Opinion
No. COA02-543
Filed 15 July 2003
Workers' Compensation — injury and death arising out of employment — workplace assault
The Industrial Commission did not err in a workers' compensation case by concluding that the evidence in the record supports the Commission's findings 11, 12, and 14, which in turn support its conclusions of law, that decedent truck driver's injury and death were rooted in the pertinent traffic merging incident involving a dispute over decedent's driving and that it arose out of decedent's employment, because: (1) the Commission properly analyzed this case according to assault cases when the incident was more closely analogous to a workplace assault than to any of the factual scenarios underpinning defendant's proposed alternative theories; (2) the dispute had as its root cause the merging incident which was related to driving and to the basic nature of decedent's work as a truck driver; (3) neither the appreciable benefits or increased risk analysis apply when decedent was driving his truck in the course of his business for defendant employer; and (4) defendant failed to prove by the greater weight of the evidence that decedent's injury and death resulted from decedent's willful intention to injure or kill himself or another.
Judge STEELMAN concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Appeal by defendants from opinion and award entered 18 January 2002 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission. Heard in the Court of Appeals 13 February 2003.
Lore McClearen, by R. James Lore, and Johnson Parsons, P.A., by Dale P. Johnson, for plaintiff-appellee. Hedrick, Eatman, Gardner Kincheloe, L.L.P., by Maura K. Gavigan and Erin D. Eveson, for defendant-appellants.
Defendants Dubose Steel, Inc. (Dubose) and American Manufacturers Mutual appeal an opinion and award entered 18 January 2002 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission that awarded plaintiff medical expenses, death benefits and the statutory $2,000 toward burial expenses, for the injury that led to the death of her husband. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff's decedent John Dodson (Dodson), was employed by defendant Dubose as a truck driver, and was driving a load of steel to Virginia for his employer on 27 September 1999. As a result of the events at issue here, Dodson was struck by a vehicle while outside of his truck, and fell to the pavement on his head. After several days without regaining consciousness, Dodson died. His widow Shelby Dodson, the plaintiff, filed claims for workers' compensation benefits due while Dodson was still alive, and for death benefits.
The claims were consolidated and heard 27 September 2000, and, in an opinion and award filed on 30 November 2000, Deputy Commissioner William C. Bost found and concluded that Dodson's injury and death arose out of and in the course of his employment, and awarded benefits to plaintiff.
In an opinion and award filed 18 January 2002 by Commissioner Bernadine Ballance, the Full Commission essentially re-wrote the findings of fact and conclusions of law, but awarded the same benefits. Defendants now appeal.
ANALYSIS A. The Standard of Review
On appeal of a worker's compensation decision, we are "limited to reviewing whether any competent evidence supports the Commission's findings of fact and whether the findings of fact support the Commission's conclusions of law." Deese v. Champion Int'l Corp., 352 N.C. 109, 116, 530 S.E.2d 549, 553 (2000). An appellate court reviewing a worker's compensation claim "does not have the right to weigh the evidence and decide the issue on the basis of its weight. The court's duty goes no further than to determine whether the record contains any evidence tending to support the finding." Adams v. AVX Corp., 349 N.C. 676, 681, 509 S.E.2d 411, 414 (1998) (citation and quotation marks omitted), reh'g denied, 350 N.C. 108, 532 S.E.2d 522 (1999). In reviewing the evidence, we are required, in accordance with the Supreme Court's mandate to construe the Workers' Compensation Act in favor of awarding benefits, to take the evidence "in the light most favorable to plaintiff." Id.
The Full Commission is the "sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence." Deese, 352 N.C. at 116, 530 S.E.2d at 553. Furthermore,
the Commission does not have to explain its findings of fact by attempting to distinguish which evidence or witnesses it finds credible. Requiring the Commission to explain its credibility determination and allowing the Court of Appeals to review the Commission's explanation of those credibility determinations would be inconsistent with our legal system's tradition of not requiring the fact finder to explain why he or she believes one witness or another or believes one piece of evidence is more credible than another.
