Opinion
5:19-cv-0560 (LEK/TWD)
05-21-2019
ERROL RICHARD DODD, Plaintiff, v. PATRICK O'SULLIVAN, et al., Defendants.
APPEARANCES: ERROL RICHARD DODD Plaintiff, pro se 8120 NW Hwy 225A Ocala, FL 34482
APPEARANCES: ERROL RICHARD DODD
Plaintiff, pro se
8120 NW Hwy 225A
Ocala, FL 34482 THÉRÈSE WILEY DANCKS, United States Magistrate Judge ORDER AND REPORT-RECOMMENDATION
The Clerk has sent to the Court for initial review the pro se complaint of Plaintiff Errol Richard Dodd against Defendants Judge Patrick O'Sullivan, Magistrate Todd Dexter, the State of New York, and Madison County Family Court. (Dkt. No. 1.) Also before the Court is Plaintiff's application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP application"). (Dkt. No. 2.)
I. BACKGROUND
In March 2019, Plaintiff, a resident of Florida, filed his complaint and accompanying IFP application in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. (Dkt. Nos. 1, 2.) By Transfer Order filed April 17, 2019, the case was transferred to this District because all Defendants were located in New York and all actions giving rise to this action allegedly occurred in Madison County. (Dkt. No. 3.) The Transfer Order made no ruling whether Plaintiff should be permitted to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee. Id. at 2.
Page references to documents identified by docket number are to the numbers assigned by the CM/ECF docketing system maintained by the Clerk's Office.
While Plaintiff's complaint is not a model in clarity, it appears Plaintiff is dissatisfied with the manner in which Defendants have handled his child support and child custody matters. (Dkt. No. 1 at 4, 14-18.) He alleges his "civil rights have been violated [because he] was not proven to be an 'unfit parent,'" yet his parental rights were nonetheless terminated "without due process" on November 18, 2016, by the Madison County Family Court. Id. at 4. He is also aggrieved that his children are not receiving counseling services. Id. at 4, 6-7. Plaintiff seeks restoration of his parental rights and monetary damages. Id. at 4, 14-15, 18. For a complete statement, reference is made to the complaint.
Plaintiff has utilized a pro se form complaint for a civil case alleging negligence (28 U.S.C. § 1332; Diversity of Citizenship). (Dkt. No. 1 at 1-5.) He also attaches sixteen pages of mostly single spaced run-on paragraphs as "additional support." Id. at 6-21. Plaintiff devotes several pages of "additional support" to his so-called "proposal/remedy" to "correct the psychological injury that is occurring to the child and ensure [sic] each and every child is set on a course of health, wellness and prosperity through early intervention at key intervals in the child's life." Id. at 6-21. Should his "proposal/remedy" be implemented by any government, Plaintiff requests, inter alia, royalties or a one-time payment of $6.66 Billion. Id. at 14-15. He continues, "Mr. Trump sir if you're reading this, I know you're a business man and can appreciate a good deal. Well, here it is. I feel this is a steal under the circumstances facing this county. May God Bless the U.S.A. Thank you for reading." Id. at 15. Plaintiff also invites the Court to read his "human trafficking remedy—also attached which will assist with solving some of the very difficult problems we are having in that area." Id. at 19.
II. IFP APPLICATION
A court may grant in forma pauperis status if a party "is unable to pay" the standard fee for commencing an action. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). After reviewing Plaintiff's IFP application, the Court finds he meets this standard. Therefore, Plaintiff's IFP application (Dkt. No. 2) is granted.
III. LEGAL STANDARDS FOR INITIAL REVIEW
Section 1915(e) directs that when a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, "the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).
In determining whether an action is frivolous, the court must look to see whether the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). "An action is frivolous when either: (1) the factual contentions are clearly baseless such as when the claims are the product of delusion or fantasy; or (2) the claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory." Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Although extreme caution should be exercised in ordering sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint before the adverse party has been served and the parties have had an opportunity to respond, Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir. 1983), the court still has a responsibility to determine that a claim is not frivolous before permitting a plaintiff to proceed. See, e.g., Thomas v. Scully, 943 F.2d 259, 260 (2d Cir. 1991) (per curiam) (holding a district court has the power to dismiss a complaint sua sponte if the complaint is frivolous).
