The possession and concomitant exercise of dominion must also have a continuity that is sufficient to acquaint an owner of the land claimed that the claim of title contrary to his own is being asserted by the claimant. Dodge v. Lavin, 34 R.I. 409, 415. The rule generally accepted is that the possession required to acquire title under this statute must be actual, open, notorious, hostile, under claim of right, continuous, and exclusive.
The authorities here and elsewhere hold that the equivalent of an ouster or disseisin may be established where the evidence clearly shows one tenant's conveyance by warranty deed and an entry thereunder by the grantee, or where the possession of one tenant is so overt and notorious and so wholly inconsistent with the rights of the other cotenants to its possession as to amount to notice of definite denial of such rights. Tiffany v. Babcock, 51 R.I. 350; Union Savings Bank v. Taber, 13 R.I. 683; Dodge v. Lavin, 34 R.I. 409. See also Astle v. Card, 52 R.I. 357.
2 C.J. 270. See also Dodge v. Lavin, 34 R.I. 409. Three deeds offered in evidence by plaintiff were excluded by the trial justice: 1. Quitclaim deed of N. Henry Lanphear and Benjamin Kenyon to Westerly Savings Bank; 2. Mortgagee's deed of the New England Linen Co., by Joseph Grenon, attorney, to Osmas Edwards; 3. Deed of Osmas Edwards to Centerville Mills, Inc. It was admitted by attorneys for both parties that the deed of Lanphear and Kenyon conveyed the interest of the surviving partners of the Centerville Mfg. Co. to the Westerly Savings Bank. Plaintiff contended that this deed and the other two above mentioned included the lot in question, which contention was denied by defendant.
This is the equivalent of actual disseizin, Union Savings Bank v. Taber, supra. As to the fourth parcel, while it has not been conveyed by warranty deed, John Babcock in his lifetime claimed and exercised such complete possession and dominion as the character of the land permitted. Dodge v. Lavin, 34 R.I. 409. When about forty years ago he cut the wood thereon he took for his own use the principal value of the land at that time.
( 4) Adverse Possession. Extent of Claim. Upon the question of title by adverse possession of a strip of land extending to the water, where claimant had from time to time filled in the shore front and cultivated the grass, considering the character of the land and the purposes for which it was adapted and all other circumstances: Held, that claimant not only claimed title to the whole strip, but that her acts assertive of ownership were sufficient to fairly indicate to others that her claim extended to the whole. BILL IN EQUITY. Heard on petition of complainant Dodge for reargument of cause decided in 34 R.I. 409. Denied. Tillinghast Collins, Harold B. Tanner, for John W. Dodge.