Id. at 116-17, 530 S.E.2d at 553.
B. Appellants' Arguments
Defendants bring forward three questions presented, organized into two arguments in their brief. In the heading of Argument I, defendants refer to all but one of the nineteen assignments of error. In the body of the argument, however, defendants do not mention any specific findings by number, but argue generally that the evidence does not support that the Commission "found that [Dodson's] injury and subsequent death arose out of his employment." In identically worded assignments of error 1 though 12, defendants challenge findings of fact 5 through 17 as not being supported by the "competent evidence of record." Similarly, assignments of error 13 through 18 challenge, in identical language, conclusions of law 1 through 4, 6 and 7 as not supported by the evidence and as "contrary to law." Assignment of error 19 challenges the award. We do not believe that this argument complies with the Rules of Appellate Procedure sufficiently to bring forward challenges to any of the specific findings of fact, with the possible exceptions of numbers 11, 12 and 14 and conclusions 1, 2 and 4, which read as follows:
11. The root cause of the confrontation between Dodson and Campbell originated when Dodson, while moving with the traffic, merged into Campbell's lane of traffic forcing Campbell out of his lane. Neither Dodson nor Campbell knew each other prior to this incident. There is no evidence that Dodson intended to force Campbell out of his lane of travel. At the time that the root cause incident occurred, Dodson was driving his truck in the ordinary course of his business for defendant-employer, Dubose Steel, Inc. which was the basic nature of his work as a truck driver. Defendants admit that at the time Dodson was struck by Campbell's vehicle he was an employee of Dubose Steel, Inc.
12. John Dodson's injuries and death resulted from an assault upon his person by a vehicle operated by Troy Campbell. Although there had been gestures and verbal exchanges between Campbell and Dodson(which neither of them could hear), based on the greater weight of the evidence, Dodson did not have a wilful intent to injure or kill Campbell when he exited his vehicle and walked toward the driver's side of Campbell's vehicle. Dodson appeared to have acted spontaneously.
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14. Dodson's injury and death arose out of his employment. As a result of his injury and subsequent death, Dodson and now his estate have incurred ambulance and medical bills for treatment for the time that he lived prior to death, as well as burial expenses in excess of $2,000. . .
* * * * * CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The injury to John Dodson occurring on September 27, 1999 and the resulting death occurring on October 4, 1999 constituted a compensable injury by accident arising out of and in the course of Dodson's employment with Dubose Steel, Inc. N.C. Gen Stat. §§ 97-2(6); 97-38.
2. John Dodson died as a result of an assault on his person by a vehicle driven by Troy Campbell. The assault originated from an argument based on the manner in which Dodson drove his truck in the course of his employment. Hegler v. Cannon Mills, 224 N.C. 669, 31 S.E.2d 918 (1944).
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4. Decedent's employment as a long distance truck driver caused him to spend the majority of his working hours traveling on highways and streets. Due to the nature of decedent's work, the risk of driver error causing tempers to flare among strangers on the busy highways was increased. Dodson and Campbell did not know each other so the inciting incident was not due to personal reasons. "Assaults arise out of the employment either if the risk of assault is increased because of the nature or setting of the work, or if the reason for the assault was a quarrel having its origin in the work." A truck driver's risk of being struck by a vehicle is a risk greater than that of the general public. 1 Arthur Larson and Lex K. Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation, Desk Edition, § 8 Scope (2000).
Thus, we will first discuss whether the evidence supports these findings and conclusions.
After a careful review according to the standard articulated by the Supreme Court, we conclude that evidence in the record supports the Commission's findings 11, 12, and 14. First, Troy Campbell, the motorist who hit Dodson, testified that his vehicle and Dodson's tractor-trailer were trying to merge into one lane of travel from the two in which they were traveling, when Dodson's truck forced Campbell off the road, while Campbell was "laying on the horn when he [Dodson] was coming over." At the next stoplight, according to Campbell and witnesses Scott Cash and Mark Davis, Dodson got out of his truck and started walking toward Campbell, banging his fist onto the hood of Campbell's vehicle, at which point Campbell drove forward, striking Dodson. Several days later Dodson died from his injuries. Campbell could not hear what, if anything, Dodson said while walking toward Campbell's vehicle, and Campbell testified that Dodson "really didn't have any kind of facial expression." We believe that this evidence, among much more, fully supports the above findings of fact to the effect that Dodson's injury and death were rooted in the driving incident.
