Opinion
2003-528 QC.
Decided June 23, 2004.
Appeal by occupant from a final judgment of the Civil Court, Queens County (A. Agate, J.), entered March 3, 2003, granting possession to petitioner.
Final judgment unanimously affirmed without costs.
PRESENT: ARONIN, J.P., GOLIA and RIOS, JJ.
As a general rule, "the trial court has broad discretion in controlling the conduct of the trial" ( Ingebretsen v. Manha, 218 AD2d 784), and the admission of evidence, including "the method and duration of cross-examination to determine a witness' credibility," is within the sound exercise of that discretion ( Feldsberg v. Nitschke, 49 NY2d 636, 643). Moreover, while "a witness may be cross-examined with respect to specific immoral, vicious or criminal acts which have a bearing on the witness's credibility" ( Badr v. Hogan, 75 NY2d 629, 634; see People v. Schwartzman, 24 NY2d 241, 244), the credibility of a witness may not be impeached "through extrinsic evidence on matters collateral to the issues in the case" ( People v. Rendon, 301 AD2d 665, 666; see also Parsons v. 218 E. Main St. Corp., 1 AD3d 420; Prince, Richardson on Evidence § 6-305 [Farrell 11th ed]). The fact that in prior proceedings, certain of the witnesses' contentions regarding the content of the parties' sublease and the right to restrict occupant's access to a portion of the disputed premises were determined adversely to the witness, is a matter collateral to the material trial issue (whether a portion of the occupied premises was subject to an oral license independent of the sublease) and did not evidence the necessary "moral turpitude" to be relevant to the witness' credibility ( Badr v. Hogan, 75 NY2d at 634). Thus, the court below did not abuse its discretion when it limited occupant's exploration of those matters on cross-examination.