To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must plead enough facts to state a claim that is "plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which sets forth the general rules of pleading, "does not require detailed factual allegations, . . . it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-harmed-me accusation." Id. In determining whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief may be granted, "the court must accept the material facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor." Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). "[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id.
Additionally, when reviewing a complaint under § 1915(e), courts are guided by the pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under Rule 8, a pleading shall contain, inter alia, "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The purpose of this rule "is to give fair notice of the claim being asserted so as to permit the adverse party the opportunity to file a responsive answer, prepare an adequate defense and determine whether the doctrine of res judicata is applicable." Hudson v. Artuz, No. 95 CIV. 4768(JSR), 1998 WL 832708, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 1998) (quoting Powell v. Marine Midland Bank, 162 F.R.D. 15, 16 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (other citations omitted)). Under Rule 10, "[a] party must state its claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances." Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). The purpose of this rule is to facilitate a cogent framing of the issues presented and permit defendants to properly respond to the allegations of a complaint. Laspisa v. Citifinancial Does 1 to 20, 269 F. Supp. 3d 11, 13 (N.D.N.Y. 2017); Dabney v. Sawyer, No. 11-CV-0273 (LEK/RFT), 2012 WL 3241571, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. July 17, 2012).
Copies of all unpublished decisions cited herein will be provided to Plaintiff in accordance with LeBron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
Where a plaintiff proceeds pro se, the pleadings must be read liberally and construed to raise the strongest arguments they suggest. Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). A pro se complaint should not be dismissed "without giving leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated." Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999) (citation and quotation marks omitted). An opportunity to amend is not required where "the problem with [the plaintiff's] causes of action is substantive" such that "better pleading will not cure it." Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000).
IV. ANALYSIS
"It is a fundamental precept that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction." Owen Equip. & Erec. Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978). If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
Federal jurisdiction exists only when a "federal question" is presented (28 U.S.C. § 1331) or where there is "diversity of citizenship" and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 (28 U.S.C. § 1332). See Perpetual Sec., Inc. v. Tang, 290 F.3d 132, 136 (2d Cir. 2002). When a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, dismissal is mandatory. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006). Federal courts "have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party." Id.
Construed liberally, Plaintiff invokes both the Court's diversity jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1332) and federal question jurisdiction (28 U.S.C. § 1331) by asserting claims couched in terms of constitutional deprivations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Dkt. No. 1.) Ordinarily, the Court would possess subject matter jurisdiction over this action. However, two separate legal doctrines require dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint. Additionally, each Defendant is absolutely immune from suit in this case.
In addition to these substantive matters, Plaintiff's complaint fails to comply with the basic pleading rules identified herein and therefore it is also subject to dismissal on that basis alone. There is nothing short nor plain about Plaintiff's twenty-one page complaint and his claims are not set forth in numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b).
A. Domestic Relations Exception
The domestic relations exception "divests the federal courts of power to issue divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees." Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992). This exception recognizes "the states have traditionally adjudicated marital and child custody disputes and therefore have developed competence and expertise in adjudicating such matters, which federal courts lack." Thomas v. N.Y.C., 814 F. Supp. 1139, 1146 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (citing Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 703-04). "The doctrine also rests on the idea that state courts are peculiarly suited to enforce state regulations and domestic relations decrees involving alimony and child custody particularly in light of the fact that such decrees often demand substantial continuing judicial oversight." Id. The domestic relations exception "is equally applicable whether jurisdiction is asserted under § 1331 or § 1332." Tait v Powell, 241 F. Supp. 3d 372, 376 (E.D.N.Y. 2017).
While Plaintiff has nominally invoked his constitutional rights and, in part, seeks monetary damages, it is clear from his complaint that the primary thrust of his claims is aimed at regaining custody of his children. For example, Plaintiff states he has not seen his children in two years and asks the Court to restore his parental rights that were terminated without "due process." (Dkt. No. 1 at 4, 6.) Specifically, he seeks "full reinstatement of [his] parental rights, unrestricted by government or state interest/influence in any way (custody and support)." Id. at 14. He also asks for "50/50 joint custody of [his children], parental rights restored." Id. at 18.
