See Horton, 591 S.W.3d 567; Perry, 272 S.W.3d at 587. Stovall relies on Dodd v. City of Beverly Hills, 78 S.W.3d 509, 512 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, pet. denied) to argue it is not permissible for Horton to fully rebrief her appeal on remand. But the court in Dodd did not decide anything about briefing on remand because the case was not before the court on remand.
When the motion gives notice of the matters on which a nonmovant must produce some evidence, the motion is legally sufficient. See Dodd v. City of Beverly Hills, 78 S.W.3d 509, 513 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, pet. denied). "[Rule 166a(i)] does not, however, require that the motion specifically attack the 'evidentiary components that may prove an element of the cause of action.'"
The remark of Parker, C. J., in Rundlett v. Dole, 10 N.H. 465, is a mere dictum. We cite Lampson v. Arnold, 19 Iowa 479, 483, 487, 489, 490; Bates v. Coe, 10 Conn. 280, 283, 290, 293; Dodd v. Hills, 21 Kan. 707. We are aware that in the later case of Van Patten v. Burr, 52 Iowa 518, the court repudiated some of the views expressed in Lampson v. Arnold. But even then they did not go to the extent of holding an assignment invalidated by a previous payment, but undertook carefully to distinguish (p. 523) between paying a debt and giving a mortgage to secure it.
The purpose of the specificity requirement is to provide the opposing party with fair notice of the matters on which it must produce some evidence. See Dodd v. City of Beverly Hills, 78 S.W.3d 509, 513 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, pet. denied). But the motion does not have to include a specific attack on the evidentiary components that make up an element of a claim.
See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i); Ortiz, 203 S.W.3d at 425; see also Dodd v. City of Beverly Hills, 78 S.W.3d 509, 513 (Tex. App.-Waco 2002, pet. denied) (purpose of specificity requirement is to provide opposing party fair notice of elements on which it must produce some evidence); Dominguez v. Payne, 112 S.W.3d 866, 868 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.) (specific attack on the evidentiary components not necessary for no evidence motion for summary judgment). Summary judgment was proper on all of Flanagan's alleged causes of action.
Rogers bore the burden of proof in the trial court to show that the City's notice did not meet the requirements of the Open Meetings Act. See Dodd v. City of Beverly Hills, 78 S.W.3d 509, 514 n. 4 (Tex.App.-Waco 2002, pet denied); Swate v. Medina Cmty. Hosp., 966 S.W.2d 693, 697 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. denied). When a party attacks the legal sufficiency of an adverse finding on an issue on which it has the burden of proof, that party must demonstrate on appeal that the evidence establishes, as a matter of law, all vital facts in support of the issue.
The purpose of the specificity requirement is to provide the opposing party with fair notice of the matters on which it must produce some evidence. See Dodd v. City of Beverly Hills, 78 S.W.3d 509, 513 (Tex.App.-Waco 2002, pet. denied). The motion does not have to include a specific attack on the evidentiary components that make up an element of a claim.
We apply the same standard in reviewing a no-evidence summary judgment as we would in reviewing a directed verdict. Dodd v. City of Beverly Hills, 78 S.W.3d 509, 512 (Tex.App.-Waco 2002, pet. denied). We review the summary-judgment evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, disregarding all contrary evidence and inferences.