D.C. Code § 23-110(e) states, "The court shall not be required to entertain a second or successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner." We have often and consistently upheld the denial of a second or successive § 23-110 motion without a hearing, at least in the absence of a showing of cause and prejudice, which appellant has not made. See, e.g., Washington v. United States, 834 A.2d 899, 902-904 (D.C. 2003) (citing cases); Dobson v. United States, 815 A.2d 748, 758 (D.C. 2003);Matos v. United States, 631 A.2d 28, 31 (D.C. 1993); Vaughn v. United States, 600 A.2d 96, 97 (D.C. 1991). A motion is "successive" if it raises claims identical to those raised and denied on the merits in a prior motion. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 444 n. 6, 106 S.Ct. 2616, 91 L.Ed.2d 364 (1986); see Vaughn, 600 A.2d at 97.
Appellant argues that there should be no procedural bar to his second § 23-110 motion either because the new evidence "is so strong that [the] court cannot have confidence in the outcome of the trial," or because there was cause and prejudice for failure to raise the claim in the first § 23-110 motion. See Dobson v. United States, 815 A.2d 748, 758 (D.C. 2003) (quotation marks omitted). As explained above, however, the evidence presented in support of appellant's IPA motion does not support his claim of actual innocence, nor can appellant show cause for failure to raise this argument of ineffective assistance of counsel in his first § 23-110 motion.
We "accept the trial court's factual findings unless they lack evidentiary support in the record," but we review the trial court's legal conclusions de novo. See Dobson v. United States, 815 A.2d 748, 755 (D.C. 2003). We are satisfied, as was the trial court, that defense counsel's decision not to have the purported alibi witnesses testify at trial was "reasonable considering all of the circumstances."