As the Second Circuit noted, where tort claims "begin and end in a domestic dispute," state courts are better suited to adjudicate the claims. See Schottel v. Kutyba, No. 06-CV-1577, 2009 WL 230106, at *1 (2d Cir. Feb. 2, 2009) (affirming, based on the domestic relations exception, the district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint alleging, inter alia, that the defendants "fraudulently misrepresented to the court the former couple's residence in order to file divorce proceedings in New York," and, as a result, plaintiff was "deprived of custody and visitation rights"). As a result, "[f]ederal courts will dismiss actions aimed at changing the results of domestic proceedings, including orders of child custody." Rabinowitz v. New York, 329 F. Supp. 2d 373, 376 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
Here, it is clear Plaintiff's claims center around a child custody dispute litigated in state court. Inasmuch as the complaint concerns a state law domestic relations matter and, in particular, because Plaintiff seeks the return of his children and a 50/50 joint custody agreement without state interference in matter of support, the Court recommends dismissing the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Demuth v. Cty. of Chenango, No. 3:18-CV-1068 (LEK/DEP), 2018 WL 4935772, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2018), report-recommendation adopted by 2019 WL 452048 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2019); Amato v. McGinty, No. 17-CV-593 (MAD/ATB), 2017 WL 9487185, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. June 6, 2017), report-recommendation adopted by 2017 WL 4083575 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2017).
B. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
Even if Plaintiff's complaint was not barred by the domestic relations exception, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes review of Plaintiff's claims in this Court. See generally District of Colombia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). This doctrine divests the federal court of jurisdiction to consider actions that seek to overturn state court judgments. Fernandez v. Turetsky, No. 12-CV-4092, 2014 WL 5823116, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2014) (citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). The doctrine also bars the federal court from considering claims that are "inextricably intertwined" with a prior state court determination. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Smithsonian Inst., 189 F.3d 180, 185 (2d Cir. 1999)).
In the Second Circuit, the following four requirements must be met for the doctrine to apply: (1) the federal-court plaintiff must have lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff must complain of injuries caused by a state-court judgment; (3) the plaintiff must invite district court review and rejection of that judgment; and (4) the state-court judgment must have been rendered before the district court proceedings commenced. McKithen v. Brown, 481 F.3d 89, 96 (2d Cir. 2007).
A plaintiff cannot avoid the application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine simply by "presenting in federal court a legal theory not raised in state court," for example, by framing claims under § 1983. Castiglione v. Papa, No. 1:09-CV-0967 (LEK/DRH), 2010 WL 2044688, at *6-7 (N.D.N.Y. May 24, 2010), aff'd, 423 F. App'x 10, 13 (2d Cir. 2011) (summary order); see also Rabinowitz, 329 F. Supp. 2d at 376 ("A plaintiff may not overcome the doctrine and seek a reversal of a state court judgment simply by casting his complaint in the form of a civil rights action."). Nor can a plaintiff circumvent the Rooker-Feldman doctrine by requesting monetary damages. Voltarie v. Westchester Cty. Dep't of Social Services, No. 11-cv-8876 (CS), 2016 WL 4540837, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2016).
Here, Plaintiff's allegations seek to collaterally attack the state court's order against Plaintiff relating to the custody of his children. (Dkt. No. 1 at 4.) Plaintiff who has lost in state court and who now complains of injuries caused by the state court, invites this Court to review and reject the state court order, which was issued on November 18, 2016, well before Plaintiff filed his complaint in federal court on March 4, 2019. Id. Thus, because all of the Rooker-Feldman requirements are satisfied, the Court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiff's claims.
Accordingly, the Court recommends dismissing the complaint on the additional ground that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine divests this Court of jurisdiction.
C. Immunity
Plaintiff's claims against Defendants are also subject to dismissal based upon a separate and independent ground. 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii). Plaintiff sues Madison County Family Court Judge Patrick J. O'Sullivan, Support Magistrate Todd Dexter, the State of New York, and Madison County Family Court, a court that is part of the New York State Unified Court System. (Dkt. No. 1 at 2.)
See http://ww2.nycourts.gov/courts/6jd/madison/family.shtml (last visited May 20, 2019).
It is well-settled judges are absolutely immune from suit for damages for judicial acts performed in their judicial capacities. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). Generally, "acts arising out of, or related to, individual cases before the judge are considered judicial in nature." Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir. 2009). Absolute immunity protects judges for their judicial acts, even when such acts "are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly." Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978). This is because "[w]ithout insulation from liability, judges would be subject to harassment and intimidation[.]" Young v. Selsky, 41 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1994). This is true however erroneous an act may have been and however injurious its consequences were to the plaintiff. Id.