The Full Commission chose to accept certain testimony as credible, which is within its authority, even though there may be evidence from which one could draw a contrary inference. Deese, 352 N.C. at 116, 530 S.E.2d at 553. As we indicated earlier, the Full Commission is the "sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence" and need not explain its findings of fact to justify which evidence or witnesses it finds credible. Id. We conclude that ample evidence in the record supported the Commission's findings of fact.
Next, we examine whether the findings of fact support the Commission's conclusions of law. We believe that they do. Findings of fact numbers 11, 12, and 14, among others, support the Commission's legal conclusions and award regarding the root cause of Dodson's injury.
In their second "Question Presented," briefed as part B of Argument I, the defendants contend that the Commission erroneously analyzed this case according to the law pertaining to workplace assaults. Defendant's argue that the Commission's conclusions and award are contrary to applicable law, for three reasons. They contend that (1) the assault cases do not apply; (2) the employer received no "appreciable benefit" from Dodson's actions at the time of the injury according to the so-called Good Samaritan cases; and (3) that Dodson's work did not place him at increased risk of the type of incident in which he was injured.
We conclude, however, that the Commission properly analyzed this case according to the assault cases, because the incident was, we believe, more closely analogous to a workplace assault than to any of the factual scenarios underpinning defendants' proposed alternative theories. In reaching this conclusion we are guided, not only by the standard of review, but also by the clear and oft-articulated mandate of the Supreme Court that, in workers' compensation cases, the statute is to be broadly construed in favor of awarding benefits, in view of the remedial purpose of the Act. Hoyle v. Isenhour Brick and Tile Co., 306 N.C. 248, 293 S.E.2d 196 (1982). "Since the terms of the Act should be liberally construed in favor of compensation, deficiencies in one factor are sometimes allowed to be made up by strength in the other." Id, 306 N.C. at 252, 293 S.E.2d at 199. Although we are mindful that the Worker's Compensation Act was not intended to provide a general insurance policy, our Courts have repeatedly held that "[t]he Workers' Compensation Act `should be liberally construed to the end that benefits thereof should not be denied upon technical, narrow and strict interpretation." Dildy v. MBW Invs., Inc., 152 N.C. App. 65, 73, 566 S.E.2d 759, 765 (2002), citing Roberts v. Burlington Indus., 321 N.C. 350, 359, 364 S.E.2d 417, 423 (1988) (additional citations omitted).
In the assault cases the analysis of "arising out of" turns on whether the assault "originated in" something related to the job. In the opinion and award, the Commission cites Hegler v. Cannon Mills Co., 224 N.C. 669, 31 S.E.2d 918 (1944), as a basis for its conclusion. There, the Supreme Court upheld an award of compensation where the injury and death resulted from an assault that followed a dispute between two cotton mill workers over one's attempt to supervise the other. The Court there pointed out:
Where men are working together at the same work disagreements may be expected to arise about the work, the manner of doing it, as to the use of tools, interference with one another, and many other details which may be trifling or unimportant. Infirmity of temper, or worse, may be expected, and occasionally blows and fighting. Where . . . as a result of it one injures the other, it may be inferred that the injury arose out of the employment.
Id., 224 N.C. at 671, 31 S.E.2d at 920 (citations omitted). Plaintiff cites a number of cases in which this Court and the Supreme Court have held that an accidental injury is compensable where it results from an assault rooted in the performance of workplace duties. See Wake County Hosp. System, Inc. v. Safety Nat'l Casualty Corp., 127 N.C. App. 33, 487 S.E.2d 789, disc. review denied 347 N.C. 410, 494 S.E.2d 600 (1997) (holding that death covered by workers' compensation where hospital social worker was abducted by hospital laundry worker, who took her to another location where he raped and murdered her, where record does not reflect whether decedent knew assailant.); Pittman v. Twin City Laundry Cleaners, 61 N.C. App. 468, 300 S.E.2d 899 (1983) (upholding award of compensation where decedent was shot after an argument over whether another worker had been fired or not.)
