct of its affairs, even though not granted by statute or rule.
(c) The powers that school corporations have under subsection (b)(1) are listed in various statutes. However, these statutes do not list the powers that school corporations have under subsection (b)(2). Therefore, the omission of a power from such a list does not imply that school corporations lack that power.
IND. CODE § 20-5-1.5-3 (emphasis added). Furthermore, A school corporation may exercise any power it has to the extent that the power:
(1) is not expressly denied by the Constitution of the State of Indiana, by statute, or by rule of the state board of education; and
(2) is not expressly granted to another entity.
IND. CODE § 20-5-1.5-4; see also South Gibson School Bd. v. Sollman, 728 N.E.2d 909, 917 n. 7 (Ind.Ct.App. 2000).
The Plaintiff's claim that absent specific statutory authority the BCSC lacks the right to prohibit students from parking off of school grounds is in error. Even if the power to require students to park on school grounds is not granted by a specific statute, BCSC may have the power to so require students if it is "necessary or desirable in the conduct of its affairs" and may exercise that power to the fullest extent consistent with Indiana Code § 20-5-1.5-4.
In his reply brief, the Plaintiff argues that the Act does not resolve the question of whether BCSC has the power to regulate activity occurring outside of its borders. This is answered, he contends, by Indiana Code § 20-5-1.5-7 which states: "[a] school corporation does not have any of the following powers: . . . (6) The power to exercise powers outside of the boundaries of the school corporation, unless authorized by statute through joint agreements or otherwise." But the question presented by the instant case is not whether BCSC may regulate student parking outside the school corporation boundaries, but whether it may regulate school related parking off of the high school property. The school corporation boundaries are not limited by the borders of the property on which schools are located. The school corporation boundaries are large geographical areas and can implicate issues well beyond school property such as residency within the school district. The cited provision of the Indiana Code simply does not relate to the issues of this case.
In arguing that it has the authority to require student drivers to park on school premises, BCSC relies on three due process and pupil discipline provisions of the Indiana Code:
IND. CODE §§ 20-8.1-5.1-3, 20-8.1-5.1-7, and 20-8.1-5.1-8. The first provides:
(a) Student supervision and the desirable behavior of students in carrying out school purposes is the responsibility of a school corporation and the students of a school corporation.
(b) In all matters relating to the discipline and conduct of students, school corporation personnel stand in the relation of parents and guardians to the students of the school corporation. Therefore, school corporation personnel have the right, subject to this chapter, to take any disciplinary action necessary to promote student conduct that conforms with an orderly and effective educational system.
(c) Students must follow responsible directions of school personnel in all educational settings and refrain from disruptive behavior that interferes with the educational environment.
IND. CODE § 20-8.1-5.1-3. The second provision states:
(a) The following are the grounds for student suspension or expulsion, subject to the procedural requirements of this chapter and as stated by school corporation rules:
(1) Student misconduct.
(2) Substantial disobedience.
(b) The grounds for suspension or expulsion listed in subsection (a) apply when a student is:
(1) on school grounds immediately before or during school hours, or immediately after school hours, or at any other time when the school is being used by a school group;
(2) off school grounds at a school activity, function, or event; or
(3) traveling to or from school or a school activity, function, or event.
IND. CODE § 20-8.1-5.1-8 (emphasis added).
The third provision requires the governing body of a school corporation to establish written discipline rules and to give notice of those rules. See IND. CODE § 20-8.1-5.1-7(a).
The governing body is not required to establish written rules regarding "[m]ovement or parking of vehicles," IND. CODE § 20-8.1-5.1-7(d)(2), but it is not prohibited from regulating parking either. IND. CODE § 20-8.1-5.1-7(d) ("Subsection (a) does not apply to rules or directions concerning the following: . . . (2) Movement or parking of vehicles. . . . However, this subsection does not prohibit the governing body from regulating the areas listed in this subsection.") Thus, as the Plaintiff acknowledges, this provision does authorize BCSC to regulate student parking.
