Dodd v. Daniel

7 Citing cases

  1. Gulf Production Co. v. Continental Oil Co.

    139 Tex. 183 (Tex. 1942)   Cited 87 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Superseding decision renders question of abandonment immaterial

    The husband cannot even accept a less amount of consideration than that specified in the wife's deed, and bind the wife. Cole v. Bammel, 62 Tex. 108; Stallings v. Hullum, 89 Tex. 431, 35 S.W. 2; Dodd v. Daniel, 89 S.W.2d 494. These cases rest upon the principle that a change in the consideration to be paid for the homestead from that specified in the deed signed and acknowledged by the wife has the effect of making the conveyance upon terms which were not in her deed, and therefore not binding upon her.

  2. In re M.R.T.

    No. 13-23-00308-CV (Tex. App. Aug. 3, 2023)

    "A judgment that is to become effective only upon the happening of some future event or contingency is ordinarily not a final judgment." Mackie, 571 S.W.2d at 380, 380; Dodd v. Daniel, 89 S.W.2d 494, 495 (Tex. App.-Waco 1935, no writ); Rockport Shrimp Co-op v. Jackson, 776 S.W.2d 758, 761 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi-Edinburg 1989, writ denied) ("[I]t is improper to make a judgment conditional upon the happening of some future event or contingency . . . ."); see also Hale v. Hale, No. 04-05-00314-CV, 2006 WL 166518, at *4 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Jan. 25, 2006, pet. denied) (mem. op.). "The judgment must conclude the dispute so that no further questions will arise requiring judicial determination."

  3. Ferguson v. DRG/Colony North, Ltd.

    764 S.W.2d 874 (Tex. App. 1989)   Cited 54 times
    Holding that plaintiff's "general pleading" of a fraud claim was sufficient to state a claim, even though plaintiff stated merely that the defendant's actions were "fraudulent" and failed to specifically plead each element of fraud

    Cases in which appeals were dismissed on the basis of lack of finality have been more obvious ones, such as those in which the actual effectiveness of the judgment itself, or the very right of plaintiff to recover at all, was conditioned on some future, uncertain event. See, e.g., Dodd v. Daniel, 89 S.W.2d 494 (Tex.Civ.App. 1935, no writ) (judgment awarded cancellation of a deed, but further recited that the judgment was conditioned on, and to take effect only upon, the payment by defendant into the registry of the court of $70, with no disposition of plaintiff's case if payment was not made); Wrather v. Wrather, 154 S.W.2d 955 (Tex.Civ.App. 1941, writ ref'd w.o.m.) (trial court's order conditioned its custody and visitation rulings on the filing by both husband and wife of $5,000 bonds that they would obey the orders of the court and would not remove their child from the jurisdiction of the court, with no provision for the judgment if one or both bonds were not filed); Abell v. Abell, 246 S.W.2d 248 (Tex.Civ.App. 1951, no writ) (divorce decree awarded wife $10,000, but conditioned its payment on the execution by her of such documents as may be necessary to show that certain community property was not owned by her alone but by husband and wife jointly, making no provision for what the judgment would be if the documen

  4. Abell v. Abell

    246 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952)   Cited 2 times

    4 C.J.S., Appeal and Error, ยง 96, p. 193, '* * * the general rule is that a conditional judgment, order, or decree, the finality of which depends upon certain contingencies which may or may not occur, is not final for the purpose of appeal'. Dodd v. Daniels, Tex.Civ.App., 89 S.W.2d 494; Wrather v. Wrather, Tex.Civ.App., 154 S.W.2d 955; Echols v. Echols, Tex.Civ.App., 168 S.W.2d 282; Stratton v. Dewey, Tex., 79 F. 32; Davis v. McCray Refrigerator Sales Corporation, 136 Tex. 296, 150 S.W.2d 377.

  5. Grayson v. Johnson

    181 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944)   Cited 4 times

    After entry of the agreed judgment, there was no further contingency upon the happening of which the court might properly be required to perform any further judicial function in connection with the case and hence in our opinion the judgment was a definite and final adjudication of the issues there involved. Shawver v. Masterson, Tex. Civ. App. 65 S.W.2d 1111; Dodd et al. v. Daniel, Tex. Civ. App. 89 S.W.2d 494; Booth v. Amicable Life Ins. Co., Tex. Civ. App. 143 S.W.2d 836, er. dis., point 4 and authorities; Beam v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., Tex. Civ. App. 164 S.W.2d 412, er. ref.; De Zavala v. Scanlan, Tex.Com.App., 65 S.W.2d 489. Appellants further contend that their asserted cause of action constituted a direct attack upon the prior judgment and entitled them to the relief presently sought because it was a proceeding in equity instituted in the same court which rendered such judgment for the purpose of securing injunctive relief and of correcting that part of the judgment which erroneously decreed a foreclosure of a lien against homestead property.

  6. Hightower v. Kellam

    118 S.W.2d 657 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938)   Cited 1 times

    It is, moreover, our duty to dismiss the appeal upon our own motion when the record discloses that we have no jurisdiction. Secrest v. Ledbetter, supra; Kosse National Bank v. Derden, Tex. Civ. App. 36 S.W.2d 295; Dodd v. Daniel, Tex. Civ. App. 89 S.W.2d 494. It is accordingly ordered that this appeal be, and same is, dismissed.

  7. Secrest v. Ledbetter

    106 S.W.2d 740 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937)   Cited 4 times

    Kosse National Bank v. Derden (Tex. Civ. App.) 36 S.W.2d 295, 296, pars. 1 to 4, inclusive, and authorities there cited; Dodd v. Daniel, (Tex. Civ. App.) 89 S.W.2d 494, par. 1. The appeal in this case is therefore dismissed.