We believe that the findings of the Commission support the conclusion that Dodson's injury and death originated in the traffic merging incident, which was clearly a dispute about Dodson's driving. Since Dodson's work primarily consisted of driving, and his workplace comprised public roads and highways, including the one upon which he was driving at the time of the merging incident, the findings also support the conclusion that the "assault upon Dodson [by Campbell's vehicle] was rooted in and grew out of his employment," and occurred in his workplace. This case is not similar to those in which a worker has been assaulted because of a personal relationship, unconnected to the employment. See Hemric v. Mfg. Co., 54 N.C. App. 314, 283 S.E.2d 436 (1981), disc. review denied, 304 N.C. 726, 288 S.E.2d 806 (1982) (employee was shot during assault on co-worker by violent boyfriend); Robbins v. Nicholson, 281 N.C. 234, 188 S.E.2d 350 (1972) (employee was assaulted at workplace by estranged husband); Dildy, 152 N.C. App. 65, 566 S.E.2d 759 (2002) (employee was assaulted at work by violent boyfriend.) Here the Commission has found as fact that the dispute had as its "root cause" the merging incident, which was related to driving and to "the basic nature of his work as a truck driver." Thus, according to the applicable case law, the Commission properly concluded that Dodson's injury and death resulted from an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment.
Defendants argue that the Commission and the Court should analyze this case according to the cases in which an employee on a business trip interrupts his work to engage in personal conduct unrelated to the employer's business, such as the Good Samaritan cases, and that we should employ an "appreciable benefits" or "increased risk" test. See Roman v. Southland Transp., 350 N.C. 549, 515 S.E.2d 214 (1999); Roberts v. Burlington Indus., 321 N.C. 350, 364 S.E.2d 417 (1988). Because we have held that the evidence supports the Commission's findings, which in turn support its conclusions to the effect that Dodson's injury and death resulted from a dispute related to his business of driving, we do not believe that these cases apply. In so concluding, we again refer to the standard of review, according to which we are bound by the findings and conclusions of the Commission if there is any evidence to support them.
In Roberts, the employee was injured while on a business trip, during a stop to render aid to a third party. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of benefits, holding that the employer received no "appreciable benefits" from the employee's stop. Here, however, the Commission found and concluded that at the time the "root cause" incident began, Dodson "was driving his truck in the course of his business for defendant-employer." Thus, we do not believe that either the "appreciable benefits" or "increased risk" analysis — applicable to cases in which the employee was not engaged in the employer's business, such as Roberts — applies here. In addition, although the Court in Roman also affirmed the denial of benefits where the decedent was shot while pursuing a robber, it did so in a three-to-three opinion, in which the Court noted that "the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed without precedential value." As such, we decline to treat Roman as authority.
In Argument II (Question presented 3), defendants contend that the plaintiff is barred from any compensation because Dodson's injury and death resulted from his wilful intention to injure Campbell. However, the Commission accepted as credible the evidence discussed above, and made findings of fact, including finding 12 quoted above, which support its conclusion number 3, that defendant failed to prove "by the greater weight of the evidence that [Dodson's] injury and death resulted from [Dodson's] wilful intention to injure or kill himself or another." Because these findings and conclusion are supported by the evidence even though there may have been evidence to the contrary, we reject this argument.
CONCLUSION
In sum, we hold that the evidence supports the findings of fact, which in turn support the conclusions of law of the Commission. Since the Commission properly analyzed this case as an assault in the workplace, its conclusions are consistent with the applicable law. For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the opinion and award of the Industrial Commission.
Affirmed.
Judge MCGEE concurs.