Construed liberally, Plaintiff claims Judge O'Sullivan and Magistrate Dexter, inter alia, terminated his parental rights without due process on or about November 18, 2016. (Dkt. No. 1 at 4, 16-17.) Specifically, Plaintiff claims "we wouldn't be at this point if my parental rights were not illegally deprived by Judge P.O. of the Madison County Family Court in the State of New York." Id. at 17. He further contends, "my civil rights are being violated as I was not first found to be an 'unfit parent' beyond a reasonable doubt before terminating my parental rights without due process." Id. at 16.
Plaintiff's allegations against these Defendants relate to actions that are judicial in nature and, therefore, they are entitled to judicial immunity. See, e.g., Williams v. Williams, No. 11-CV-246S, 2012 WL 639697, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2012) ("This [absolute judicial] immunity has also been found to extend to support magistrates."); Lometvas v. Cardozo, No. 95-CV-2779 (DLI)(LB), 2006 WL 229908, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2006) (finding that plaintiff's claims against a support magistrate in the Family Court were barred by absolute judicial immunity).
Moreover, the Eleventh Amendment bars all federal court actions "against a state or its agencies absent a waiver of immunity or congressional legislation specifically overriding immunity." Mamot v. Bd. of Regents, 367 F. App'x 191, 192 (2d Cir. 2010). "[I]t is beyond dispute that the State of New York and its agencies have never consented to be sued in federal court." Dube v. State Univ. of N.Y., 900 F.2d 587, 594-95 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1211 (1991). Moreover, Congress did not abrogate New York's Eleventh Amendment immunity by enacting § 1983. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 343-45 (1979). "The law is clear that the State, and state agencies . . . are immune from . . . § 1983 suits because of their Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity." Jackson v. Johnson, 985 F. Supp. 422, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
The Second Circuit has expressly held that "the New York State Unified Court System is unquestionably an arm of the State and is entitled to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity." Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 368 (2d Cir. 2009) (quotation and citation omitted). Madison County Family Court is "a part of the New York State Unified Court system and is, therefore, also protected by the State's sovereign immunity for suit in federal court." McKnight v. Middleton, 699 F. Supp. 2d 507, 521 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).
Thus, the State of New York and Madison County Family Court are also entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984); Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 365-67 (2d Cir. 2009); Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 149 (2d Cir. 2004); see, e.g., Robertson v. Allen, No. 1:15-cv-11 (GLS/CFH), 2016 WL 205381, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2016) (dismissing claims against the State of New York and Ulster Country Family Court).
V. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds it lacks subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiff's claims pursuant to the domestic relations doctrine and Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Even if the Court did have jurisdiction, Plaintiff would not be able to overcome Defendants' immunity. 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii). Given the Second Circuit's guidance that a pro se complaint should not be dismissed without leave to amend unless amendment would be futile, Cuoco, 222 F.3d at 112, the Court has carefully considered whether leave to amend is warranted here. Because the defects identified above are substantive and would not be cured if afforded an opportunity to amend, the Court recommends dismissal without leave to amend. See, e.g., Ogden v. Marshall Cty. Dep't of Social Services, No. 3:18-cv-0373 (BKS/DEP), 2018 WL 2306493, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. May 21, 2018) (sua sponte dismissing compliant for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as barred by the domestic relations exception and Rooker-Feldman doctrine and without leave to amend); Meyers v. Hughes, No. 18-CV-4399 (JS/GRB), 2018 WL 3748156, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2018) (same).
ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby
ORDERED that Plaintiffs' IFP Application (Dkt. No. 2) is GRANTED, and it is further
RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's complaint (Dkt. No. 1) be sua sponte DISMISSED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk serve a copy of this Order and Report-Recommendation on Plaintiffs, along with a copy of the unpublished decisions cited herein in accordance with the Second Circuit's decision in Lebron v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (Supp. 2013); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72, 6(a). Dated: May 21, 2019
If you are proceeding pro se and are served with this Order and Report-Recommendation by mail, three additional days will be added to the fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date the Order and Report-Recommendation was mailed to you to serve and file objections. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(C).
Syracuse, New York
/s/_________
Thérèse Wiley Dancks
United States Magistrate Judge