Indiana Code § 20-8.1-5.1-8(b)(3) also may be interpreted as authorizing BCSC's parking policy, and it arguably authorizes BCSC to discipline students for failing to follow the policy. The Plaintiff argues that § 20-8.1-5.1-8(b)(3) "does not specifically indicate that it is intended to apply to activity which occurs off of school grounds in areas not deemed to be traditionally under control of the school," (Pl.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. at 9), and he is correct. But he offers no authority for the proposition that it has to, and nothing in the provision suggests that it is inapplicable to activity which occurs off of school grounds.
The Plaintiff points to Indiana Code § 20-8.1-5.1-9 as an example of a statutory provision intended to reach student activity off of school grounds. That provision addresses student activity on school grounds as well. Whether on or off school grounds, the provision states that a student may be suspended or expelled for engaging in activity that is "unlawful." Other statutory provisions reach student activity that is not "unlawful" and are not expressly limited to activity on school grounds. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 20-8.1-5.1-3(c) ("Students must follow responsible directions of school personnel in all educational settings and refrain from disruptive behavior that interferes with the educational environment."), § 20-8.1-5.1-8. This is apparent from § 20-8.1-5.1-9 itself, which begins by stating "[i]n addition to the grounds specified in section 8 of this chapter, a student may be suspended or expelled for engaging in unlawful activity on or off school grounds. . . ." IND. CODE § 20-8.1-5.1-9.
The Plaintiff next contends that an interpretation of IND. CODE § 20-8.1-5.1-8 as allowing BCSC to regulate off school ground parking would be illogical and untenable because it would lead to absurd consequences and would be contrary to Indiana law. The Plaintiff argues that such an interpretation would subject a student who is driven home by a parent to discipline for smoking in the parent's vehicle and similarly would subject a student who walks home from school to discipline for smoking on the way home, even if he or she was legally entitled to smoke. This argument is unavailing. BCSC students are not allowed to smoke cigarettes on school grounds (including school buses). Smoking in a parent's vehicle off of school grounds on the way to or from school or while walking to or from school, but off of school grounds, would not violate BCSC's smoking ban and, therefore, would not constitute student misconduct or substantial disobedience. Thus, an interpretation of § 20-8.1-5.1-8(b)(3) as reaching students traveling to or from school does not expand BCSC's smoking ban beyond school grounds.
That BCSC has no duty to students who are not on school grounds or otherwise under the care and control of the school does not mean that BCSC has no authority to require students driving to school to park on school grounds. None of the cases cited by the Plaintiff in support of this argument compels a different conclusion, see, e.g., Mangold v. Department of Natural Resources, 720 N.E.2d 424, 428-29 (Ind.Ct.App. 1999) (holding school owed no duty to student for injuries he suffered in explosion of shotgun shell because accident occurred in student's home, student was not under supervision of the school or its representatives at the time, and school did not provide the shell); Ashcraft v. Northeast Sullivan County Sch. Corp., 706 N.E.2d 1101, 1104 (Ind.Ct.App. 1999) (holding school and its representative owed a duty of care to student participating in school sponsored fund-raiser in store parking lot); Brewster v. Rankins, 600 N.E.2d 154, 158 (Ind.Ct.App. 1992) (holding school had no duty to prevent child's injury caused by student practicing golf swing where student was practicing off of school property); Swanson v. Wabash College, 504 N.E.2d 327, 331 (Ind.Ct.App. 1987) (holding college owed no duty to supervise recreational baseball practices played in city park which were not supervised by college); School City of Gary v. Claudio, 413 N.E.2d 628, 632 (Ind.Ct.App. 1980) (school has a duty to maintain some supervision over students under its control who are waiting for, and boarding, buses). It is evident from these cases that the degree of control over a student's conduct and its relation to a school sponsored activity are relevant factors in determining the scope of the duty, if any, assumed by the school. But that is not to say that duty and authority are synonymous.
The Plaintiff also argues that a right to control the behavior of students who wish to park off of school grounds would give rise to a duty to do so and subject BCSC to liability for any harm that befell any student in any location on his or her way to or from school. The right to control and duty may be linked under Indiana negligence law, see Martin v. Shea, 463 N.E.2d 1092, 1094 (Ind. 1984) ("Any duty to control the conduct of another must be grounded in the right to control him."); Baltimore Ohio Southwestern R.R. Co., 79 N.E. 186, 191 (Ind. 1906) ("the right to control the whole width of the road gives rise to a corresponding duty."); but the Plaintiff miscomprehends the duty which arises from the BCSC's right to control where students driving to school park. That duty does not encompass all activity and behavior of the drivers off of school grounds; rather, the duty would extend to such things as providing a safe place to park. BCSC does not define the route that students must drive to travel to the school; rather, only the parking place for the vehicle used in travel is restricted.
