Opinion
CIVIL NO. 1:02CV00706
January 27, 2003
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Basilios Dodge ("Plaintiff") filed this action pro se against Defendant VT INC., as Trustee of World Omni LT ("VT Inc."), and Planet Toyota (collectively "Defendants"), alleging that VT Inc. unlawfully attempted to recover Durham City/County personal property taxes assessed on his motor vehicle and billed to Plaintiff by VT Inc. as administrator of a motor vehicle lease agreement between Plaintiff and Planet Toyota. Plaintiff seeks relief from personal property taxes in the amount of $1,103.34 plus compensatory and punitive damages in the amount of $10,000.00. VT Inc. filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). No response has been filed by Planet Toyota. On December 19, 2002, Plaintiff moved to amend his complaint to substitute Fred Anderson Toyota in lieu of Planet Toyota, alleging that Planet Toyota's assets have been acquired by Fred Anderson Toyota. However, Plaintiff seeks relief only from VT, Inc.
FACTS
Plaintiff is a senior citizen who lives on a limited income. In 1999, Plaintiff entered into a lease agreement with Planet Toyota for a 1999 Toyota Sienna minivan. Plaintiff alleges that he was assured at that time that his only monthly payments were to be $347.21 after the initial down payment of $3,500.00.
In the summer of 2000, Plaintiff received a bill from VT Inc. for $399.05. The bill stated that the amount was personal property tax for the minivan due to the City/County of Durham that VT Inc. had already paid. Plaintiff refused to pay, despite being told by Planet Toyota that he must.
Plaintiff complained to Planet Toyota that this cost had been concealed from him. Plaintiff also argued that, as a lessee, he was not obligated to pay the personal property taxes on the minivan. He claimed that because VT Inc. was the legal owner of the vehicle and lessor, it was VT Inc.'s legal obligation to pay the personal property taxes.
Although Plaintiff and Defendants have been in communication since the fall of 2000, the parties have consistently maintained their respective positions regarding payment of property taxes on the minivan. Subsequently, additional property taxes have accumulated and now total $1,103.34. This amount includes a new "sales use tax" and a "late charges" fee for August 2002.
Plaintiff brought this suit against Defendants on August 27, 2002, alleging various causes of action and seeking to have VT Inc. held liable for all "personal property taxes," and for compensatory and punitive damages in the amount of $10,000.00.
DISCUSSION
VT Inc. requests that the court dismiss Plaintiff's claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. "It is generally accepted that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only the power authorized by the Constitution and by statute." Byrd v. Hunt, 136 F. Supp.2d 511, 513 (M.D.N.C. 2001); see, e.g., Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 136-37 (1992). Section 1331 of Title 28 of the United States Code provides that "the district court shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The vast majority of cases brought under the general federal question jurisdiction of the federal courts are those in which the federal law creates the cause of action. See Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986).
Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, federal question jurisdiction exists only when a federal question appears on the face of a plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint. See Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. Drain, 237 F.3d 366, 370 (4th Cir. 2001). "The plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating that a federal question exists." Jackson v. Strayer College, 941 F. Supp. 192, 195 (D.D.C. 1996). In addition, in order to support a claim of federal jurisdiction, "[t]he federal question raised must be a direct element in the plaintiff's claim, and must be substantial and not plainly frivolous." Id.
When a defendant grounds its Rule 12(b)(1) challenge on a facial attack on the sufficiency of the pleading, the court must, as with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, accept the allegations of the complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in the manner most favorable to the plaintiff. See Robinson v. Overseas Military Sales Corp., 21 F.3d 502, 507 (2d Cir. 1994); see also Goldstar (Panama) S.A. v. United States, 967 F.2d 965, 967 (4th Cir. 1992).
After reviewing the complaint, the court finds no allegations supporting a federal cause of action. Among the various causes of action alleged by Plaintiff in his complaint, Plaintiff alleges numerous contract law claims including breach of contract, ambiguity of terms, misrepresentations of fact, and bad faith. None of these claims, however, "arise under the Constitution or laws of the United States." In fact, Plaintiff even acknowledges that these are nothing more than state law contract law allegations. (Compl. at 1.) (claiming that all claims are "clearly violations of Contract Law").
Under a liberal view of the complaint, Plaintiff may also attempt to invoke the court's diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Section 1332(a) grants federal district courts subject matter jurisdiction over civil actions between parties of diverse citizenship when the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00. Plaintiff alleges that he seeks for VT Inc. to be held liable for all personal property taxes due on the minivan, plus "compensatory and punitive damages in the amount of $10,000." (Compl. at 1.) Even under a liberal reading, however these allegations do not exceed the jurisdictional minimum of $75,000.00.
Plaintiff also alleges that VT Inc. has negligently failed to pay the property tax due on the minivan on at least one occasion and that the lease is "flawed, perhaps fraudulent." ( Id.) Even viewing these claims in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the court finds no federal law to be at issue. Furthermore, Plaintiff's assertion that Defendants' actions were "unconstitutional" is simply not sufficient to raise a federal question. See McCartney v. State of W. Va., 156 F.2d 739, 741 (4th Cir. 1946) ("Mere references to the federal Constitution, laws or treaties and mere assertions that a federal question is involved are not sufficient to confer jurisdiction.")
As a result, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and must dismiss Plaintiff's claims. For the same reasons, the court lacks jurisdiction of VT Inc.'s counterclaim for past due taxes.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff's complaint and Defendant VT Inc.'s counterclaim will be dismissed. Plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint to substitute Fred Anderson Toyota for Planet Toyota will be denied as futile. In the event Plaintiff seeks to pursue this matter further, he should endeavor to adhere to the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) by setting forth a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends and a short and plain statement of the claim showing how and why he is entitled to relief.