None of the cases cited by the Plaintiff suggests that such a wide-sweeping duty arises from the limited right to control where students driving to school park. See, e.g., Handrow v. Cox, 575 N.E.2d 611, 614 (Ind. 1991) (holding passenger owed no duty of care where she did not exercise any control over the vehicle or driver); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Lohman, 661 N.E.2d 554, 557 (Ind.Ct.App. 1995) (holding property owner owed no duty to independent contractor's employee where instrumentality which injured them was within the control of the independent contractor rather than property owner); Hawn v. Padgett, 598 N.E.2d 630 (Ind.Ct.App. 1992) (holding female acquaintances who returned car keys to intoxicated driver owed no duty of care to driver or his passenger when they had no right to control the actions of the driver or passenger); Murphy v. Target Prods., 580 N.E.2d 687, 690 (Ind.Ct.App. 1991) (holding employer has no common law duty to employee to maintain potential evidence for third party action). The Plaintiff's focus on tort related duty is misplaced and distracting. The real focus should be on the authority of the school over student conduct in the vicinity of the school, and if the school's duty is of concern, at all, it should relate to duties in that vicinity.
Indiana Code § 20-8.1-5.1-8(b)(3) authorizes BCSC to discipline students for misconduct or substantial disobedience which occurs, inter alia, while the student is traveling to or from school. When a student driving to school parks his or her car, he or she is "traveling" to school. Section 20-8.1-5.1-8(b)(3), therefore, authorizes BCSC to discipline students for failing to follow the BCSC parking policy requiring them to park on school grounds. Were there any doubt as to the BCSC's authority under Indiana Code § 20-8.1-5.1-7(d) and § 20-8.1-5.1-8 to require students to park on school grounds, and the court has none, such doubt would have to be resolved in favor of finding the authority. See IND. CODE § 20-5-1.5-3(b). Given the evidence that all but one of BCSC's schools are located on Odell Street and BCSC's need to get buses through in a timely manner, particularly since the buses run a double route, the power to regulate where students driving to school park is "necessary and desirable in the conduct of" BCSC's affairs. See IND. CODE § 20-5-1.5-3(b)(2). The court therefore holds that BCSC's parking policy is not invalid under Indiana law.
B. Whether BCSC's Parking Policy Violates Substantive Due Process Rights The Plaintiff's second contention is that BCSC's parking policy which requires student who drive to school to park on school grounds violates the substantive due process rights of the student drivers. He argues that the policy violates the drivers' substantive due process rights because it is arbitrary and unreasonable.
It is clear that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the rights of students. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 334 (1985). Both the Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit have "emphasized . . . how limited the scope of the substantive due process doctrine is." Dunn v. Fairfield Community High Sch. Dist. No. 225, 158 F.3d 962, 964-66 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, ___, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 1717-20 (1998); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, ___, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 2267 (1997)). The Lewis and Glucksberg decisions remind courts that they must "`exercise the utmost care whenever . . . asked to break new ground in this field. . . .'" Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720 (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)); see also Lewis, 523 U.S. at 842 (noting traditional reluctance of Court to expand concept).
The criteria used to determine whether something violates substantive due process differ depending on whether a legislative or executive act of the government is challenged. See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846; Dunn, 158 F.3d at 965. The court understands the Plaintiff to be asserting a legislative violation of substantive due process rights as he is challenging BCSC's parking policy. When the claimed violation is a legislative, the court applies a two-step analysis. First, it must determine whether the challenged legislation interferes with "certain fundamental rights and liberty interests," Dunn, 158 F.3d at 966 (quoting Glucksberg, 117 S.Ct. at 2267), which are "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition," Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (quotation omitted), and "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. . . ." Id. (quotation omitted). If the asserted right is "fundamental," then it is entitled to the protection of the strict scrutiny test. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (observing that fundamental liberty interest is violated by legislation that infringes it unless the infringement is "`narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest'") (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)). If the asserted right is not fundamental, then it is entitled to the protection under the rational basis test. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 728; Dunn, 158 F.3d at 966 (holding a decision affecting a right which is not fundamental must be "wholly arbitrary"); accord Hawkins v. Freeman, 195 F.3d 732, 739, 748 (4th Cir. 1999).
The "shocks the conscience" test is applied when the challenged action is executive. See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 846-47; and, therefore, is inapplicable here.
Under that test, the legislation need only have "a reasonable relation to a legitimate [government] interest. . . ." Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 722; see also Dunn, 158 F.3d at 966. It is not clear what right the Plaintiff asserts is infringed by BCSC's parking policy, but it appears to be the right to choose where to park. (See Pl.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. at 18 (arguing "BCSC has no . . . right to intrude on the lawful parking choices of John Doe and the class. . . .")). What is clear, though, is that whatever the right is, it is not a fundamental right. The Plaintiff concedes as much. (Pl.'s Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. at 18 ("In this case the drivers are not asserting a fundamental right.")). See also IND. CODE § 9-24-13-1 (recognizing that a driver's license grants a "privilege" to the licensee).
The Plaintiff asserts as a statement of material fact that BCSC has enacted a random drug testing policy which subjects students who participate in extracurricular activities or athletics or students who drive to school to mandatory random drug testing. (Hodgkin Dep. at 15, Ex. 6 at 106.) There is no evidence, however, that the Plaintiff has ever been subjected to random drug testing, and this action does not directly challenge that drug testing policy.
BCSC asserts two interests are furthered by its student parking policy:
(1) holding student drivers for 5 minutes to allow school buses to clear the congested school complex thus reducing congestion and increasing student safety ("traffic congestion and student safety interest"); and
(2) simplifying supervision of students at the beginning and end of the school day by simplifying enforcement of the "no smoking" policy. BCSC need not demonstrate that its parking policy has a reasonable relation to both interests. It is sufficient that the policy furthers at least one of these interests.
BCSC also asserted that the policy furthered the interest of avoiding student parking in residential areas which reduces spaces for neighborhood use, but the cited portions of Mr. Hodkin's deposition do not provide any evidentiary support for this assertion of fact. It is, therefore, disregarded by the court.
BCSC has an important and legitimate interest in reducing traffic congestion and increasing student safety. Reducing traffic congestion allows the school buses to transport students to and from school more quickly and efficiently. This is of special concern since the buses run a double route and must first transport the high school and junior high students and then transport the elementary students. Furthermore, BCSC "stand[s] in the relation of parents and guardians to the students," IND. CODE § 20-8.1-5.1-3, and, therefore, student safety is paramount.
That the student parking lot on the high school grounds is the closest and safest place for students to park is undisputed. The reality of the extensive school bus traffic on Odell Street immediately after school and the traffic congestion created by an interruption in the flow of bus traffic also is undisputed. By keeping the student drivers in the school parking lot for 5 minutes, BCSC allows the buses to get on their way, thus avoiding increased traffic congestion and other problems such as potential accidents involving the student drivers. The court concludes that BCSC's parking policy requiring students to park on school grounds is reasonably related to the promotion and protection of the traffic congestion and student safety interest. Support for this conclusion is demonstrated by the experience during the 1998-99 school year when added traffic congestion and near accidents were caused by students who had to park in the gravel lot across Odell Street due to construction. The court holds that BCSC's parking policy requiring students who drive to school to park on school grounds is reasonably related to a legitimate school corporation interest and, therefore, does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive due process guarantees.
The court does not find that the policy is reasonably related to simplification of enforcement of the "no smoking" policy. It does not appear that requiring students to park on school grounds simplifies that policy's enforcement in any way.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the court holds that BCSC's parking policy requiring students to park on school grounds is within BCSC's statutory authority and does not violate the substantive due process rights of the Plaintiff class. Accordingly, the Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is DENIED and the Defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. Final judgment will be duly entered.
ALL OF WHICH IS ORDERED this 31st day of August 2000.